




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ŚLĄSKI KWARTALNIK HISTORYCZNY SOBÓTKA



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ŚLĄSKI
KWARTALNIK HISTORYCZNY
SOBÓTKA

**TIMES OF PROSPERITY AND STAGNATION
IN THE ECONOMY OF SILESIA IN PAST CENTURIES**

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EDITORIAL

The fourth English-language special issue of the “Silesian Historical Quarterly Sobótka”, is devoted to economic issues. The subject of the authors’ analyses was the economic basis for the region’s development in recent centuries. In the studies presented here, the problems of internal and external opportunities as well as limitations to Silesia’s participation in European trade were accentuated. They were mainly framed in the context of its changing state-political affiliation. Particular attention was paid to the modernising transformations and also crises in Silesia between 1815 and 1945, as well as to the constant presence of economic issues in the post-war historiographical discourse in both Poland and Germany. Separate treatment was given to issues relating to the end of many years of warfare on a global scale and with long-term repercussions within the European continent, without neglecting to consider the process of reconstruction of the region and its development after the Second World War.

The volume opens with an article “The economic history of Silesia in the Polish-German academic dialogue after 1945 (overview)” by Leszek Belzyt. The author focuses on the presence of Silesian themes and the ways in which they were interpreted in Polish and German historiography after the end of the Second World War. The situation at the time was peculiar, because in Poland and East Germany the canons of Marxist historiography were being introduced, while in West Germany, the traditions of pre-war, so-called Eastern research (*Ostforschung*) were generally continued. A review of the studies shows that national antagonisms only weakened after 1989.

The next text “Economic and social impact of the Prussian Army in Silesia in the years 1815–1848. State of research and research postulates” by Jacek Jędrysiak, introduces 19th-century topics and deals with the issue of the impact of the Prussian army on the economy of Silesia and its inhabitants, in the period of the so-called Vienna Order. The issue, hitherto ignored by historians, substantively brings considerable informative potential, mainly in showing the manifestations of the interaction between the military and society in times of peace.

The next two studies concern the interwar period, situating themselves in the reality of Silesia, which has been divided into German and Polish parts since 1922. The first by Tomasz Przerwa, titled “Lower Silesia looks to the future. The project

of Wrocław – Kłodzko County motorway (1927–1932) as part of the provincial authorities’ modernization plans” focuses on the project to build a motorway linking Wrocław, the provincial capital, with the Kłodzko region, which would allow easier access to the resort and tourist centres located in the Sudetes. The bold modernisation plan, discussed in the late 1920s and early 1930s, nevertheless failed to materialise. Mainly due to a lack of sufficient funds, although it was part of the trend at the time to develop public infrastructure as a method of combating unemployment. The second study by Marcin Smierz titled “The contribution of the Polish coal mining industry to the economy of interwar Europe”, concerns the Polish part of Upper Silesia and the role of the local coal mines as suppliers of raw materials in Poland and to European markets. These mines, although operating in the new political and social realities, were economically successful, albeit with difficulty, and the statistics quoted above attest to this. They also prove that Polish mines were paving the way to customers in various parts of Europe, competing in sales with exporters from Britain and Germany. A different subject is presented by Tomasz Głowiński, whose article “Provincial city or regional capital? Concepts and barriers to the rebuilding of Wrocław in 1945–1947 from wartime destruction” deals with the scale of the war damage to Wrocław and the process of rebuilding the city and its slow return to normal functioning. The author then discusses the problem of deciding on a concept for the future development of the city, seeing it – regardless of the scale of wartime destruction – as one of several major metropolises in post-war Poland.

A Miscellaneum accompanying the thematic articles, titled “Economic and social situation in Wrocław and Silesia before the Second World War – a document from the Wrocław archive”, is presented by Teresa Kulak. It relates to a fragment of a file preserved in the State Archives in Wrocław, which was created as a result of a decree, issued on 1st February 1939 by Hitler, on assistance from the Reich authorities to the eastern provinces of Germany, in connection with the imminent outbreak of war. In the document presented, the authorities of Wrocław (Breslau) recalled the many years of systemic deficiencies and negligence of previous governments in the city’s economy, while at the same time expecting economic changes and the creation of the “Greater Germany” announced by Hitler. They approved of the project to build the Oder-Danube canal and the motorway network, seeing it as beneficial to integrate Silesia, situated on the south-eastern edge of the Reich, into the modern system of goods and passenger traffic in the vast area of

Eastern Europe. It was clear that its capture and further development meant war, which, however, was approvingly and neutrally described as ‘expansion to the south and east of Europe’.

As in the article part, the discussions and reviews present a diverse range of topics. One of the reviews concerns research on settlement in medieval Silesia from the perspective of socio-economic history (W. Mrozowicz), while other reviews were dominated by texts on publications in the field of 20th-century history. Among them, the issue of the contemporary economic identity of Upper Silesians (Wanda Musialik), the economic development of Silesia in the years 1936–1956 (Paweł Jaworski), treated as valuable for the post-war breakthrough period, were both assessed. The case of the return of Polish workers from France after the war was also covered (Monika Piotrowska-Marchewa). A separate topic is the history of crafts (Michał Dalidowicz), functioning in the new economic conditions in Poland in recent years. The volume closes with a discussion (by Elżbieta Kościk) of “Wrocław Meetings with Economic History”, a long-standing series of academic conferences organised by the Institute of History at the University of Wrocław.

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THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF SILESIA IN THE POLISH-GERMAN ACADEMIC DIALOGUE AFTER 1945 (OVERVIEW)

HISTORIA GOSPODARCZA ŚLĄSKA W POLSKO-NIEMIECKIM DIALOGU PO 1945 R. (ZARYS PROBLEMATYKI)

ABSTRACT: The impressive development of industry in Silesia was reflected in many works of Polish and German historians after 1945. Differences in assessments are generally small, and those that do exist are mainly due to different national positions. These differences relate in particular to the crisis situation after 1918 and the division of Upper Silesia. After 1989, evaluations of this kind occur incidentally, and rather just in publications of a popular-science character.

KEYWORDS: history of historiography, Silesia, industrialisation, German-Polish relations

The differences that appeared in academic studies in Poland and Germany between 1949 and 1989 were mainly due to different national approaches. This is a thesis that we will try to prove by quoting a broader fragment of Henryk Olszewski's statement from 2006: "Historiography", wrote a well-known researcher of Polish-German relations, "expresses collective memory, is like the oxygen that nations breathe [...] In particular, the historiography of neighbouring countries is sometimes exposed to the temptation of one-sided or even tendentious approaches; by willingly using myths and stereotypes, it manifests complexes, is biased, and when faced with tasks directed towards it from outside the sphere of science, it wants to be an advocate of *raisons d'état*, and subordinates itself to pressure from

public opinion and pressure from politicians. The history of historiography of German-Polish relations can serve as a clinical example¹. A fragment of them, i.e. the Polish-German historical dialogue on the economic history of Silesia conducted after 1945, should be divided into several time sections and into many thematic areas. In its short outline presented here, not all of these aspects can be addressed with due diligence. Thus, the focus was on the issue related to the industrialisation of Silesia, while refraining from a similar presentation of agriculture, forestry, crafts and trade, which also developed rapidly in the 19th and 20th centuries, i.e. in the period when industrialisation decided about the region's large-scale economic transformation and acceleration of its civilizational development.

When speaking about agriculture, it is worth mentioning that in the 19th century, in the Silesian countryside, there was almost a revolutionary transition to a capitalist economy, which took place as a result of enfranchisement reforms and the modernisation process. Large land estates and farms of rich peasants gradually introduced crop rotation, used machines and artificial fertilizers. This led to a significant increase in yields per hectare of cereal crops, potatoes and industrial plants (rape, flax, sugar beet)². With regard to these then new crops, it should be added that the cultivation of flax and also sheep farming was gradually regressing, due to competition from imported cotton. On the other hand, the cultivation of sugar beet, processed in more and more numerous sugar factories, was growing rapidly. Alongside them, a modernised food industry was being set up, especially breweries, distilleries, mills and dairies. At that time agriculture, as well as the food industry, had to cope with numerous crises – including the deepest economic collapses in 1840s and the 1870s, when the global agrarian crisis appeared. Generally speaking, in the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, agricultural production increased very rapidly, and differences in the opinions of Polish and German historians on this issue are practically imperceptible³.

¹ Henryk Olszewski, *Klaus Zernack i jego filozofia historii stosunków niemiecko-polskich*, [in:] Klaus Zernack, *Niemcy–Polska: z dziejów trudnego dialogu historiograficznego*, Poznań 2006, p. 9.

² See e.g. Reinhard Krämer, *Die schlesische Wirtschaft vom ihren Anfängen bis zur Industrialisierung*, [in:] Joachim Bahlcke, *Schlesien und die Schlesier*, München 2000, p. 239. In 1800–1930, the productivity of cereals per hectare doubled and yields increased 2–3 times (for wheat even 8 times). The author stresses that the years 1890–1914 in the area of grain and potato cultivation in Silesia were among the most beneficial (as was the development of industry).

³ See e.g. Kazimierz Popiołek, *Śląskie dzieje*, Warszawa–Kraków 1976, pp. 160–161, 164, 213; Arno Herzig, *Geschichte Schlesiens. Vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart*, München 2015,

In the “socialist” period, before German reunification, a distinction must be made between the historical Polish-East German dialogue and the Polish-West German dialogue. The latter, before the signing and ratification of the Warsaw Agreement of December 1970, was clearly unilateral on both sides, so it can hardly be called a dialogue. Each of them made their own statements, presented their own arguments, criticised the researchers of the opposite side and reviewed their publications severely. Mutual personal contacts have been possible since 1971, however, they were relatively rare at that time. The cooperation within the framework of the so-called textbook commission deserves a mention in this period⁴. There was hardly any discussion with East German historians, and H. Olszewski noted that in the first post-war decades “probably the only common particularity of the historical sciences in Poland and West Germany was the unanimous ignoring of unilateral hard-hitting trends in texts published in the GDR”⁵. After the political changes and the reunification of Germany, the conditions for a rapprochement of positions were created. This was all the more possible especially in the 21st century, when the older generation, ‘burdened’ with previously fierce discussion.

In presenting the position of West German historians regarding the industrialisation of Silesia in the 19th and 20th centuries, we must draw attention to a research direction called *Ostforschung* (research of the East). The leading figure of the Silesian *Ostforschung* was Hermann Aubin (1885–1969), professor at the University of Breslau (Wrocław) until 1945. He was not a member of the NSDAP during the Nazi period, but was one of the party’s sympathisers who worked scientifically for totalitarian ideology. After the war he continued his academic career and after 1949 he played an important role in the institutional rebuilding of the history

p. 71; Hans-Jakob Tebarth, *Technischer Fortschritt und sozialer Wandel in deutschen Ostprovinzen Ostpreußen, Westpreußen und Schlesien im Zeitalter der Industrialisierung*, Berlin 1991, pp. 186–187; Marek Czapliński, *Dzieje Śląska od 1806 do 1945*, [in:] Marek Czapliński, Elżbieta Kaszuba, Gabriela Wąs, Rościślaw Żerelik, *Historia Śląska*, Wrocław 2002, pp. 268, 310; Piotr Pregiel, Tomasz Przerwa, *Dzieje Śląska*, Wrocław 2005, p. 127; Teresa Kulak, *Dolny Śląsk w latach 1806–1918*, [in:] *Dolny Śląsk. Monografia historyczna*, ed. Wojciech Wrzesiński, Wrocław 2006, pp. 435–436.

⁴ The Polish-West German Commission for School Textbooks on History and Geography was established in 1972. Its activities have been somewhat forgotten, and the achievements in the field of scientific dialogue were, after all, very large. The Recommendations were published in 1977. In both countries in 300,000 copies. See e.g. *Empfehlungen für Schulbücher der Geschichte und Geographie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Volksrepublik Polen, Internationales Jahrbuch für Geschichts- und Geographieunterricht*, vol. 17, Braunschweig 1977, pp. 155–184.

⁵ Olszewski, Klaus Zernack, p. 17. Cf. also Christoph Kleßmann, *DDR-Historiker und “imperialistische Ostforschung”*, “Deutschland-Archiv”, 35 (2002), 1, pp. 13–31.

science in West Germany. In 1950, he was, among others, the founder of the Herder Institute in Marburg and president of its Research Council until 1959, and the publisher of the scholarly journal “Zeitschrift für Ostforschung” (1952–1966), the most important body of Eastern research in West Germany. The creator of Aubin’s academic biography, Eduard Mühle, was very critical of his social activities and in fact repeated the Polish accusations against him of scientific bias – the use of science for political, nationalist purposes⁶. Eduard Mühle described Hermann Aubin’s attitude in the Nazi period as affirmative and cooperative⁷.

Another representatives of the Silesian *Ostforschung* were Ludwig Petry (1908–1991) and Josef Joachim Menzel (born in 1933 in Upper Silesia). The former was a doctoral student of Herman Aubin, a member of the SA since 1933 and of the NSDAP since 1937. Even before the war he worked as an assistant professor at the University of Breslau and from 1950 to 1973 as a professor at the University of Mainz. He was also co-publisher of the “Zeitschrift für Ostforschung”. Despite his Nazi past, he is still considered to be a precursor of research on Silesia in West Germany. Josef J. Menzel was Petry’s assistant and then took up his post as a professor in Mainz in 1972. Like his predecessor, he studied, above all, medieval history. All three of them published a total of three volumes of the history of Silesia, which were reprinted unchanged still in 2000⁸.

The current researchers in the history of Silesia are mainly Arno Herzig and Joachim Bahlcke. Arno Herzig (born 1937 in Albendorf / Wambierzyce) is not considered to be part of the *Ostforschung* trend, because this research direction has clearly taken on a negative character, which has long been pointed out by Polish and East German historians⁹, and for some time now, this has also been emphasised by

⁶ Cf. Eduard Mühle, *Für Volk und Deutschen Osten. Der Historiker Hermann Aubin und die deutsche Ostforschung*, Düsseldorf 2005 (Schriftenreihe des Bundesarchiv, 65). Eduard Mühle was Director of the Herder Institute in Marburg from 1995 to 2002 and Director of the German Historical Institute in Warsaw from 2008 to 2013 – a very important institution for the cooperation of historians from Poland and Germany.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 625: “affirmativ-kollaborativ” in German.

⁸ *Geschichte Schlesiens*, vol. 1: *Von der Urzeit bis zum Jahre 1526*, eds. Ludwig Petry and Hermann Aubin, Sigmaringen 1990; *Geschichte Schlesiens*, vol. 2: *Die Habsburger Zeit 1526–1740*, eds. Ludwig Petry, Josef J. Menzel, Sigmaringen 1990; *Geschichte Schlesiens*, vol. 3: *Preußisch-Schlesien 1740–1945, Österreichisch-Schlesien 1740–1918/1945*, ed. Josef J. Menzel, Stuttgart 1999.

⁹ It is difficult to describe here the complexity of the *Ostforschung* problem. A comprehensive and accurate analysis of it can be found in: Eduard Mühle, “*Ostforschung*”. *Beobachtungen zu Aufstieg und Niedergang eines geschichtswissenschaftlichen Paradigmas*, “Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung”, 46 (1997), pp. 317–350. From older Polish literature, see e.g. Gerard Labuda, *Stare i nowe tendencje w historiografii zachodniemieckiej*, “Przegląd Zachodni”, 1956, pp. 224–252;

historians of the united Germany¹⁰. This is due to the fact that Arno Herzig has a very open approach to the history of his homeland and cooperates with Polish researchers¹¹. In his history of Silesia, he is very critical of the Nazi rule, and his assessments are devoid of any nationalist, anti-Polish accents, even when describing the Silesian uprisings and the division of Upper Silesia in 1921¹².

Joachim Bahlcke is much younger (born in 1963), but like the ones mentioned earlier, he is engaged in the organisational activities of historical institutions, including those connected with the history of Silesia, such as the Historical Commission for Silesia (Historische Kommission für Schlesien) and Herder-Institut. He regularly cooperates with Polish and Czech researchers, but it should be admitted that his history *Schlesien und Schlesier*, translated into Polish as *Śląsk i Ślązacy (Silesia and Silesians)*¹³, was written primarily for the “expellees” and he considers rather those who left the area after 1945 to be Silesians¹⁴. On the

Jacek Sobczak, *Przegląd ważniejszych ośrodków tzw. Ostforschung w NRF*, “Przegląd Zachodni”, 1959, pp. 439–461; Wacław Długoborski, *Śląsk w oczach zachodniemieckiej Ostforschung*, Katowice 1962; Józef Szłapeczyński, Tadeusz Walichnowski, *Nauka w służbie ekspansji i rewizjonizmu (Ostforschung)*, Warszawa 1969. In East Germany, there was a special institute for research on the “imperialist *Ostforschung*”. See Hans Elsner, *Abteilung für Geschichte der imperialistischen Ostforschung*, [in:] *Osteuropa in der historischen Forschung der DDR*, vol. 1: *Darstellungen*, ed. Manfred Hellmann, Düsseldorf 1972, s. 123–131.

¹⁰ See e.g. Mühle, “*Ostforschung*”; Karl Arne, *Das Erbe der Ostforschung. Zur Rolle Göttingens in der Geschichtswissenschaft der Nachkriegszeit*, Marburg 2002 and the review of the recent work: Hans-Christian Petersen, Rezension zu: Karl Arne, *Das Erbe der Ostforschung. Zur Rolle Göttingens in der Geschichtswissenschaft der Nachkriegszeit*, Marburg 2002, “H-Soz-Kult”, 12 XIII 2003, www.hsozkult.de/publicationreview/id/reb-5032 (access: 22 XII 2019). Among the West German historians who tried to change the character of Eastern research as early as the 1950s and 1960s, the following are mentioned Walter Schlesinger, Eugen Lemberg, Christoph Kleßmann, Klaus Zernack, Gotthold Rhode, then also Hans Hennig Hahn and Rudolf Jaworski.

¹¹ Arno Herzig, Krzysztof Ruchniewicz, Małgorzata Ruchniewicz, *Śląsk i jego dzieje*, Wrocław 2012.

¹² Herzig, *Geschichte Schlesiens*, pp. 88–91.

¹³ Joachim Bahlcke, *Śląsk i Ślązacy*, transl. Michał Misiorny, Zofia Rybicka, Warszawa 2001.

¹⁴ *Idem*, *Schlesien und die Schlesier*; In fact, this is a collective work of 6 authors, and part of Joachim Bahlcke accounts for about 45% of the total. See the opinion of M. Czaplinski: “It turned out that one of the German histories of Silesia has been translated into Polish and widely distributed, a book by Joachim Bahlcke, *Śląsk i Ślązacy*. All the more so given that Professor Bahlcke, whom I know and respect, has written it for a specific reader. He wrote it for those who, as the Germans say, were expelled from these lands. [...] At many points, I cannot agree with Professor Bahlcke’s book. Professor Bahlcke, who is regarded as a modern historian, took a number of facts from literature from years that we don’t approve of, from German literature, especially from the inter-war or Nazi years”. For: Wojciech Trojanowski, *O „Historii Śląska” Marka Czaplńskiego*, http://web.archive.org/web/20120626030418/http://www.miastowroclaw.pl:80/index.php?option=com%20_content&view

cover of this publication a somewhat biased opinion (with an exclamation mark at the end) was quoted by Monika Glettler, professor at the University of Freiburg in 1994–2002 (review in the journal “Bohemia”): “Looking at the whole picture, the authors have achieved [...] a remarkable accomplishment, especially since the history of Silesia after World War II was proclaimed as the domain of Polish historiography, which by unilaterally emphasizing the links between Silesia and Poland tried to convey a false image of Polish continuation. Also for this reason this book is important!”¹⁵. Joachim Bahlcke also published a collective study on the history of Silesia¹⁶ and moreover, together with Dan Gawrecki and Ryszard Kaczmarek, *Historia Górnego Śląska (History of Upper Silesia)*, which established his position as an expert in the history of the Silesian region, cooperating with Polish and Czech researchers¹⁷.

It is worth noting at this point, at least in a few sentences, Klaus Zernack, one of the most eminent German researchers. He is the author and propagator of the term ‘negative Polenpolitik’, which indicates, in particular, Frederick II’s destructive policy towards the Rzeczypospolita and ‘undermines’ at the same time the myth of the ‘Great’ Frederick¹⁸. Zernack has educated many outstanding scholars who are also engaged in a positive historical dialogue with Polish researchers. In the 1970s, he participated in the work of the Polish-German Textbook Commission and publicly defended its conclusions in Germany. He also supported the departure of the Herder Institute in Marburg from the *Ostforschung* principles.

=[article&id=182:o-historii-lska-marka-czaplińskiego-&catid=14:%20artykuly&Itemid=98](#) (access: 22 XII 2019). J. Bahlcke’s name in the quote was “polonized”.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, last page on the book’s wrapper: “Aufs Ganze gesehen ist den Autoren ... eine höchst bemerkenswerte Leistung geglückt, zumal die Geschichte Schlesiens nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg zu einer Domäne der polnischen Geschichtswissenschaft erklärt wurde, die durch das einseitige Hervorheben der Verbindungen Schlesiens mit Polen ein falsches Bild polnischer Kontinuität vermitteln wollte. Auch deshalb kommt diesem Buch eine wichtige Bedeutung zu!”. Transl. L. C. Belzyt.

¹⁶ *Historische Schlesienforschung. Methoden, Themen und Perspektiven zwischen traditioneller Landesgeschichtsschreibung und moderner Kulturwissenschaft*, ed. Joachim Bahlcke, Köln–Weimar–Wien 2005.

¹⁷ *Historia Górnego Śląska. Polityka, gospodarka i kultura europejskiego regionu*, eds. Joachim Bahlcke, Dan Gawrecki, Ryszard Kaczmarek, Gliwice 2011. This study was highly rated by Marek Czaplinski in his review: “it increases knowledge [...] of the history of Upper Silesia, free from political, ethnic or religious prejudice”. See: <http://frodo.com.pl/portfolio/na-papierze/publikacje-ksi%C4%85%C5%BCkowie/historia.html> (access: 22 XII 2019).

¹⁸ Cf. e.g. Zernack, *Niemcy-Polska; idem, Preußen – Deutschland – Polen. Aufsätze zur Geschichte der deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen*, eds. Wolfram Fischer, Michael G. Müller, Berlin 1991 (*Historische Forschungen*, 44).

After World War II, several studies on the history of Silesia were published in Poland. The first of these, by Kazimierz Piwowarski, was published as early as 1947¹⁹. Next, there were publications by Kazimierz Popiołek²⁰ and the team led by Stanisław Michalkiewicz²¹. All of them, published during the period of real socialism, sinned by a more or less pro-Polish and anti-German attitude. However, in many areas – this is especially true of the collective work under the direction of Stanisław Michalkiewicz – they are very solid and astonishing in their meticulousness, but without exception they consider Silesia (sometimes even East Prussia) to be the Prussian partition and promote the ‘liberation’ of Silesia in 1945²².

After 1990, those historians who tried to present the German-Polish relations of the past in a reliable way also increasingly often made their voices heard in Poland. At that time, several monographs on the history of Silesia were prepared. In 2002, *Historia Śląska (History of Silesia)* was published by Marek Czapliński, Elżbieta Kaszuba, Gabriela Wąs and Rościsław Żerelik²³. Three years later, Piotr Pregiel and Tomasz Przerwa published a popular (and shorter) study²⁴, and in 2006 a monograph on Lower Silesia edited by Wojciech Wrzesiński²⁵ was released. These works demonstrate – in comparison with the previously mentioned ones – objectivity and try not to expose the pro-Polish interpretation of the history of the Silesian province²⁶. Marek Czapliński, said, for example: “The Polish-German national struggle spread into history, it spread into the study of history. Everyone

¹⁹ Kazimierz Piwowarski, *Historia Śląska w zarysie*, Katowice–Wrocław 1947.

²⁰ Kazimierz Popiołek, *Historia Śląska od pradziejów do 1945 roku*, Katowice 1972; Popiołek, *Śląskie dzieje*.

²¹ The history of Silesia (*Historia Śląska*) published by the Polish Academy of Sciences (Polska Akademia Nauk) consists of three volumes, of which we are interested here in two parts of volume 3: *Historia Śląska*, vol. 3: 1850–1918, part 1: 1850–1890, ed. Stanisław Michalkiewicz, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków–Gdańsk 1976, and *Historia Śląska*, vol. 3: 1850–1918, part. 2: 1891–1918, ed. Stanisław Michalkiewicz, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków–Gdańsk 1985.

²² See e.g. *Historia Śląska*, vol. 3, pp. 134, 148; Popiołek, *Śląskie dzieje*, pp. 503–509.

²³ Czapliński, Kaszuba, Wąs, Żerelik, *Historia Śląska*.

²⁴ Pregiel, Przerwa, *Dzieje Śląska*.

²⁵ *Dolny Śląsk. Monografia historyczna*, Wrocław 2006.

²⁶ See, e.g., review of *Historia Śląska*: Tomasz Jurek, Review: Marek Czapliński, Elżbieta Kaszuba, Gabriela Wąs, Rościsław Żerelik, *Historia Śląska*, Wrocław 2002, pp. 612, “Roczniki Historyczne”, 68 (2002), pp. 264–268. Its author severely assesses Żerelik’s part concerning the Middle Ages. He thinks that part of M. Czapliński (years 1806–1945) shows maximum objectivity, also with regard to difficult issues, such as the Silesian uprisings, the plebiscite, the expulsion of Germans after 1945 and the takeover of administration in the area by the Polish Catholic Church. He writes that M. Czapliński noted “specific protocols of discrepancies between the views of Polish and German researchers”. (p. 267).

had to prove to themselves what role they played, and they did not see what the other side had accomplished here"²⁷. To this list should be added a very balanced, five-volume work in English, *Cuius regio?*, which covered the entire history of Silesia, from around 1000 to 2000. It was edited in 2015 by Lucyna Harc, Przemysław Wiszewski and Rościśław Żerelik²⁸.

The Polish-German dialogue on the industrialisation of Silesia in the period up to 1945 was less conflicting than that on the whole of Silesian history. Differences of opinion in historical works appeared mainly in descriptions of the division of Upper Silesia in 1922. Additional discrepancies were noted in the assessment of periods of collapse, stagnation and prosperity in the industry and in the presentation of economic results in particular industries, which were not split according to the criteria of national researchers. They were more determined by the professionalism of the individual publications. It is worth presenting evaluations of several of the most important studies.

Hans-Jakob Tebarth based his work, published in 1991, mainly on the existing literature of the problem, including also the older one from the 19th century. He also made use of statistical data from the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, but completely skipped archival documents²⁹. He draws attention to the development of the textile industry after its crisis in the second quarter of the 19th century (the Silesian Weavers' Uprising in 1844), caused by the influx of cheaper goods from England. In the second half of the 19th century, this sector became the second largest and economically important in Silesia after heavy industry. The author lists

²⁷ Trojanowski, O „Historii Śląska” Marka Czaplńskiego.

²⁸ *Cuius regio? Ideological and Territorial Cohesion of the Historical Region of Silesia (c. 1000–2000)*, eds. Lucyna Harc, Przemysław Wiszewski, Rościśław Żerelik, vol. 1–5, Wrocław 2013–2015.

²⁹ H.-J. Tebarth refers, among others, to the work of a researcher of the Upper Silesian economy: Kurt Fuchs, *Vom Dirigismus zum Liberalismus. Die Entwicklung Oberschlesiens als preußisches Berg- und Hüttenrevier. Ein Beitrag zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte Deutschlands im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert*, Wiesbaden 1970; Kurt Fuchs, *Wirtschaftsgeschichte Oberschlesiens 1871–1945. Aufsätze*, Dortmund 1981. The lack of sources from the Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz in Berlin-Dahlem is particularly problematic for the part that deals with the ethnic structure of the eastern Prussian provinces. However, it must be acknowledged that this author avoids biased interpretations of statistical results. The picture he presents of the ethnic structure of East and West Prussia and Silesia without a proper correction of statistical data is far from reality. For example, he wrongly praises the 1861 census. See Tebarth, *Technischer Fortschritt*, p. 149. On this subject, see Leszek C. Belzyt, *Pruska statystyka językowa (1825–1911) a Polacy zaboru pruskiego, Mazur i Śląska*, Zielona Góra 2013.

a dozen or so centres, including Zielona Góra (Grünberg), but omits important regional centres such as Żagań (Sagan) and Nowa Sól (Neusalz an der Oder).

The period of initial industrialisation in the second half of the 18th century in Upper Silesia, supported by the Prussian government, is assessed by him rather low, and he points to the small number of mines and miners. He recognises, in turn, the development of ironworks in the area at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, caused by the demand from the army. He acknowledges Upper Silesia as the leading iron and steel producer in Prussia until the mid-19th century. It likewise highly values zinc mining and smelting – but he does so, in just two sentences: “Still in 1850, 50% of iron in the whole of Prussia was produced in Silesia, but after 1857 the production of the Ruhr region was already dominant”³⁰. Generally speaking, he states that the heavy industry of Upper Silesia was characterized by stagnation until the 1840s, and the situation changed after the construction of railway connections. At the same time, the metallurgical industry was switching en masse to coke, in the production of which Upper Silesia was also the leader, definitely ahead of the Ruhr area (only during the introduction of steam machines). The structurally unilateral development of industry in Upper Silesia (mainly semi-finished products were exported) caused deeper economic crises, as for example after 1873 (Gründerzeitkrise) and in 1882 and 1893³¹. Tebarth also mentions the significant participation of landowners in industrialisation, which he even considers to be somewhat negative, as it shows a lack of financiers and rich merchants among the burghers. He says that at the beginning of World War I as many as 7 of the 10 richest Germans came from Upper Silesia, headed by Count Henckel von Donnarsmarck, Duke von Pless and Duke von Hohenlohe³².

In the aforementioned study by J. Bahlcke, *Schlesien und Schlesier*, the economic issues was elaborated by Reinhard Krämer. He also drew attention to the fact that the breakthrough initiating the development of great industry in Upper Silesia took place in the middle of the 19th century, when the problem of communication was solved, i.e. the establishment of a network of railway connections³³. The industry in Upper Silesia only managed to survive the years of crisis, lasting from the Napoleonic Wars to the mid-1840s, thanks to the impressive development of the zinc industry.

³⁰ Tebarth, *Technischer Fortschritt*, pp. 189–190, 192: “In 1850, 50% of iron in the whole of Prussia was still being produced in Silesia, but after 1857 production in the Ruhr was already higher”.

³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 197.

³² *Ibidem*, p. 193.

³³ Krämer, *Die schlesische Wirtschaft*, p. 232.

In 1821, there were 33 zinc works there, and in the 1860s, already 40% of world production of this metal was produced there³⁴. He does not mention the severe crisis of 1830 and points out that the industrialisation of Silesia was a special case because of the involvement of large landowners. However, it was only the inflow of capital after 1871 – from contributions after Germany’s victory over France – enabled greater investment in Upper Silesia³⁵. He also pointed out the development of industry in the Wałbrzych–Nowa Ruda Basin (Walmburg / Waldenburg Neurode Becken), which – in his opinion – recorded a “breathhtaking development” after 1871, lasting until 1909. Annual coal output increased in the years 1850 to 1909, from 378,000 tonnes to 5.6 million tonnes³⁶. The third Silesian industrial centre was Wrocław (Breslau), the largest urban centre in eastern Germany. The Linke-Hofmann-Werke wagon factory, established in 1839, was the most significant plant there.

With regard to the division of Upper Silesia in 1922, he writes about “significant losses of German heavy industry”³⁷. However, he pointed out that in 1940 there was an increase in coal output in the whole of the already ‘united’ Upper Silesia, among other things thanks to modernisation³⁸. This view was supported by certain figures, but it was left without comment, so it sounds a little provocative to Poles³⁹. For the Third Reich, during the War, the economic importance of the region increased, as it was not bombed until 1945, so many industrial plants from western Germany, producing synthetic petrol and armaments, among other things, were moved to this region. R. Krämer also expressed the opinion that after the conquest of Upper Silesia by the Red Army on 30th January 1945 the economic and military fate (sic!) of the whole Germany was already determined⁴⁰.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 234.

³⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 235. On page 236, however, the author states that after 1871 German heavy industry remained in deep crisis for the next 20 years. This position differs from his earlier opinions and partly from his later ones!

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 237. This assessment is contrary to the viewpoint given on the previous page (p. 236).

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 241.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 243–244: “Eine wichtige Vorgabe erhielt die Bergwerksverwaltung Oberschlesiens im Frühjahr des Kriegsjahres 1940. Die Förderleistung auf den Zechen, die in der Friedenszeit noch bei 58 000 t täglich gelegen hatte, sollte möglichst schnell auf 100 000 t, später sogar auf 120 000 t gesteigert werden. Begleitet wurden diese Forderungen von einem umfassenden Modernisierungsprogramm, das die technischen Möglichkeiten des Untertagebetriebs auf den Zechen erweiterte”.

³⁹ The author refers to the work: Volker Hentschel, *Deutsche Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik 1815–1945*, Düsseldorf 1980, pp. 68–69.

⁴⁰ Krämer, *Die schlesische Wirtschaft*, p. 244.

Arno Herzig also outlines the process of industrialisation of Silesia and states that the Napoleon's continental blockade guaranteed a short period of prosperity for the textile industry, while the war of 1813–1814 caused a significant increase in production in Upper Silesian heavy industry⁴¹. After the opening of European markets in 1815, the Silesian economy found itself again in a structural crisis. It was only the railway connection to Upper Silesia in 1845 that caused the development of the local industry and the second largest basin in Germany emerged there⁴².

The development of weaving industry was stimulated by a Jewish industrialist, Salomon Kaufmann, who supplied 5 of his factories with modern weaving machines, whose production after 1851 brought Silesia to the leading position in Germany⁴³. A. Herzig points out, like other researchers, that large landowners were those who invested in industry. He notes this fact without any special assessment, but adds that they belonged to the richest families in Germany, but “their subjects in mines and estates were among the poorest”⁴⁴. Apart from the Upper Silesian Basin, he also mentions the Wałbrzych–Nowa Ruda Basin and states that in 1910, the former extracted 40 million tonnes of coal annually and the latter only about 6 million. In Lower Silesia, industry was mainly invested in by bourgeois merchants and financiers, so Wrocław and smaller towns were developing simultaneously, where machine, chemical, wood, ceramic, glass, paper, food and spirits industries were being established. In the Karkonosze Mountains (Riesengebirge) and Kłodzko Valley (Glatzer Kessel), the tourist and resort industry developed on a large scale⁴⁵.

Among the Polish researchers who represented the nationalist, sometimes also “Marxist” view of the history of Silesia, one can mention Kazimierz Popiołek, who regarded the whole of Silesia as “Polish lands”, according to the post-war canon of Polish “official” historiography⁴⁶. He stresses that in the mid-18th century coal mining in the Wałbrzych Basin was ten times higher than in Upper Silesia, and in 1800, still four times higher⁴⁷. In the Napoleonic period the local ironworks

⁴¹ Herzig, *Geschichte Schlesiens*, p. 72. The author does not explain this in more detail, but he probably meant iron and steel production and not the development of mining.

⁴² *Ibidem*, p. 73.

⁴³ *Ibidem*, p. 73.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 73, and p. 74, where he writes: “Als Großindustrielle und Großgrundbesitzer zählten die oberschlesischen Adligen zu den reichsten Familien in Deutschland, ihre Untertanen in den Gruben und auf den Gütern allerdings zu den ärmsten”.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 74.

⁴⁶ Popiołek, *Śląskie dzieje*, p. 164.

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 147.

worked for the army and soon Upper Silesia was the best developed economically “among Polish lands”⁴⁸. Later, English competition led to difficulties in selling, and it was only in the 1840s that the situation improved, thanks to the imposition of a duty by the Prussian state on imports of pig iron⁴⁹. Already in 1841, 40% of the pig iron in the Prussian state was produced in Upper Silesia, the situation was worse in steel production. The author estimates that the transition to coke was at a slower pace than in Western Europe⁵⁰, yet Tebarth has a different view on this issue, as mentioned earlier. K. Ash also expresses the opinion that in the first half of the 19th century “the decline of the Silesian textile industry continued and deepened”, although he partially contradicts this categorical statement on the following pages⁵¹. However, like other researchers, he points to the “serious development of Upper Silesian industry” in the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries. He determinates the crisis periods between 1857–1859, 1873–1875 and 1900–1902⁵². Nevertheless, looking at the longer term, he recognises that coal mining and the production of pig iron and steel has increased rapidly.

The Silesian Uprisings 1919–1920–1921 are evaluated very positively by Popiołek and he writes about the victorious Third Uprising, pointing out the political pressure and falsifications during the plebiscite on the German side. The division of Upper Silesia in 1922 was, in his opinion, partly unfair, as was seen also by some German researchers, but from a different perspective⁵³. He admits that the Polish side received most of the industrial potential of the Upper Silesian region, but since German ownership was still preserved there, the most disadvantaged part was the ‘masses of people’. Especially the Upper Silesian workers, whose social situation has not changed much in Poland. In the interwar period, “German capital played an extremely detrimental role in Poland in both the economic and national fields”⁵⁴. In turn, Zbigniew Kwaśny, who specialised in the research of Silesian industry, published a quite balanced study in 1983⁵⁵. He confirms many of the facts mentioned by K. Popiołek, and makes a factual analysis of the various branches of industry.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, p 209.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 165.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 166.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, p. 169.

⁵² *Ibidem*, p. 205. Likewise, in a previous publication: Popiołek, *Historia Śląska*, p. 209.

⁵³ *Ibidem*, pp. 352–361 and 371–372.

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 379.

⁵⁵ Zbigniew Kwaśny, *Rozwój przemysłu na Górnym Śląsku w pierwszej połowie XIX wieku*, Wrocław 1983.

In principle, the author is not interested in polemics with German researchers, so the work is devoid of particular anti-German accents. Z. Kwaśny highlighted the unilateral development of the Upper Silesian industry⁵⁶ and the particularly low level of working wages, as compared to other areas of Germany. However, he assessed it rather positively, because food commodities were also cheap there and so there was considerable stabilisation of real wages⁵⁷. Stanisław Michalkiewicz, in *Historia Śląska* vol. 3, also refers to industrial development and despite numerous anti-German accents in the whole volume, his analysis of the industrialisation process is extremely thorough and belongs to the most solid parts of the whole study. He stresses the diversity of industrial branches and the varied pace of both sectoral and territorial development. Like other researchers, S. Michalkiewicz points to the years of economic crises in 1873, 1890 and 1900–1903⁵⁸. He does not avoid certain inconsistencies in this regard, for example in the assessment of the time when 20 million tonnes of coal were mined in Upper Silesia⁵⁹.

In *Historia Śląska* under the editorship of Marek Czapliński from 2002, Gabriela Wąs points out that the policy of the Prussian state in the second half of the 18th century in Upper Silesia did not yield many results (Hans-Jakob Tebarth expressed a similar view) and more private landowners invested there. In 1806, the value of mining and metallurgy production represented only 10% of canvas production and 30% of cloth production⁶⁰. According to M. Czapliński, this intensive industrialisation of Silesia “is one of the most difficult epochs for the inhabitants of the province who were forced to switch from the feudal to the capitalist system at an accelerated pace”⁶¹. He notes that the Napoleonic continental blockade has brought more damage than the benefits for textile production (unlike Arno Herzig)⁶². He also stresses, like other researchers, that initially the driving force of heavy industry in Upper Silesia was the zinc metallurgy, which nevertheless experienced

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 267.

⁵⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 268.

⁵⁸ *Historia Śląska*, vol. 3, pp. 169–170.

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 169–171. In addition, he is no longer, rightly, considered Gubin (Guben) as part of Silesia, but includes Żary (Sorau) and Lubsko (Sommerfeld), which also undoubtedly belonged to Lower Lusatia.

⁶⁰ Gabriela Wąs, *Dzieje Śląska od 1526 do 1806 roku*, [in:] *Historia Śląska*, pp. 234–235.

⁶¹ Czapliński, *Dzieje Śląska od 1806 do 1945 roku*, p. 250.

⁶² *Ibidem*, p. 252.

a severe crisis in 1830 (62% decrease in production!)⁶³. The analysis of the process of economic development in the history of Silesia is very solid, as it draws attention to all major branches and even smaller industrial centres (such as Zielona Góra and Żagań) – not only the Upper Silesia, Wrocław and the Sudeten Industrial District (with the Wałbrzych–Nowa Ruda Basin). He describes the Silesian uprisings, the plebiscite and division of Upper Silesia without nationalistic accents⁶⁴. He stresses the really difficult economic situation of the German part of Silesia after 1921⁶⁵. His assessment of the internal situation during the Nazi period is characteristic and he claims that: “Poles are often inclined to see Germany of that time as one big concentration camp. The reality was more varied. Many Silesians benefited from the growing economic prosperity and could enjoy life”⁶⁶. M. Czapliński also stresses, like R. Krämer, that between 1940 and 1943 there was a significant increase in production in the “whole” Upper Silesia, but points out that this was due to slave labour of prisoners and forced labourers in “terrible conditions”⁶⁷.

Industrialisation is also mentioned by the authors of *Dzieje Śląska (History of Silesia)* from 2005, Piotr Pregiel and Tomasz Przerwa. Their work is not as detailed as the previously discussed publications. They also – like Marek Czapliński, among others – evaluate the Napoleon’s continental blockade as a very unfavourable phenomenon for the Silesian textile industry⁶⁸. Although the crises of the economy in the second half of the 19th century is not noticed in the book, it nevertheless draws attention to the most important problems of industrialisation in Silesia. It is an astonishingly balanced study, without any anti-German accents, and in the case of the Silesian Uprisings it highlights, among other things, cases of rape and terror on both sides⁶⁹. The division of Upper Silesia in 1922 is considered to be a success of the Polish side – due to obtaining the most of industry infrastructure and resources of coal, zinc ore, lead and iron⁷⁰. The authors do not write about the “liberation”

⁶³ *Ibidem*, p. 266. Similar opinion: Adam Frużyński, *Industrializacja Górnego Śląska do 1922 roku*, [in:] *Encyklopedia Województwa Śląskiego*, 2016, vol. 3, pp. 7–8, available online: [http://ibrbs.pl/mediawiki/index.php/Kategoria:Tom_3_\(2016\)](http://ibrbs.pl/mediawiki/index.php/Kategoria:Tom_3_(2016)) (access: 28 XII 2019).

⁶⁴ Czapliński, *Dzieje Śląska od 1806 do 1945 roku*, pp. 358–360.

⁶⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 366–367.

⁶⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 391.

⁶⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 409–410.

⁶⁸ Pregiel, Przerwa, *Dzieje Śląska*, p. 113.

⁶⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 144–147.

⁷⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 147.

of Silesia in 1945 (only for captives and prisoners)⁷¹, and they mention the “tragedy” of the Germans in 1945 in a very balanced way⁷².

In the monograph *Dolny Śląsk (Lower Silesia)* from 2006, Teresa Kulak took up the problem we are interested in. She presents the industrialisation in this area (i.e. without Upper Silesia) until 1918 in a concrete way and draws particular attention to the dominant role of the textile industry which developed in many centres. In the second half of the 19th century, it employed almost 24% of workers (the most in the “rebuilt”, after the crisis in the first half of the 19th century, linen branch)⁷³. Heavy industry (mining, machinery and metal industries) was the second most important sector, employing almost 17% of the workforce, and then, due to agriculture dominating in the Lower Silesian province, over 14% was employed by the food industry – especially sugar factories, distilleries and breweries⁷⁴. She also highlights the crisis during the First World War, when the arms industry in Lower Silesia, as well as the leather and tobacco industries developed for the needs of the military. However, the previously developing agricultural machinery industry was “forgotten” when men and horses were sent to the front, so most branches of industrial production suffered from a lack of raw materials and the population from a lack of food⁷⁵.

Teresa Kulak presented similar theses on the economic development of Silesia in one of the chapters of the five-volume work *Cuius regio?*. It should be added that she included Upper Silesia to her research. She drew attention to the protective policy of Frederick II and his successor, Frederick William II, in relation to the local mining and metallurgy. The latter was supported due to the needs of the army⁷⁶. This author also highlights the huge increase in zinc production in the first half of the nineteenth century (40 percent of the world production) and a very rapid increase in coal mining and steel production in the second half of this century. She also cites figures indicating the concentration of enterprises in these industries – the number of mines and ironworks was clearly decreasing, with rapidly increasing

⁷¹ *Ibidem*, p. 172.

⁷² *Ibidem*, pp. 173–176.

⁷³ Kulak, *Dolny Śląsk*, p. 431.

⁷⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 432–435.

⁷⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 463–465.

⁷⁶ Teresa Kulak, *The economy and socioeconomic processes in the Silesia region (from the mid-18th century to 1918)*, [in:] *Silesia under the Authority of the Hohenzollerns (1741–1918)*, eds. Lucyna Harc, Teresa Kulak, Wrocław 2015 (*Cuius regio? Ideological and Territorial Cohesion of the Historical Region of Silesia (c. 1000–2000)*, 3), pp. 73–74.

production and the number of workers⁷⁷. In the fourth volume of the aforementioned study, Miron Urbaniak in a very objective way, without national prejudices, shows the division of Silesia after World War I, noting that Poland had the largest part of the industrial potential. In addition, he points to numerous complications for all the countries in the area: Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland⁷⁸.

At the end of the reflection on the industrialisation of Silesia, it is worth noting the publication of Yaman Kouli, who takes an unusual approach to this question⁷⁹. This is a comparative work in the fields of history, sociology and economics (it also includes human capital management), and part of its title – “failed [industrial] reconstruction of Lower Silesia” – suggests a research conclusion from the very beginning. The main thesis of the author is that due to the displacement (the author speaks about the “expulsion”) of German professionals and workers in 1945–1950, new residents unfamiliar with industrial production arrived in Lower Silesia, so it was not possible to achieve the economic “miracle” till 1956, which marked itself in the economies of Western Europe. At the same time, it tries to prove that the destruction, robbery and dismantling in 1945 was not too great and could not have affected the failure of the post-war “reconstruction”. By emphasising the role of “human capital” in economic development, he underestimates the extent of economic losses in Lower Silesia. It also does not take into account the political and systemic conditions of the time, including the effects of the presence of Soviet troops, which were located in the Lower Silesian area. These circumstances could not have been conducive to economic development requiring decision-making autonomy, especially modernisation of industry. Jaromir Balcar, a reviewer of Yaman Kouli’s book, emphasises, first and foremost, that he overly absolutises his thesis on the “central importance of knowledge networking for production”, or in the original: “Zudem

⁷⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 89.

⁷⁸ Miron Urbaniak, *Integrating and disintegrating factors for the economy of Silesia in the interwar period*, [in:] *Region Divided. Times of Nation-States (1918–1945)*, eds. Marek Czapliński, Przemysław Wiszewski, Wrocław 2015 (Cuius regio? Ideological and Territorial Cohesion of the Historical Region of Silesia (c. 1000–2000), 4), pp. 70–72. The author consistently uses the names of places not only in Polish and German, but also in Czech.

⁷⁹ Yaman Kouli, *Wissen und nach-industrielle Produktion. Das Beispiel der gescheiterten Rekonstruktion Niederschlesiens 1936–1956*, Stuttgart 2014. Polish transl.: *idem*, *Dolny Śląsk 1936–1956. Szybki rozwój i nieudana odbudowa. Wpływ wiedzy na produkcję przemysłową*, transl. Tomasz Dominiak, Warszawa 2018.

verabsolutiert Kouli seine These von der Zentralen Bedeutung der Wissensnetzwerke für die Produktion”⁸⁰.

Polish and German historiographies after 1945 initially showed significant differences in the interpretation of Silesian history. They were connected, among others, with the continuation of the so-called *Ostforschung* trend in West Germany and, on the other hand, with the introduction of Marxist historiography in Poland and East Germany. It is clear that immediately after the war, there were strong anti-German nationalist accents in Poland, just like in the GDR there was a strong criticism of the ‘rematchism and imperialism’ of West German historians who ‘practised the *Ostforschung*’. After 1989, the positions of Polish and German historians are becoming increasingly similar, although assessing the pace of this convergence of views is more complicated. This is partly due to the fact that many historians on both sides of the Oder and Lusatian Neisse have already presented different attitudes, more open than the officially dominant ones. Even today, there are sometimes “traditional” attitudes and “national” statements. As an example of the latter, we can mention on the German side both the aforementioned publication by J. Bahlcke *Schlesien und Schlesier* and also the publications of the Federation of Expellees, e.g. Helmut Neubach’s 1996 publication⁸¹. On the Polish side, in turn, we can mention Stefan Mizi’s 1997 popular science booklet⁸². In it, Julian Janczak, “Instead of an introduction”, wrote unambiguously: “The author presents the Polish point of view on the past of the Silesian land, and let’s say it openly, although with great regret that lately it has not always been fashionable and well seen! A deep patriotism speaks through him...”⁸³.

As far as the industrialisation of Silesia is concerned, it should be stated that both Polish and German historians describe the processes taking place in Silesia

⁸⁰ Jaromir Balcar, Review: Kouli, Yaman, *Wissen und nach-industrielle Produktion. Das Beispiel der gescheiterten Rekonstruktion Niederschlesiens 1936–1956*, Stuttgart 2014, [in:] H-Soz-Kult, 19 II 2015, www.hsozkult.de/publicationreview/id/reb-21491 (access: 28 XII 2019).

⁸¹ Helmut Neubach, *Kleine Geschichte Schlesiens*, ed. Bund der Vertriebenen, Bonn 1996 (Kulturstelle Arbeitshefte, 24). He writes about the Silesian uprisings in quotation marks, about the great losses after the division of Upper Silesia in 1921 and about the “industrial basin torn apart by violence” (p. 14).

⁸² Stefan Mizia, *Historia Śląska. Popularny zarys dziejów*, Wrocław 1997. On the division of Upper Silesia in 1921, he writes that “as a result of German machinations” Poland was granted only 30% of the plebiscite area (p. 40). He does not mention anything about the results of the plebiscite, nor about granting Poland the vast majority of Upper Silesian industry. In his opinion, in 1945 the whole of “Silesia was liberated” (p. 41).

⁸³ *Ibidem*, p. 4.

during the 19th and early 20th centuries in a similar way. Apart from insignificant differences, they describe almost the same chronology of prosperity and crises that have affected heavy industry, textiles and other industries, and describe their causes in much the same way. The differences found in the studies are more often due to the degree of research soundness (it happens that, for example, the authors contradict themselves or approach the problem in a superficial way) than to nationality. Only on the issue of the division of Upper Silesia and its industrial potential in 1922 the evaluations are nationally differentiated, but – recently – without any more severe antagonistic accents. Thus, it can be concluded that the thesis put forward at the beginning of the article is basically correct in assessing the overall approach to the history of Silesia, but with regard to Polish-German analyses concerning the industrialisation of this district, it has only partially proved true. It is worth noting at the end that the differences in the opinions of Polish and German historians are most noticeable in publications from 1945–1989.

STRESZCZENIE

Historiografia polska i niemiecka po 1945 r. początkowo wykazywały znaczne różnice w interpretacji dziejów Śląska. Związane to było m.in. z kontynuacją w Niemczech Zachodnich nurtu tzw. *Ostforschung*, a z drugiej strony z wprowadzaniem historiografii marksistowskiej w Polsce i w Niemczech Wschodnich. W Polsce silne były nacjonalistyczne akcenty antyniemieckie, a w NRD ostro krytykowano „rewanżyzm i imperializm” historyków z RFN, którzy „uprawiali *Ostforschung*”. Po 1989 r. stanowiska historyków polskich i niemieckich coraz bardziej są podobne do siebie, chociaż problem tempa przemian jest sprawą bardziej skomplikowaną. Między innymi dlatego, że wielu historyków po obu stronach Odry i Nysy Łużyckiej już wcześniej prezentowało inne, bardziej otwarte, postawy od dominujących oficjalnie. Z drugiej strony i dzisiaj zdarzają się postawy „tradycyjne”, zabarwione „narodowo”. W sprawie uprzemysłowienia Śląska stwierdzić należy, że zarówno historycy polscy, jak i niemieccy w podobny sposób opisują występujące tam procesy w XIX i na początku XX w. Poza nieistotnymi różnicami prawie tak samo określają chronologię okresów koniunktury i kryzysów, które dotyczyły przemysłu ciężkiego, włókienniczego i inne, mniej istotne gałęzie, a ponadto podobnie opisują ich przyczyny. Występujące w opracowaniach dyferencje częściej wynikają ze stopnia solidności badawczej (kiedy np. autorzy sami sobie przeczą lub pobieżnie podchodzą do problemu) niż przynależności narodowej. Jedynie w sprawie podziału Górnego Śląska i jego potencjału przemysłowego w 1921 r. oceny zróżnicowane są narodowo, ale – ostatnio – bez ostrzejszych akcentów antagonistycznych.

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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY IN SILESIA IN THE YEARS 1815–1848. STATE OR RESEARCH AND RESEARCH POSTULATES

GOSPODARCZE I SPOŁECZNE ODDZIAŁYWANIE ARMII PRUSKIEJ NA ŚLĄSKU W LATACH 1815–1848. STAN BADAŃ I POSTULATY BADAWCZE

ABSTRACT: This study is an introduction to the subject of the Prussian army's impact on economic and social issues in the Province of Silesia in the years 1815–1848. The most important files on the relations between the army and the civilian population have been preserved in the records of Prussian ministries, offices and local authorities, stored in Polish and German archives. The aim of the text is to indicate a catalogue of the most important issues to be investigated, together with suggestions regarding the methods of their reconstruction. The text discusses the problems of the presence and functions of the Prussian army in Silesia and the catalogue of the benefits for the army.

KEYWORDS: Prussian army, Silesia, fortresses, mobilisation

The text presented here is of a postulative and introductory nature. In the Silesian historiography there are no studies on the economic and social implications of the Prussian military organisation in this province in the period from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to the outbreak of the March Revolution in 1848. In the context of the history of the Prussian army, this period has so far interested researchers basically only in connection with the figure of Carl von Clausewitz and the problem of the formation of the *Landwehr*, which was, however, basically limited to the caesura of 1819. The time of peace before 1914 did not receive the

recognition of the relevant institutions of the Prussian armed forces¹, which had a monopoly on the use of records of military character, so only a few studies now describe in detail the organisational changes that took place in the Prussian army during this period². The burning of the Potsdam *Heeresarchiv* in April 1945, as a result of a British air raid, caused the greatest damage to the files of individual brigades and regiments, of which only scraps have remained to this day³. This is probably best illustrated by the example of the VI Army Corps (hereinafter: AC) stationed in Silesia, from whose files only a few of the Commissariat have survived in the collection of the State Archives in Wrocław⁴.

Fragmentary information on economic and social conditions of the Prussian army presence in Silesia can be found today in several categories of studies. The first are monographs on particular regiments stationed in this province, which are based on source material not available today. They are often the only reports allowing for any reference to the interaction of the Prussian army with the civilian population in peacetime, despite the fact that these issues were obviously less important for the authors of the time than the descriptions of the military superiority of the regiments presented⁵. Relevant information is also often found in monographs of individual fortress towns, but the period 1815–1848, which I am interested in, is usually absent or treated in a cursory manner⁶. Monographs on

¹ Curt Jany, *Die preußischen Militärarchive*, “Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preußischen Geschichte”, 1924, pp. 67–86; Hans Umbreit, *Von der preußisch-deutschen Militärgeschichtsschreibung zur heutigen Militärgeschichte, I. Teilstreitkraft Heer*, [in:] *Geschichte und Militärgeschichte. Wege der Forschung*, ed. Ursula von Gersdorff, Frankfurt am Main 1974, pp. 33–49.

² Curt Jany, *Geschichte der Königlich Preussischen Armee vom 15. Jahrhundert bis 1914*, vol. 4: *Die Königlich Preussische Armee und das Deutsche Reichsheer 1807 bis 1914*, Berlin 1933, pp. 115–214; Otto von der Osten-Sacken und von Rhein, *Preußens Heer. Von seinen Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*, vol. 2, *Die neue Armee. Bis zur Armee Reorganisation 1859/60*, Berlin 1912, pp. 181–371; Dierk Walter, *Preussische Heeresreformen 1807–1870: militärische Innovationen und der Mythos der “Roonschen Reform”*, Paderborn–Wien–München 2003.

³ Heinrich Otto Meisner, Georg Winter, *Übersicht über die Bestände des Geheimen Staatsarchivs zu Berlin-Dahlem*, part. 2: *II.–IX. Hauptabteilung*, Leipzig 1935 (Mitteilungen der preussischen Archiv-Verwaltung, 25), pp. 130, 157.

⁴ Only 40 archival units.

⁵ E.g. *Geschichte des 1. Oberschlesischen Infanterie-Regiments Nr. 22 von seiner Gründung bis zum Gegenwart*, Berlin 1884; Adolf Tiersch, *Geschichte des Schlesischen Pionierbataillons Nr. 6*, Leipzig 1904; A. von Tronchin, M. Naumann, *Geschichte des Infanterie-Regiments von Winterfeldts (2. Oberschlesisches)*, Berlin 1913; Hans von Wechmar, *Braune Husaren. Geschichte des braunen Husaren-Regiments der friederizianischen Armee 1742–1807 und des jetzigen Husaren-Regiments von Schill (1. Schlesischen) Nr. 4 1807–1893*, part. 2, Berlin 1893.

⁶ Np. Tomasz Grudziński, *Między twierdzą a miastem. Obraz życia miejskiego Świdnicy w latach 1815–1870*, Wrocław–Świdnica 2014; Wiesław Maciuszczak, *Twierdza Głogów*:

garrison towns other than fortresses⁷, as well as works on the economic history of Silesia are of surprisingly little use. In all of them, the aspect of the presence of the military remains a completely marginal issue.

With the above in mind, I would like to propose an initial ordering of this area, by indicating a catalogue of the most important issues to be investigated, together with suggestions regarding the methods of their reconstruction. Due to the volume restrictions of the text, this will only be an introduction to the subject matter, covering the issues of the presence and function of the Prussian army in Silesia and the extent of the province's benefits to the army.

The role of the army in the Province of Silesia

In the years 1814–1820 the peacetime structure of the Prussian army was gradually formed. It was composed of 8 so-called General Commands (*Generalkommandos*), each one headed by the so-called *Kommandierender General* (KG), whose function was unified in 1820 with that of an army corps commander. Initially, only six such commands were to be established, and Silesia, together with the territory of the Grand Duchy of Poznań (Posen), was to form the IV *Generalkommando*⁸. However, for political reasons, already in May 1815 a separate KG position was created there. A remnant of these plans was probably the structure of the local V AC. The 9. Division from Głogów (Glogau), stationed in Silesia, was subordinated to the KG in Poznań and the lack of modification of that situation was motivated by the desire to dilute the Polish conscripts to the army⁹. Thus, the area of the Province of Silesia was more heavily saturated with troops than other Prussian provinces, which usually had a two-division corps plus an artillery brigade and a detachment of pioneers¹⁰.

garnizon i ludzie: 1630–2009, Głogów 2009; Grzegorz Podruczny, Tomasz Przerwa, *Twierdza Srebrna Góra*, Warszawa 2010; Tomasz Przerwa, *Miasteczko poza historią: Srebrna Góra w XIX w. (Part 1)*, [in:] *Twierdza srebrnogórska V: Perspektywa miasteczka*, eds. Tomasz Przerwa, Piotr Sroka, Bielsko-Biała 2014, pp. 71–87.

⁷ There is little contribution from short studies, e.g. Major Erdlinger, *Gross Strelitz als Garnisonstadt*, Gross Strelitz; Leonhard Radler, *Schwiednitz als Garnisonstadt*, Breslau 1937. Regrettably, Piotr Sput's doctoral dissertation has not yet been published, *Garnizon Racibórz 1741–1919. Zarys monograficzny*, defended on 8th December 2010 at the Institute of History, University of Wrocław.

⁸ *Verordnung wegen verbesserter Einrichtung der Provinzial-Behörden. Vom 30sten April 1815*, [in:] *Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlich Preußischen Staaten 1815*, Berlin 1815, pp. 85–98.

⁹ Manfred Laubert, *Die Verwaltung der Provinz Posen 1815–1847*, Breslau 1923, p. 97.

¹⁰ Jany, *Geschichte der Königlich*, vol. 4, pp. 126–127.

In Silesia, with its command in Wrocław (Breslau), the VI AC was stationed until 1919. A detailed list of individual units and their garrison locations can be found in Appendix 1¹¹. It shows that infantry and artillery units of both the ACs were principally concentrated in the provincial capital and the strongholds – Głogów, Koźle (Cosel), Kłodzko (Glatz), Nysa (Neisse), Świdnica (Schweidnitz) and Srebrna Góra (Silberberg). However, after 1815, only the first two retained any operational significance¹². In the new geopolitical circumstances, the belt of Frederickian fortifications near the border with Austria maintained its usefulness only as a place of concentration and depots for *Landwehr* battalions¹³. Their stationing areas meant only headquarters and in peacetime, these units would only assemble for 14-day exercises. As a rule, the cavalry regiments were quartered in squadrons, which resulted, on the one hand, from high costs of maintaining a large cavalry unit in a given locality and, on the other hand, from the patrol and shield functions performed by those mobile units. However, the specific structure of the Prussian army, based on the universal military service obligation introduced by the *Wehrgesetz* of 3rd September 1814¹⁴, makes it impossible to determine the number of troops stationed in Silesia in peacetime. For economy reasons, battalions and squadrons rarely reached the prescribed peacetime numbers. In this situation, without specific registers being found, it is difficult to determine how many troops were actually quartered in the province.

The main role of the troops stationed in Silesia was to provide the province with external security. Silesia avoided the devastating effects of warfare in the period 1815–1848, but twice, in 1830–1831 and 1846, mobilisation was carried out in its area. The economic and social consequences of the actions carried out at that time have not been appreciated in military literature. The November Uprising in Warsaw forced a rapid reaction and partial mobilisation of detachments of the corps¹⁵,

¹¹ Romuald Bergner, *Truppen und Garnisonen in Schlesien 1740–1945*, Friedberg 1987; Hugo Sommer, *Preußische militärische Standorte im Posener Lande, in Westpreußen und Oberschlesien*, “Deutsche Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift für Polen“, 1933 (25), pp. 51–92. Reprint: *Pruskie garnizony wojskowe w Poznańskim, Prusach Zachodnich i na Górnym Śląsku*, transl. Jarosław Pawlikowski, Oświęcim 2011.

¹² The Secret State Archives Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation (Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz, hereinafter: GStA PK), VI. HA, NI H. v. Boyen, No. 334, Instruktion für den General [Karl] v. Grolman über die Befestigung der östlichen Provinzen [copy], 1816 r., pp. 6–8.

¹³ The Berlin State Library (Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin), PDK, XXXIII Schlesien, No. 126, Karl von Grolman, *Bemerkungen über die Schloesser Laehn, Bolkenhaim, Schweinhaus, über das Kloster Leubus und über die Schweidnitz, Breslau, Brieg und Glogau*, [copy], 10 VI 1816, n.pag.

¹⁴ *Gesetz über die Verpflichtung zum Kriegsdienste. Vom 3sten September 1814*, [in:] *Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlich Preussischen Staaten 1814*, Berlin, pp. 79–82.

¹⁵ Wechmar, *Braune Husaren*, p. 80.

according to the regulations included in the first Prussian mobilisation plan¹⁶. In line with it, procedures were implemented to call up reservists, purchase supplies, equipment, *Lederwerk*¹⁷ and horses, and to appoint coachmen, blacksmiths and other craftsmen to service. It should be noted that Silesia also served as the main supply base for forces concentrated both in this province and in Wielkopolska. Sources preserved in the collections of the Prussian *Ministerium des Innern* (hereinafter: MdI) indicate that the availability of provisions and victuals in the Grand Duchy of Poznań (Wielkie Księstwo Poznańskie) was so limited that it turned out necessary to organise supplies from Silesia and the Marches and transport them from Wrocław and Głogów to Poznań¹⁸. At present, we still do not know much about the financial and economic consequences of this undertaking. A preliminary analysis of this problem on the territory of the Grand Duchy of Poznań proves that the financial settlements related to this mobilisation were an internal problem even in 1833 and had serious consequences for the economic condition of the inhabitants of that area¹⁹.

A separate issue is the participation of Silesian regiments in the creation of a cordon protecting the Prussian border from a very specific type of external threat, namely the cholera epidemic in mid-1831. The resulting administrative order and the then need to establish a cordon sanitaire have not yet been sufficiently analysed in historiography, i.e. with the use of military archival sources²⁰. This is most clearly demonstrated by Vana Eftimova Bellinger's unpublished work, "Carl von Clausewitz's Last Campaign Cholera, the Campaign of 1831, and the Lessons Never Written Down"²¹. She found previously unknown correspondence between Clausewitz

¹⁶ The State Archives in Poznań (Archiwum Państwowe w Poznaniu, hereinafter: APP), Supreme Presidium (Naczelne Prezydium), ref. 567, *Mobilmachungs-plan für die Königliche Preussische Armee, Berlin 21 III 1831*.

¹⁷ Leather items for soldiers' equipment, belts, satchels, etc.

¹⁸ GStA PK, I. HA, MdI, Rep. 77, Tit. 332z, No. 10, Letter from the *Oberpräsident* of the Province of Silesia, Friedrich von Merckel to the Minister of the Interior and Police, von Brenn, Wrocław 19 XII 1830, n.pag.

¹⁹ Jacek Jędrzyński, *Benefits for the Prussian Army by the Inhabitants of the Grand Duchy of Poznań between 1815–1844. Research Status and Research Perspectives*, "Roczniki Dziejów Społecznych i Gospodarczych", 81 (2020), pp. 225–261.

²⁰ Barbara Dettke, *Die asiatische Hydra: Die Cholera von 1830/31 in Berlin und den preussischen Provinzen Posen, Preußen und Schlesien*, Berlin–New York 1995; Richard S. Ross III, *Contagion in Prussia, 1831: The Cholera Epidemic and the Threat of the Polish Uprising*, Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 2015.

²¹ I had the opportunity to read the typescript of the work thanks to an invitation to serve as one of its publishing reviewers in June 2018 as part of the project "Recovering Forgotten History", funded by the Foundation for Civic Space and Public Policy; <http://civicspace.org.pl/en/konferencja/16th-conference/> (access: 21 XII 2019).

and his wife in the collections of the Secret State Archives Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation (*Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz*) in Berlin Dahlem. Through it and further queries in the materials of various Prussian ministries, she presented many previously unknown issues related to the different positions of civil and military authorities regarding the fight against the epidemic.

Another major action was the mobilisation and concentration of Prussian troops in the face of the Kraków uprising of 1846. Almost half of the VI AC was gathered at the Austrian border and most of the troops were transported by rail. The whole undertaking was a proof of the strength and efficiency of the Prussian railways²² and a demonstration of the military potential of this new means of transport²³. It should also be noted that the mobilisation of troops took place in accordance with the new operational plan, which came into effect on 10th April 1844²⁴, but has not yet been the subject of any research. An analysis of the issues signalled is certainly possible in the course of research into the archival materials of the Prussian MdI and the files of the civil authorities of the provinces, districts and towns, from the State Archives in Wrocław, Opole and Katowice.

In the context of mobilisation, Bernhard Schicken's postulate concerning the analysis of restrictions imposed on the inhabitants of fortress towns should be regarded as correct. This problem is usually reduced to issues strictly connected with the construction and architecture of individual fortresses and their influence on the urban planning of specific towns²⁵. Meanwhile, as studies on Prussian fortresses in Westphalia and the Rhineland²⁶, have shown, a number of tangible and intangible obligations were incumbent on the inhabitants at the time of putting the fortress into military readiness. The most acute of these were undoubtedly the potential regulations

²² Hence, the reports from it were used for propaganda, among others, in the forum of the German Confederation; The German Federal Archives (Bundesarchiv) Berlin-Lichterfelde (hereinafter BAB), DB 5-I/41, Abzug Bundestags-Protokoll der 2. Sitzung v. 13. Jan. 1848. § 48 Den Einfluss der Eisenbahn auf die Wahrhaftigen des Deutschen Bundes betr., n.pag.

²³ On the course of the transport and the reaction of the population; Jacek Jędrysiak, *Operacyjne wykorzystanie śląskich linii kolejowych w obliczu powstania krakowskiego w 1846 roku*, "Śląski Kwartalnik Historyczny Sobótka", 72 (2017), 3, pp. 87–110.

²⁴ GStA PK, IV. HA, Preußische Armee, Rep. 16 Militärvorschriften, 643, Mobilmachungsp lan für die preußische Armee 10 IV 1844.

²⁵ Bernhard Schicken, *Militärische Notwendigkeit und soziale Diskriminierung: Zur Ausweisung von Einwohnern aus preußischen Festungsstädten bei drohender Invasion* (1830/31–1870/71), "Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift", 74 (2015), 1–2, p. 98.

²⁶ *Stadt und Militär 1815–1914: Wirtschaftliche Impulse, infrastrukturelle Beziehungen, sicherheitspolitische Aspekte*, ed. Bernhard Schicken, Paderborn 1998; Alf Lütke, *Police and State in Prussia, 1815–1850*, Cambridge 2009.

on leaving the fortress in the event of a siege. This issue is practically absent from the historiography of Silesia in the period 1815–1848, which I consider to be a lack requiring attention in the light of the two mobilisations mentioned above, which significantly affected the garrisons in Głogów, Kłodzko, Nysa and Koźle.

The issue of fortresses is also linked to the question of the army's influence on the development of the province's railway network²⁷. The head of the Engineer and Pioneer Corps, General Ernst von Aster alerted in 1844 that in his opinion the planned extension of the railway network threatened the importance of as many as 17 fortresses, including Głogów, Świdnica, Nysa and Koźle. Moreover, he pushed for an opinion that railway lines should be built within the second radius of fortress outworks, where they could simultaneously retain their usefulness and remain under control of fortress artillery fire²⁸. These views led to the fact that the station of the Upper Silesian Railway, instead of in Koźle, was located in the village of Kędzierzyn, 4 km away. The Wrocław – Świebodzice (Freiburg im Schlesien) – Świdnica Railway initially bypassed the last town, and problems also accompanied the works in Nysa and Głogów²⁹. Apart from Świdnica, however, in none of these cases was the construction of the entire route or its section prevented. The army slowly began to accept the new mode of transport, and a symbol of change was the introduction in November 1843, on the occasion of the approval of the statute of the Lower Silesia – Marchy Railway, of standards for the rolling stock which was to be at its disposal in the case of mobilisation³⁰. It was a kind of interlude to the already mentioned transport of 1846. The complete lack of analogous studies on the influence of the army on the development of the road network, which is, however, difficult to capture in sources, should be considered a significant shortcoming.

The Prussian army also performed a police function in the province, wrongly marginalised by researchers specialising in social and economic history. Whereas,

²⁷ Jacek Jędrzyński, *Wpływ czynników wojskowych na rozwój sieci kolejowej byłego zaboru pruskiego*, [in:] *Gospodarczy bilans otwarcia polskiej niepodległości*, eds. Tomasz Głowiński, Marek Zawałdka, Wrocław 2018, pp. 227–248.

²⁸ Hermann Frobenius, *Geschichte des preussischen Ingenieur- und Pionier-Korps von der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zum Jahre 1886: auf Veranlassung der Königl. General-Inspektion des Ingenieur- und Pionier-Korps und der Festungen nach amtlichen Quellen*, Bd. 1: *Die Zeit von 1848 bis 1869*, Berlin 1906, pp. 6–7.

²⁹ Marek Jerczyński, Stanisław Koziarski, *150 lat kolei na Śląsku*, Opole–Wrocław 1992, pp. 31, 34; Przemysław Dominas, *Powstanie i rozwój kolei na Ziemi Kłodzkiej w latach 1854–1914*, Kłodzko 2009, p. 40.

³⁰ *Bedienungen in Betreff der Benutzung der Eisenbahn für militairische Zwecke*, [in:] *Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlich Preußischen Staaten 1843*, p. 373.

military sources can add to the knowledge on the causes of social crises affecting the population of Silesia. In the period 1815–1848 Prussian troops had occasions to intervene in a number of disturbances. One of the first significant tumults was caused indirectly by the army itself. In August 1817, there was a revolt in Wrocław by burghers conscripted as *Ersatz*³¹ to the 1. Wrocław *Landwehr* Battalion³². This was related to the then ongoing process of transforming the Civil Guard (*Bürgergarde*), in which they had been previously sworn in, into national defence units³³, which apparently met with resistance in the Silesian capital, regarded since 1813 as the cradle of the institution of the *Landwehr*³⁴. The whole matter certainly requires deeper analysis, but it shows that the implementation of the principles of the new military organisation in Silesia was not necessarily carried out with the full acceptance of the local population and the reasons for this are certainly an interesting aspect of the social history of the province. Noteworthy is also the participation of the army in the actions against the anti-Jewish tumult of the weavers in Wrocław on 27th September 1831³⁵. The Prussian army, of course, also played an important role in suppressing the revolt of the Owl Mountain weavers in 1844³⁶. In this case the actions of the army were very decisive, firearms and cannons were used, and there were fatalities. Many participants in the uprising were arrested and imprisoned in fortresses³⁷. Some regimental histories describe it as a rather serious military

³¹ Literally, reserve troops, intended for rear service, which should be distinguished from the reserve force filling in the numbers of units at the time of mobilisation. In this case they were probably treated as a supplement to the *Landwehr* battalion.

³² *Friedrich Wilhelm III. an Kriegsminister Hermann von Boyen und dieser an Staatskanzler Karl August v. Hardenberg mit beiliegendem Bericht über Tumult im Breslau anlässlich der Verteidigung der Landwehrmannschaft*, [in:] Dorothea Schmidt, *Die preußische Landwehr. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der allgemeinen Wehrpflicht in Preussen zwischen 1813 und 1830*, Berlin 1981, pp. 198–201 [Annex No. 17. Substantial resources on: GStA PK, VI. HA, NI. Karl v. d. Groeben, No. I Ca 3, Aufstand in Breslau vom 23. August 1817 und seine Veranlassungen; die Eidesleistung mit dem General Hünerbein, Gneisenau, Boyen, Thile, 1817–1818].

³³ The State Archives in Wrocław (Archiwum Państwowe we Wrocławiu, hereinafter: APWr), Records of the city of Wrocław (Akta miasta Wrocławia), ref. 12249–12252, Acta generalia die Organisation der Landwehr und Auflösung der Bürgergarde in den Städten betr. Vol. I–IV, 1813–1824.

³⁴ GStA PK, VI. HA, I. HA Rep. 77, Tit. 332m Schlesien No. 1, Neue Formation der Landwehr in der Provinz Schlesien.

³⁵ Vanya E. Bellinger, *Marie von Clausewitz: The Woman Behind the Making of On War*, Oxford 2015, pp. 204–206.

³⁶ *Bericht des Langenbielauer Patrimonialgerichts über den Aufstand*, [in:] Christina von Hodenberg, *Aufstand der Weber: Die Revolte von 1844 und ihr Aufstieg zum Mythos*, Bonn 1997, pp. 240–252. See also Krzysztof Pludro, *Powstanie Tkaczy Sowiogórkich (czerwiec 1844)*, Bielawa 2004.

³⁷ *Verzeichnis der Toten and Auszug aus dem Gefangenennrapport* [in:] Hodenberg, *Aufstand*, pp. 252–253.

operation³⁸, a battalion of fusiliers of the 22. Infantry Regiment is said to have even been transported from Wrocław to Świdnica by rail. The very severe repressive actions of the army later influenced the mythologisation of the event, especially in the historiography of the GDR, which affects many aspects of the presentation of its course, also in the context of the use of force³⁹.

Linked to the police role of the army was undoubtedly the role of fortresses as prisons, both for criminal offenders and for those incarcerated for political reasons. At least a few testimonies are known about the last category of prisoners, although of course the whole phenomenon had far wider dimensions. As already mentioned, Nysa was frequently used for this purpose, but the same practices in other Silesian fortifications are evident. The testimony of Moritz Elsner, imprisoned in Srebrna Góra, is especially valuable⁴⁰. Fritz Reuter, a German writer and classic of the Lower German language, was also imprisoned for some time in this fortress and in Głogów⁴¹. From the latter fortress, in an atmosphere of great scandal, General Jan Nepomucen Umiński, who had been imprisoned since 1828, escaped in the wake of news of the outbreak of the November Uprising⁴². The weavers sentenced for the events of 1844 were placed, among others, in Świdnica⁴³. The Kraków insurgents were taken under guard to Koźle and Nysa and interned there⁴⁴.

The police function was not limited to repressive aspects. An important issue, although one which can only be presented here briefly at the moment, was the question of the army's participation in combating the effects of elementary disasters. A trace of such activity is undoubtedly the participation of the 6. Pioneer Detachment in the evacuation by rafts of people, cattle and equipment during the flood

³⁸ E.g. *Geschichte des I. Oberschlesischen*, p. 157; Tronchin von, Naumann, *Geschichte*, pp. 194–195.

³⁹ Hodenberg, *Aufstand, passim*; Lutz Kroneberg, Rolf Schloesser, *Weber-Revolution 1844. Der schlesische Weberaufstand im Spiegel der zeitgenössischen Publizistik und Literatur*, Köln 1979.

⁴⁰ Mariusz Kotkowski, *Zapiski więzienne Moritza Elsnera (1838–1839)*, [in:] *Twierdza srebrnogórska III. Miasteczko i fortyfikacje*, Wrocław 2010, pp. 167–166.

⁴¹ Fritz Reuter, *Twierdza Głogów: listy ze Śląska*, transl. and ed. Marcin Błaszczkowski, Głogów 2014.

⁴² Manfred Laubert, *Die Haft des polnischen Generals von Umiński in Glogau und seine Flucht*, "Zeitschrift des Vereins für Geschichte Schlesiens", 55 (1921), pp. 65–76; Bronisław J. Umiński, *General Jan Nepomucen Umiński 1778–1851*, Wrocław 1999, pp. 166–186.

⁴³ *Auszug aus dem Gefangenennarrativ*.

⁴⁴ "Beilage zu No. 55 der Breslauer Zeitung", 6 III 1846, p. 471; "Beilage zu No. 59 der Breslauer Zeitung", 11 III 1846, p. 509.

of the Nysa river in 1829⁴⁵. There may have been more such incidents, but they require a closer look at similar disasters that occurred in Silesia at the time.

Benefits for the Prussian army in Silesia

A study on Grand Duchy of Poznań⁴⁶, allows us to conclude that in the period 1815–1848 the contributions made by Prussian subjects to the army included: service and accommodation for soldiers and horses, supply of troops in garrisons and during marches in war and peace, supply of horses and transport means for training and mobilisation.

The sphere of service tariffs and lodging was generally regulated by an ordinance of 17th March 1810⁴⁷, according to which military men were to have the right to housing in peacetime, to be granted according to the decisions of the relevant authorities. Lodging might take place in royal or municipal buildings, either as lodging or in the form of monetary compensation. It was binding for all towns and villages in the kingdom. The military authorities were responsible for ensuring that the rights were enforced, while the civil authorities and the deputations created by them were responsible for the whole process. The deputations, i.e. commissions, were to be composed of representatives of the magistrate and inhabitants, in the proportion of 2 + 6 to 10 in large towns and 1 + 4 to 6 in medium-sized and small towns⁴⁸. They were supported by the Commissariats, which had been operating in practice since 1828 at each corps⁴⁹. Lodging was generally divided into those for persons and those for animals, mainly service horses. The regulations specified in detail the categories of persons entitled to the benefit, the number of habitable rooms required, and their facilities⁵⁰. As a rule, the entitled person had no right to demand more from the host and the municipal authorities than the regulations stipulated. Obviously, the regulatory requirements had nothing to do with local realities, which sometimes led to problems and complaints.

⁴⁵ Tiersch, *Geschichte*, pp. 49–50.

⁴⁶ Jędrysiak, *Benefits*, *passim*.

⁴⁷ GStA PK, I. HA. Rep. 77, Tit. 332cc, No. 15 Bd. 1, Allgemeines Regulativ über das Servis- und Einquartierungs-Wesen, Berlin 17 III 1810, pp. 2–8.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 4–6.

⁴⁹ *Die Wirkungskreis und die amtliche Stellung der Militair-Intendanturen betreffend*, [in:] *Amtsblatt der Königlichen Regierung zu Posen*, 1828, No. 9, pp. 93–97.

⁵⁰ These requirements are quite well discussed by Grudziński, *Między twierdzą*, pp. 198–199.

It is worth mentioning, however, that at that time local citizens were able to make money on some types of lodging, for example those concerning horses.

In Silesia, the lodging was financed by the so-called service tariff. According to a regulation from 1810, all towns in then Prussia were divided into classes, according to which a tariff was calculated, from which the billeting was subsequently financed. Towns were divided into categories with specific annual tariff amounts: Class I – at least 10,000 inhabitants, 20/25 silver groshes per head; Class II – 3,500–10,000 inhabitants, 15 or 18 silver groshes and 9 fenig per head; Class III – up to 3,500 inhabitants 10 silver groshes/12 groshes and 6 fenig per head. Service claims had to be transferred by the towns each month to the service funds of the provinces, which then distributed the dues. Provinces which were losing out on the balance of the service tariff were to be subsidised in order to compensate for their losses, it is not clear whether Silesia was in this category. In 1815, the service amount for the so-called old provinces was set at 677,790 thalers. The service was financed from various sources, including income tax, which in the opinion of the authorities of the charged provinces increased the burden considerably⁵¹. The authorities of the so-called “old provinces”⁵² strived to change this state of affairs and introduce the financing of the service from land tax, without paying the tariff to the service fund, as was the practice in some of the new provinces. The implementation of this idea was announced in the Tax Act of 30th May 1820, which provided for the introduction of a uniform land tax throughout the country⁵³. Contrary to hopes, however, the previous system was maintained and 393 towns in four eastern provinces were now obliged to pay 721,319 thalers, 8 silver grosches and 8 fenigs annually into the service fund on account of the tariff, of which in Silesia it was respectively:

1. Wrocław *Regierungsbezirk* (55): 103,473 thalers, 10 silver groshes;
2. Legnica *Regierungsbezirk* (37): 52,893 thalers, 10 silver groshes;
3. Opole *Regierungsbezirk* (38): 31,625 thalers, 18 silver groshes.

Moreover, although no uniform rate of land tax was introduced, Silesia was to be obliged to pay, in addition to service, various amounts for other military expenses, which totalled 2,794 thalers, 29 silver groshes and 11 fenigs a year. Dissatisfaction with this state of affairs was the basis for a great push for change.

⁵¹ GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77, Tit. 332cc, No. 32, Entwurf eines Gesetzes über die anderweite Aufbringung der Servis-Abgabe in den Städten des Östlichen Provinzen, 14 X 1844, n.pag.

⁵² Prussia, Pomerania, Brandenburg and Silesia.

⁵³ GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77, Tit. 332cc, No. 32, Motive zum Gesetz-Entwurfe über die Umwandlung des Servises in eine Grundsteuer, 14 X 1844, n.pag.

Until the law of 1844 came into force, however, there was no question of a uniform land tax throughout the monarchy⁵⁴.

In the State Archives in Wrocław there are preserved records of the Deputation making annual calculations of receipts and expenditures on account of service to the provincial capital. The table below shows how difficult it was to balance the necessary amount in particular years (rounded to thalers):

Table No. 1: Balance sheets of service tariffs in Wrocław from 1815 to 1848

Year	Receipts	Expenditure	Year	Receipts	Expenditure
1815	-	-	1832	66,493	66,493
1816	-	-	1833	66,250	66,250
1817	-	-	1834	-	-
1818	-	-	1835	-	-
1819	101,512	17,460	1836	-	-
1820	139,897	140,030	1837	3,939	61,591
1821	64,230	64,230	1838	3,631	61,591
1822	64,053	64,053	1839	3,403	60,670
1823	64,343	64,343	1840	3,403	60,670
1824	67,085	67,085	1841	3,403	60,670
1825	66,005	66,005	1842	2,794	60,206
1826	64,913	64,913	1843	2,794	60,206
1827	65,213	65,213	1844	2,794	60,206
1828	67,843	67,843	1845	3,340	61,607
1829	66,793	66,793	1846	2,952	61,347
1830	66,793	66,793	1847	2,875	61,266
1831	66,493	66,493	1848	2,925	5,405

Source: Own preparation on the basis of: APWr, Records of the city of Wrocław, ref. 41557–41558, *Die Einrichtung des Servis Etats*, vol. 1–2, 1816–55.

A precise explanation of the reasons for the changes in the amounts, their structure and significance requires studies in the preserved materials. Particularly interesting is the change in the balance since the 2nd half of the 19th century. It can clearly be seen that between 1821 and 1833 the city managed to achieve a fair balance of tariff income and payouts. Between 1834 and 1837, however, there was

⁵⁴ Friedrich G. Schimmelfennig, *Die Preussischen direkten Steuern*, part 1, Potsdam 1842, pp. 106–111.

a drastic change in the situation, which is not yet explainable without a thorough analysis of the documentation. In a similar way, the service in the other Silesian municipalities remains a subject for very painstaking analysis.

The natural supply of troops in peacetime comprised four main sections⁵⁵: bread supply; food on the march; victuals supply; horse forage supply. In view of the purpose of the study and the lack of sources, I will limit myself here to a few general remarks. The supply of bread was regulated by very precise guidelines as to its quality and baking time. The instruction of 16th March 1819 divided the portions into light and heavy ones. The first was the equivalent of 1/5 loaf of bread per day for 30 days in a month, which meant that a soldier received 6 loaves. The heavy portion amounted to 210 days' rations and was provided in case of prolonged absence from the garrison, or marches, or temporary absence outside the garrison for duty reasons⁵⁶. The feeding of troops on the march was a more complicated issue. It was regulated by a series of instructions and orders of 1819, 1821 and 1827⁵⁷. Soldiers were generally dependent on the hospitality of their hosts and should be content with what they received in their quarters. However, to prevent hosts from lowering standards as well as soldiers from making excessive claims, strict standards were introduced. The due rations included two pounds of well-baked rye bread and half a pound of meat, vegetables and salt. The same amount for lunch and for dinner. Marching soldiers were not entitled to breakfast, nor to request beer, wine or even coffee from their hosts. The relevant authorities were to ensure that provisions of alcoholic beverages were available at stopping places at prices affordable to soldiers⁵⁸. According to the regulation of 1818, in such a case the hosts were to receive four silver groshes a day for the quartered soldier, paid in thalers. Two groshes from a soldier's wages were handed over immediately and a further two groshes were handed over in return for a receipt, with payment specified by day. The remaining two groshes were to come from a special fund. Bearing in mind the time, the towns through which the march was to pass had to be supported by advance payments. It was necessary to ensure that the hosts always

⁵⁵ GStA PK, IV. HA, Preußische Armee, Militärvorschriften, Rep. 16, No. 221, Naturalverpflegung der Truppen im Frieden, n.d., p. 7.

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 11–12.

⁵⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 21v.

⁵⁸ GStA PK, IV. HA, Preußische Armee, Militärvorschriften, Rep. 16, No. 221, Naturalverpflegung der Truppen im Frieden, n.d., pp. 39–40.

received their 4 groshes as soon as possible⁵⁹. From 1822, the hosts were entitled by law to 5 silver groshes⁶⁰, and this amount remained unchanged until the 1840s⁶¹. Separate and equally detailed regulations pertained to the provision of forage for service horses.

We do not have exact data on the quality of food received by soldiers and the functioning of the whole system in the Silesian Province. On the one hand, the above-mentioned actions taken at the end of 1830, when supplies and horse forage were collected in Silesia for the troops concentrating in Grand Duchy of Poznań, may attest to the affluence of the area. On the other hand, Carl Friedrich Riecke, who investigated typhus epidemics in Silesian garrisons, pointed to poor food and unfair practices of food suppliers as one of the main causes of the disease⁶².

The matter of the contingent of work horses and transport means was not sufficiently regulated before the mobilisation plan was approved in March 1831. The regulations introduced stipulated that the horse equipping of line troops was to take place partly by means of domestic deliveries on the royal account, and partly with monetary compensation in the amount of 100 thalers per saddle horse and 80 thalers per gelding. Purchases from foreign suppliers were to be the exception to the rule and each time arranged by a special order. Purchases from foreign suppliers were to be the exception to the rule and in each case arranged by special order. Horses for the *Landwehr* were supplied free of charge. Already in peacetime each government department was to be informed of the need for mobilisation horses, and the detachments and places to which they were to be supplied. This placed an obligation on local authorities to keep accurate records of the number and categories of horses in their district to ensure that deliveries could be made within 14 days of receiving the mobilisation order⁶³. Data on the necessary horses is contained in tables:

⁵⁹ GStA PK, IV. HA, Rep. 16, No. 180, Neuere Bestimmungen über Verpflegung der Truppen auf Märschen bewirkt und Vorspann vergütet werden soll, Berlin 6 VI 1818, pp. 1–2.

⁶⁰ GStA PK, IV. HA Rep. 16, No. 221, Naturalverpflegung der Truppen im Frieden, n.d., p. 43v.

⁶¹ GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77, Tit. 332z, No. 13 Bd. 9, Ueber die Natural-Verpflegung der Truppen im Frieden, Berlin 1837, n.pag.

⁶² Carl F. Riecke, *Der Kriegs- und Friedens-Typhus in Den Armeen: Ein Beitrag Zu Einer Künftigen Gesundheitspflege in Den Kriegsheeren. Mit Besonderer Rücksicht auf die Königlich. Preuss. Armee*, Potsdam 1848, pp. 134–138, 145–149.

⁶³ APP, Supreme Presidium (Naczelne Prezydium), ref. 567, Mobilmachungs-plan für die Königlische Preußische Armee, Berlin 21 III 1831, pp. 204–205.

Table No. 2: Repartition of horses from Silesia by army corps

Army Corps	<i>Landwehr</i>	Line troops	Guard	Total
III	145	252	46	443
IV	29	52	6	87
V	1,615	2,634	-	4,249
VI	2,982	4,673	-	7,655
Total:	4,771	7,611	52	12,434

Source: GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77, Tit. 332r, No. 7 Bd. 3, Anhang XXVIII, Repartition der bei einer Mobilmachung der Armee von den Regierungs-Departements zu stellenden Pferde, Berlin 11 IV 1831, n.pag.

Table No. 3: Repartition of horses for the VI Army Corps by *Regierungsbezirk*

Regierungsbezirk	<i>Landwehr</i>	Line troops	Total
Wrocław	1,308	2,050	3,358
Opole	1,674	2,623	4,297
Poznań	237	576	813
Total:	3,219	5,249	8,468

Source: GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 77, Tit. 332r, No. 7 Bd. 3, Anhang XXVIII, Repartition der bei einer Mobilmachung der Armee von den Regierungs-Departements zu stellenden Pferde, Berlin 11 IV 1831, n.pag.

Silesia thus provided a total of 12,434 horses, of which 7,655 were for VI AC, the rest being transferred to other corps *Regierungsbezirks*, yet it should be borne in mind the specific nature of the 9th Division, which was stationed in Silesia and which certainly received the bulk of the 4,249 horses allocated to V AC. The economic significance of this procedure requires increased attention, as does a study of the regulations introduced by the next mobilisation plan in April 1844⁶⁴. Unfortunately, no more precise data are available on the issue of the transport means and the mobilisation of the so-called *Trainsoldaten*.

The impact of the above contributions on the provincial economy, including the opportunities for Prussian subjects to benefit from it, remains an open question. In this aspect there are unfortunately no authoritative studies. Certainly an important element of military organisation were orders for uniforms, leather equipment,

⁶⁴ GStA PK, IV. HA Rep. 16 Militärvorschriften, No. 643, Mobilmachungsplan für die preußische Armee 10 IV 1844.

boots, belts and all sorts of smithing and related services. This is an issue which is difficult to capture in sources, usually occurring in the context of conflicts and litigation. Recognition of this issue certainly requires a careful analysis of existing guild records and the press of the period⁶⁵.

Conclusion

As Jerzy Maroń rightly pointed out, military history is also social history⁶⁶. The functions of the Prussian army and its impact on Silesian society and economy are undoubtedly areas which require wider exploration. The catalogue of problems discussed in the text probably does not exhaust the issue in a holistic way. However, it indicates the main research directions which, in my opinion, should be developed in an attempt to inscribe the Prussian army in the social and economic landscape of Silesia in the 1st half of the 19th century. Fortunately, the main corpus of archival sources can be found today in the collections of the Ministry of the Interior, the Provincial Presidium and municipal records in Poland and Germany. Therefore, even the destruction of military records does not exclude studies on this issue, in which the main areas of research include the questions of population's contributions, the mobilizations of 1831 and 1846 and the presence of the army in the space of garrison towns.

STRESZCZENIE

Prezentowane opracowanie stanowi w zamierzeniu wprowadzenie do tematyki wpływu armii pruskiej na kwestie gospodarcze i społeczne w Prowincji Śląskiej w latach 1815–1848. Jest to zagadnienie często ignorowane w literaturze, co ma związek z dokonywanym przez wielu badaczy ograniczaniem obszaru zainteresowania historii wojen i wojskowości jedynie do kwestii organizacyjnych i tych związanych bezpośrednio z prowadzeniem działań zbrojnych. Optyce tej umyka szereg aspektów związanych z interakcją między armią i społeczeństwem w czasie pokoju. Dodatkowy problem stanowi niedobór źródeł proveniencji wojskowej, w dużej mierze zniszczonych i rozproszonych w 1945 r., powodujący wrażenie, że badanie dziejów armii pruskiej w XIX w. jest niemal niemożliwe. Na szczęście najistotniejsze akta dotyczące relacji wojska i ludności cywilnej zachowały się w aktach pruskich ministerstw, urzędów cywilnych i władz lokalnych,

⁶⁵ I would like to thank Professor Wanda Musialik for her valuable comments in this regard, expressed during our discussion.

⁶⁶ Jerzy Maroń, *Wokół teorii rewolucji militarnej. Wybrane problemy*, Wrocław 2011, p. 13.

przechowywanych w archiwach polskich i niemieckich, co umożliwiła prowadzenie studiów w tym obszarze badawczym.

Celem tekstu jest wskazanie katalogu najważniejszych do przebadania zagadnień, wraz z sugestiami dotyczącymi możliwości ich rekonstrukcji. W tekście omówione zostały problemy obejmujące kwestie obecności i funkcji armii pruskiej na Śląsku oraz katalogu świadczeń na rzecz wojska, obejmujących kwaterek, zaopatrzenie w żywność oraz kontyngenty koni i środków transportu. Scharakteryzowana została także specyfika struktury organizacyjnej armii pruskiej w prowincji.

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Appendix 1: List of garrison towns and units stationed in Silesia between 1815 and 1848

Garrison town	Stationed units	Dates of stationing
Brzeg (Brieg)	Fusilier Battalion of the 11. Infantry Regiment	1810–1860
Bystrzyca Kłodzka (<i>Habelschwerdt</i>)	part of the 11. Invalids Company	1808–1819
Bytom (Beuthen)	4. Squadron of the 2. Uhlan Regiment	1819–1860
Chojnów (Haynau)	1. Squadron of the 4. Dragoon Regiment	
Gliwice (<i>Gleiwitz</i>)	Staff and 1. Squadron of the 2. Uhlan Regiment	1819–1919
Głogów (<i>Glogau</i>)	5. Lower Silesian Pioneer Detachment	1808–1819
	5. Lower Silesian Artillery Brigade	1808–1873
	Command of the 9. Division, 17. Infantry Brigade, 9. Cavalry Brigade, 9. Field Artillery Brigade, 2. Pioneer Inspectorate	1820–1919
	11. Garrison Battalion	1810–1860
Głubczyce (<i>Leobschütz</i>)	part of the 2. <i>Landwehr</i> Uhlan Regiment	1820–1860
Grodków (<i>Grottkau</i>)	Staff, 1. and 3. Horse Battery of the 6. Artillery Brigade	1808–1919
Jawor (Jauer)	1. Battalion of the 7. Infantry Regiment	1820–1861
	Fusilier battalion of the 7. <i>Landwehr</i> Infantry Regiment	1830–1919
Jelenia Góra (<i>Hirschberg im Riesengebirge</i>)	2. Battalion of the 7. <i>Landwehr</i> Infantry Regiment	1820–1860
Kłodzko (Glatz)	Fusilier Battalion of the 11. Infantry Regiment	1808–1860
	a company of the 6. Silesian Pioneer Detachment	1808–1860
	staff and two battalions of the 22. Infantry Regiment	1808–1883
	3. fortress artillery companies	1808–1860
	1. Battalion of 4. <i>Landwehr</i> Infantry Regiment	1808–1860
	23. Infantry Regiment	1844–1860
	38. Infantry Regiment (reserve)	1818–1819
Koźle (Cosel)	11. Garrison Battalion	from 1808
	two artillery infantry batteries	from 1818
	a pioneer company	from 1819
	two battalions of the 22. <i>Landwehr</i> Infantry Regiment	from 1819

Garrison town	Stationed units	Dates of stationing
Koźuchów (<i>Freystadt in Schlesien</i>)	2. Battalion of the 6. <i>Landwehr</i> Infantry Regiment	1819–1860
Krapkowice (<i>Krappitz</i>)	1. Battalion 23. <i>Landwehr</i> Infantry Regiment	1808–1821
Legnica (<i>Liegnitz</i>)	1. and 2. Battalions of the 7. Infantry Regiment	1808–1919
Lwówek Śląski (<i>Löwenberg in Schlesien</i>)	3. Battalion of the 7. Infantry Regiment	1819–1859
	Silasien Invalid Company	1819–1860
Lubań (<i>Lauban</i>)	2. Battalion of the 9. Infantry Regiment	1808–1919
Lubin (<i>Lüben</i>)	Staff, 4. and 5. Squadrons of the 4. Dragoon Regiment	1815–1919
Mikołów (<i>Nikolai</i>)	2. and 4. Squadrons of the 6. Uhlán Regiment	1819–1860
Namysłów (<i>Namslau</i>)	4. squadron of the 4. Hussar Regiment	1808–1860
Nysa (Neisse)	Staff, 1. and 3. Battalions of the 10. Infantry Regiment	1808–1819
	Command of the 12. Division, 12. Infantry Brigade, 12. Cavalry Brigade, 6. Pioneer Detachment,	1819–1919
	Staff, 1. Battalion and Fusilier Battalion of the 23. Infantry Regiment	1819–1823
	1. Battalion of the 23. <i>Landwehr</i> Infantry Regiment	1820–1868
	Two companies of the 11. Garrison Battalion	1820–1859
Oleśnica (Oels)	1. Squadron of the 4. Hussar Regiment	1819–1823
	2. Battalion of the 10. <i>Landwehr</i> Infantry Regiment	1820–1868
Oława (Ohlau)	1. and 2. squadrons of the 4. Hussar Regiment	1819–1850
Opole (Oppeln)	headquarters of the 2. <i>Landwehr</i> Uhlán Regiment	1819–1860
	3. Battalion of the 23. <i>Landwehr</i> Infantry Regiment	1819–1860
Prudnik (<i>Neustadt an der Prudnik</i>)	2. and 4. Squadrons of the 6. Uhlán Regiment	1819–1859
Pszczyna (Pless)	a squadron of 2. Uhlán Regiment	1808–1919
Racibórz (Ratibor)	3. Squadron of the 2. <i>Landwehr</i> Uhlán Regiment	1819–1859
	3. Battalion of the 23. <i>Landwehr</i> Infantry Regiment	1819–1859
Srebrna Góra (Silberberg)	Infantry Company of the 6. Artillery Brigade	1819–1860
Strzelce Opolskie (<i>Groß Strehlitz</i>)	2. Battalion of the 10. <i>Landwehr</i> Infantry Regiment	1817–1820
	part of the 23. <i>Landwehr</i> Infantry Regiment	1820–1861

Garrison town	Stationed units	Dates of stationing
Świdnica (Schweidnitz)	battalions of the 11. Infantry Regiment	1816–1817
	3. Detachment of the 5. Artillery Brigade	1817–1844
	23. Infantry Regiment	1829–1844
	battalions of the 10. Infantry Regiment	1843–1849
Wołów (Wohlau)	3. Squadron of the 2. Hussar Regiment	1818–1859
Wrocław (Breslau)	Command of the VI Army Corps, its institutions, Command of the 11. Division, Command of the 22. Infantry Brigade, 11. Cavalry Brigade, 11. Artillery Brigade, 11. Infantry Regiment, 1. Cuirassier Regiment. Two infantry and three horse batteries of the 6. Artillery Brigade	1813–1918
Ząbkowice Śląskie (Frankenstein)	a horse artillery company	1819–1860
Zgorzelec (Görlitz)	5. Jäger Battalion	1830–1887
Ziębice (Münsterberg)	3. Battalion of the 10. <i>Landwehr</i> Infantry Regiment and part of the 4. <i>Landwehr</i> Hussar Regiment	1819–1860

Source: Own elaboration based on Romuald Bergner, *Truppen und Garnisonen in Schlesien 1740–1945*, Friedberg 1987; Hugo Sommer, *Preußische militärische Standorte im Posener Lande, in Westpreußen und Oberschlesien*, “Deutsche Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift für Polen”, 25 (1933), pp. 51–92 and regiments’ monographs (quoted in the footnote no. 5 and others).

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LOWER SILESIA LOOKS TO THE FUTURE. THE PROJECT OF WROCLAW – KŁODZKO COUNTY MOTORWAY (1927–1932) AS PART OF THE PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES’ MODERNIZATION PLANS

DOLNY ŚLĄSK PATRZY W PRZYSZŁOŚĆ. PROJEKT AUTOSTRADY WROCLAW – HRABSTWO KŁODZKIE (1927–1932) JAKO ELEMENT MODERNIZACYJNYCH ZAMIERZEŃ WŁADZ PROWINCJONALNYCH

ABSTRACT: The article presents the fate on an unrealized plan to build the Wrocław – Kłodzko County motorway (1927–1932), which was to connect the capital of Lower Silesia with the Sudetes. It was the object of discussion of regional authorities responsible for modernization of the road network of the Province of Lower Silesia.

KEYWORDS: history of industry, road construction, history of Silesia, Weimar republic

Historical literature used to a perceive of the interwar Lower Silesia in the perspective of successive political and economic crises¹. The increasing number of problems undoubtedly contributed to the weakening of this far eastern Prussian

¹ Suffice to mention the Revolution of 1918, the Czechoslovakian claims to the Kłodzko (Glatz) area, the Polish-German fight for Upper Silesia 1919–1921, the post-war economic crisis (with hyperinflation in 1923), the Kappa-Lüttwitz Putsch of 1920, the great economic crisis triggered in 1929, and the street clashes of the 1920s and 1930s. In 1919, the Prussian Parliament passed a division of Silesia into two provinces – the Province of Lower Silesia with its capital in Wrocław (Breslau) and the Province of Upper Silesia with its capital in Opole (Oppeln), but the executive act came into force only in 1923. For more information on the situation of Lower Silesia in the interwar period, see: Joanna Nowosielska–Sobel, Grzegorz Sobel, *Dolny Śląsk w latach 1918–1945*, [in:] *Dolny Śląsk. Monografia historyczna*, ed. Wojciech Wrzesiński, Wrocław 2006, pp. 507–586.

province of Germany, but at the same time a number of positive transformations and initiatives cannot be ignored. In this context, it is worth to emphasize the efforts of the Lower Silesian authorities, who were trying to break down the development barriers of the region. Its peripheral location and at the same time rapid automotive progress made the adaptation of the road network of Lower Silesia one of the challenges of the 1920s and 1930s. This issue has not yet been discussed in greater depth, and partial findings have in fact only covered the construction of the “Hitler’s Roads”: the unfinished Berlin – Wrocław (Breslau) – Upper Silesia motorway (*Reichsautobahn*) and the scenic Sudeten Road (*Sudetenstraße*)². The Nazi motorway program has been of interest to historians for years, but, as German researchers have stressed, it should not overshadow earlier preparations³.

In Roland Gabriel’s monograph on the planning of special roads for automotive traffic in Germany before 1933⁴, there is a reference to the project of the Wrocław – Kłodzko (Glatz) motorway from 1929⁵, but apart from this exception, the Lower Silesian attempt did not become a subject of academic discourse. Unlike other pioneering motorway projects, especially HAFRABA (Hamburg – Frankfurt am Main – Basel)⁶, it was not commented on more broadly by specialists at the right time, which later resulted in little interest from historians. Among the reasons for this omission, one should mention the lack of information on the activity of the

² See, among others: Wolfgang Jäger, *Die Geschichte der BAB A 15 Dreieck Spreewald – Cottbus – Breslau*, [in:] <http://www.autobahn-online.de/a15geschichte.html> (access: 10 XII 2019); Tomasz Przerwa, *Wokół genezy Drogi Sudeckiej – nowe spojrzenie*, [in:] *Znowuż ‘z kufierkiem i chlebakiem’*, eds. Beata Konopska, Joanna Nowosielska-Sobel, Grzegorz Strauchold, Wrocław 2014, pp. 263–276.

³ For more information on German motorways before 1945: *Reichsautobahn. Pyramiden des Dritten Reichs*, ed. Rainer Stommer, Marburg 1982; Erhard Schütz, Eckhard Gruber, *Mythos Reichsautobahn. Bau und Inszenierung der “Straßen des Führers” 1933–1941*, Berlin 1996; *Die Autobahn. Von der Idee zur Wirklichkeit*, ed. Wolfgang Wirth, Köln 2005; Wolfgang F. Jäger, *Der Streckenentwurf der Reichsautobahnen 1933 bis 1945*, Köln 2013.

⁴ The construction of the motorway network was preceded by a discussion on the model of special roads designed exclusively for cars, which were supposed to serve the automotive progress in a similar way as the laying of the railroad tracks contributed to the development of the rail transport. In the process of establishing the technical and organizational-financial parameters, different definitions of motorways were used in Germany, such as *Autostraße*, *reine Autostraße*, *Automobilstraße*, *Autobahnstraße*, *Autobahn*, *Automobil-Verkehrstraße*, *Kraftwagenbahn*, *Kraftwagenstraße* and *Nurautostraße*. See Roland Gabriel, *Dem Auto eine Bahn. Deutsche “Nurautostraßen” vor 1933*, Köln 2010, p. 321.

⁵ Gabriel, *Dem Auto eine Bahn*, p. 40.

⁶ See Kurt Kaftan, *Der Kampf um die Autobahnen. Geschichte der Autobahnen in Deutschland 1907–1935*, Berlin 1955; Martin Kornrumpf, *HAFRABA e.V. Deutsche Autobahn-Planung 1926–1934*, Bonn 1990.

Lower Silesian authorities⁷, which is why it seems so important to include previously unused source materials stored in the State Archives in Wrocław⁸. Their analysis does not indicate that this project is of particular importance in the supra-regional dimension, but allows to understand its Lower Silesian context. There is, however, some uncertainty as to how far the first planned motorway would represent a breakthrough in the region's transport practice, but it can certainly be seen as an indication of future developments in this area.

The first press releases about the planned motorway connecting Wrocław and Kłodzko County (*Autostraße Breslau – Grafschaft Glatz*) appeared in September 1927 in the well-known tourist-resort periodical “Schlesische Bäderzeitung”. It should be noted that from the very beginning it was a protourist investment, which was to make it easier for the inhabitants of Wrocław to get to the Kłodzko Sudetes⁹. It was not a particularly unusual idea at that time, because the tourist purposes were already behind the construction of the Italian Motorway of the Lakes (*Autostrada dei Laghi*) Milan – Varese / Como / Sesto Calende, which provided a comfortable drive from the capital of Lombardy towards the Alps¹⁰. It was opened between 1924 and 1925 and is considered to be a precursor of European motorways. From 1925 onwards, similar concepts were proposed in Munich, where a link to the Alps (Garmisch) was also considered¹¹. In the case of the Wrocław project, Italian inspirations were not exposed, but they seem obvious, since the Motorway of the Lakes was widely discussed at the time.

In the light of the “Schlesische Bäderzeitung” releases, the motorway link between Wrocław and Kłodzko County was to be the subject of discussions between representatives of the Province of Lower Silesia, the Silesian Association of Tourism Promotion (*Schlesischer Verkehrsverband*) and the Federation of Mountain Societies

⁷ Roland Gabriel referred in his work (p. 377) to only one article titled *Schlesische Nur-Autostraßen-Pläne*, published in 1929 in the specialist periodical of Berlin “HAFRABA-Mitteilungsblatt”.

⁸ The State Archives in Wrocław (Archiwum Państwowe we Wrocławiu, hereinafter: APWr), Local Government Department of the Province of Silesia in Wrocław (Wydział Samorządowy Prowincji Śląskiej we Wrocławiu, hereinafter: WSPŚ), ref. 2272: Nur-Autostrassen; ref. 2223: Kraftwagenstrasse Breslau – Grafsch[aft] Glatz; APWr, Regency of Wrocław (Rejencja Wrocławska, hereinafter: Regency), ref. I/9759, Automobilstraßen.

⁹ *Autostraße von Breslau in die Grafschaft Glatz*, “Schlesische Bäderzeitung”, No. 19, 14 XII 1927, p. 163.

¹⁰ Piero Puricelli, *Autostrade. Die Autostrasse Mailand – Oberitalienische Seen*, Milano 1925.

¹¹ Gabriel, *Dem Auto eine Bahn*, p. 228.

at the Owl (*Verband der Gebirgsvereine an der Eule*)¹². The latter sought to lead the motorway through one of the Owl Mountains Passes, which enjoyed growing popularity among the inhabitants of Wrocław. However, the potential benefits of the tourism industry in the Owl Mountains and Kłodzko Land have provoked powerful organizations: the Central Agency for Tourism Promotion in the Karkonosze and Jizera Mountains (*Hauptverkehrsstelle des Riesen- und Isergebirges*) and the Karkonosze Society (*Riesengebirgsverein*) to intervene with the *Landeshauptmann* of the Province of Lower Silesia, Georg von Thaer. They were concerned that the planned investment would affect the tourist preferences of the motorists – i.e. the more affluent – residents of Wrocław, which could be a double loss to the leading Karkonosze resorts at that time. Therefore, the aforementioned organizations were demanding equal treatment, i.e., simultaneous implementation of the motorway towards Jelenia Góra (Hirschberg) and Karkonosze¹³.

The *Landeshauptmann* tried to calm things down. He questioned the credibility of press releases and claimed that no provincial funding was planned for such projects. It cannot be ruled out that some other official favoured plans for motorway construction at that time, but Thaer himself clearly distanced himself from them. He underlined the need to modernize the network of the main road connections of Lower Silesia, but at the same time the potentially small interest in using the motorway, caused by the limited number of cars¹⁴. The reputable “*Schlesische Zeitung*” reported that the provincial authorities did not plan to build the Wrocław – Kłodzko County motorway, because it would be extremely expensive and there was a lack of money for more urgent tasks¹⁵. This approach to the problem was highly rational, which is why the modernization and expansion of the basic road infrastructure was supported by recognised industry associations in Germany (e.g. *Straßenbauverband Deutschland*) and study teams (e.g. *Studien-gesellschaft für Automobilstraßenbau*). Lower Silesian province officials knew their recommendations, yet they also heard about the financial failure of the toll Motorway of the Lakes¹⁶.

¹² *Autostraße Breslau-Eulengebirge-Grafschaft*, “*Schlesische Bäderzeitung*”, No 20, 28 IX 1927, p. 170.

¹³ APWr, WSPŚ, ref. 2272, pp. 1, 4–5, 9.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 3.

¹⁵ *Die Autostraße nach dem Riesengebirge*, “*Schlesische Zeitung*“, No. 509, 7 X 1927, 2. Bogen.

¹⁶ APWr, WSPŚ, ref. 2272, pp. 8, 15, 17–20.

At a time when the automotive industry in Germany was just gaining momentum, when the authorities were concentrating on adapting existing roads to the needs of car traffic, which required, among other things, hardening of the surface and widening of the roadways¹⁷, when there were ongoing discussions about transit connections and sections to improve traffic on the most heavily trafficked routes, the idea of building a tourist motorway to the Sudetes might seem like a distant future. This visionary project, however, had a considerable promotional potential, which probably decided about its undertaking again. Its main and, in fact, only significant advocate was the new *Oberpräsidenten* of the Province of Lower Silesia, the social democrat Hermann Lüdemann (1928–1932)¹⁸. It is now difficult to see why he supported this ambitious plan, but it is worth noting that he had a technical education and spent many years in Berlin, where he had to observe the rapid automotive progress. The enthusiasm of the *Oberpräsidenten* was not shared by the *Landeshauptmann* Georg von Thaer, whose scepticism was shared by many local government officials in Lower Silesia who were expecting to invest in the construction of roads in the region.

The key discussion on the Wrocław – Ślęża Massif (Zobten-Gebirge) – The Owl Mountains – Kłodzko Land (*Autostraße Breslau – Zobtengebirge – Eulengebirge – Glatzer Bergland*) took place on 13th August 1929. At the invitation of the *Oberpräsidenten*, about 50 participants attended the event, including: the President of the Regency of Wrocław, interested *Landrats*, representatives of Wrocław, the Labour Office, the Post, the Railways and chambers of commerce. Lüdemann persuaded the audience that the new road will significantly shorten the access to attractive mountain areas for the residents of Wrocław, which will result in the development of the local tourist industry. He mentioned the facilitation of transportation of goods and agricultural produce, and at the same time the possibility of using investments to fight unemployment. However, the presented vision had a weak point. It was a wishful

¹⁷ In 1926, they were registered in Germany as a whole 0.53 million cars, buses and motorcycles, and in 1930 – 1.08 million. In 1924, 87.2% of the national and provincial roads in Germany and 32.1% in 1933 had a gravel surface only. Only 24.5% of roads in these categories had the recommended width of 5.5–6.5 m in 1933, and only 3.7% were wider. See Gabriel, *Dem Auto eine Bahn*, pp. 12, 23, 35–37.

¹⁸ Hermann Lüdemann was born in 1880 in Lübeck. In 1908 he joined the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). From 1915 to 1922 he was a member of the Berlin City Council and from 1921 to 1929 of the Landtag of Prussia. Prisoned by the Nazis between 1933–1935 and 1944–1945, he died in 1959. See Gisela M. Krause, *Lüdemann Hermann*, [in:] *Neue Deutsche Biographie*, vol. 15, Berlin 1987, pp. 450–452.

thinking about the financing of the project, which later decided to gradually trim it down. Originally it envisaged the construction of a motorway running from Wrocław – to the east of the Ślęza Massif – in the direction of the Owl Mountains and further to Radków (Radkau), through the Stołowe Mountains (Heuscheuergebirge), to Duszniki-Zdrój (Bad Rainerz), Polanica-Zdrój (Bad Altheide), Bystrzyca Kłodzka (Habelschwerdt), from here through the Śnieżnik Massif (Glatzer Schneegebirge) to Łądek-Zdrój (Bad Landeck), Złoty Stok (Raichenstein) and Ząbkowice Śląskie (Frankenstein), from where one could return to Wrocław¹⁹.

The voices of those gathered at the meeting were divided into strong supporters and reserved sceptics. The former expressed hope for economic revival of the areas located in the vicinity of the planned road, while the latter pointed to the lack of any real justification for such an expensive undertaking. It is worth noting the opinion expressed by a representative of the Automobile Club of Germany (*Automobilklub von Deutschland*), who showed interest in the motorway, but did not believe in its creation, so he postulated an increase in expenditure on modernization of existing roads²⁰. At the request of the *Oberpräsidenten*, the meeting ended with the establishment of a committee (*Arbeitsausschuss für den Bau einer Kraftwagenstraße Breslau – Grafschaft Glatz*) to determine further details of the plan. The committee was made up of Prof. Louis Jaenicke of the Technical University (Wrocław), *Landrats* Friedrich von Degenfeld-Schonburg (Dzierżoniów/Reichenbach) and Emil Schubert (Nowa Ruda/Neurode), a city councillor Günter Trauer (Wrocław), and a director of a resort Georg Berlit (Polanica-Zdrój)²¹.

The Wrocław press informed about the course of the talks, however its tone was far from euphoric. On 15th August 1929, the “Schlesische Zeitung” published a short discussion of the project, which was clearly attributed to Lüdemann and linked to the development of tourism in the Ślęza and Kłodzko Massif. The author of this text acknowledged the importance of the project yet pointed to the unresolved problem of financing the construction of the road (120 km) estimated at 75 million marks. He expressed doubts whether in the country’s economic situation at that

¹⁹ APWr, WSPŚ, ref. 2223, pp. 1–4. It can be assumed that the Kłodzko part of the project referred to the idea of the “spa ring” (Bäderring), which was discussed in the Kłodzko tourist circles.

²⁰ A similar attitude towards the Munich – Garmisch motorway was presented by the Bavarian Automobile Club (*Bayerischer Automobil-Club*), whose representatives decided that the modernization of existing roads is more urgent than the implementation of an investment “of the future”. See Gabriel, *Dem Auto eine Bahn*, p. 228.

²¹ APWr, WSPŚ, ref. 2223, pp. 2–4; APWr, Regency, ref. I/9759, pp. 51–52.

time the investment would be possible at all to implement and whether it would not be better to allocate the available public funds to other purposes²². The weak points of the project were pointed out by a representative of the Railways, who understandably considered the improvement of railroad transport as a cheaper and more effective solution. He noted that the new road will not have the potential to contribute to the mass tourism, as a limited number of cars will not allow it. He recalled the reservations of the representatives of Karkonosze organizations about the unequal treatment of the Jelenia Góra Sudetes, which could only be remedied by a double investment, but then the expected costs of such operations would be inconceivable²³. Let us add, for the sake of order, that the Karkonosze associations did not cease their protests and loudly demanded an improvement of communication in the region of the Western Sudetes²⁴.

In the summer of 1929, there was only an initial concept, which included a motorway connection of Wrocław with Kłodzko County, its ring road, and several motorway junctions, including an important access for tourists to the Tąpadła Pass in the Ślęza Massif²⁵. Detailed proposals were to be presented by the aforementioned commission, headed by the *Landrat* of Nowa Ruda, E. Schubert. Originally, this place was intended for the *Landeshauptmann* Thaer, but he refused to participate in the committee's work. He justified his refusal by his deep conviction that it was impossible to finance the construction of the motorway. He also allegedly did not want to give the impression that he preferred one of the tourist regions. The commission met for the first time on 10th September 1929 and asked the land construction councillor, Beiersdorf to design a road from Wrocław to the Owl Mountains, specifically to Woliborz in the Kłodzko (Nowa Ruda) part of the massif. The first results of these works were available at the beginning of December, and the members of the commission were able to read them during an outgoing meeting on 19th December 1929²⁶.

From the very beginning, the topic of fighting unemployment was a component of the motorway project, allowing to justify the investment in the social dimension and count on government support within the framework of aid programs. Without

²² APWr, Regency, ref. I/9759, p. 49; APWr, WSPŚ, ref. 2223, p. 5; *Eine kreuzungsfreie Autostraße nach der Grafschaft*, "Schlesische Zeitung", No. 412, 15 VIII 1929, 2. Bogen.

²³ APWr, WSPŚ, ref. 2223, p. 12 (Pischel, *Die kreuzungsfreie Autostraße*, "Schlesische Zeitung", 13 X 1929).

²⁴ APWr, WSPŚ, ref. 2223, p. 75.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 8–9.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 14–18, 26–27.

this money it was difficult to even think about financing the project. The great economic crisis which began in the autumn of 1929 strengthened the importance of this factor, but it had already been assumed that governmental aid programs would be introduced in Lower Silesia to help in overcoming the region's economic decline. Schubert convinced the *Landeshauptmann* that most of the costs of building the motorway could be covered by government loans and unemployment funds, but Thaer wanted concrete figures, and these could not be provided²⁷. The topic of raising money and lowering the investment costs was constantly accompanying the talks about the motorway. Depending on a technical standard and length of the section assumed, different amounts were given. For example, in the calculation from autumn 1929, the amount of 3.1 million marks was given for the first stage of the works, but the laying of a permanent (asphalt or paving) surface was omitted²⁸.

The program of building a motorway to the mountains and improving the road system within Kłodzko County was too ambitious, so it had to be scheduled for stages. From 1930 onwards, only the motorway Wrocław – the Ślęza Massif – the Owl Mountains (*Kraftwagenstrasse Breslau – Zobten – Eulengebirge*) was mentioned, but this also did not determine the success. The work of the commission lost its intensity at that time, which can be explained by the growing general crisis. The passing months were used to look for optimal solutions and verified patterns. It turned out that in Germany, one can only refer to the experience with the construction of the first Cologne – Bonn motorway (1929–1932)²⁹. The Wrocław project itself was not widely publicized in Germany, so it remained essentially a topic of intra-regional discourse. During the planning of the Lower Silesian investment, an attempt was made to determine how far it would shorten the passage to the Sudetes. The calculations showed that on roads running from Wrocław to Kłodzko County, cars were travelling at an average speed of 43 km/h. On the motorway running to the foothills of the Owl Mountains, the speed of 80 km/h was expected, on the mountain sections and non-upgraded Kłodzko roads only 45–50 km/h. The Wrocław users of the planned route were therefore to save 18 minutes on their way to the Tąpadła Pass, about 30 minutes to the Owl Mountains and 40–50 minutes

²⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 14, 17, 36, 72–73, 76, 78–79.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 21.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 11, 28–29; ref. 2272, pp. 16, 19, 21–26, 29–30.

to the Kłodzko resorts³⁰. These differences were not impressive, but the expected improvement in travel comfort and safety should be added to this.

The revised Beiersdorf's project was completed in early March 1930. It envisaged the construction of a 68.8 km long motorway for 12.6 million marks³¹. Its course was discussed at several meetings and field trips. The most questionable was the designation of the exit route from Wrocław: via Klecina (Klettendorf) or Oporów (Opperau), because it involved the need to solve the wider communication problems of the land capital³². Refining the details of the motorway project did not mean that doubts about its future were resolved. The opposition was invariably expressed by *Landeshauptmann* Thaer, who on 10th June 1930 explained to the local government officials concerned that the provincial authorities had not taken binding decisions on this subject and that it was likely that, due to the high costs, the project would not be implemented at all. Another time, he explained that the motorway programme will not deprive others of access to capital, because private investors will never lend their money for an unprofitable venture³³. He still remained an advocate of gradual modernisation of existing roads, including the construction of ring roads. The Provincial *Oberpräsidenten* was aware of the problems that existed, so at the beginning of 1931, in a letter to the President of the Regency of Wrocław, he mentioned that although the project "Kłodzko" should not be underestimated, at the same time he accepted the need to improve the condition of existing Lower Silesian roads³⁴. According to the information sent by the *Landrats*, only in this Regency of Wrocław 388 towns waited for a road connection. One of the *Landrats* stated on that occasion that the Kłodzko County already has good enough transport links to Wrocław, so he felt that the planned motorway had a purely technical dimension, while investment in the basic transport tissue was pro-development. The *Landrat* of Świdnica (Schweidnitz) regarded the project under consideration as a luxury (*Luxus-Autostraße*) and, in total, only the *Landrat* of Nowa Ruda supported the idea of building a new road to relieve the existing roads. He also expressed the opinion that the Kłodzko County should not lose out on the fact that other counties did not conduct proper work in the field of road

³⁰ APWr, WSPŚ, ref. 2223, pp. 21, 24.

³¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 32, 46.

³² *Ibidem*, pp. 47, 50, 56–57, 60, 62–65, 68–70.

³³ *Ibidem*, pp. 40–42; ref. 2272, pp. 20, 27–28.

³⁴ APWr, Regency, ref. I/9759, p. 1.

construction³⁵. Lüdemann was at that time determined to support at least a part of the planned route and on 13th February 1931 he offered the *Landrat* of Niemcza (Nimptsch), Paul Seibold, funds (35,000 marks) for the construction of a short section crossing the Oleszeńskie Hills in the Ślęza Massif, if he would declare immediate commencement of work. The attempt to break the deadlock was not successful. The policy of small steps did not make sense when the course of the road was still under discussion and subject to constant adjustments³⁶.

At a meeting organised on 22nd August 1931, the *Oberpräsidenten* felt compelled to declare that he did not see any chance of implementing the original plan to lead the motorway towards Kłodzko County, and he advocated cutting the project down to the section connecting Wrocław with the Ślęza Massif. He considered the public financing of the project to be unrealistic, therefore he opted for the establishment of an association (company) and the collection of road tolls in the future³⁷. In the autumn of 1931, the committee presented its final conclusions on the “Ślęza” road, after which it stopped its activities. The proposed route was to be 26.7 km long, to leave the busy Wrocław–Świdnica road near Tyniec Mały (Klein Tinz) and lead to Przemiłów (Schieferstein) (Oleszeńskie Hills). In order to save money, the construction of collision-free junctions was abandoned, and the only major engineering facility was to be a viaduct over the railway line near Olbrachtowice (Albrechtsdorf). Although it was assumed that the road should ultimately be 12 m wide, a more modest solution adapted to the expected traffic volume (9 and 6 m) was initially proposed. Cuts were also visible in the case of road construction, limited to the base (15 cm) and gravel layer (18 cm). The upper layer was supposed to be a stone cube or bituminous cover (8 cm), but its laying was supposed to wait a few years, which allowed to “save” 1.3 million marks. Thanks to these decisions, the cost of the project was to be reduced to about 2.5 million marks³⁸.

On 19th January 1932, *Oberpräsidenten* Lüdemann convened a meeting during which he tried to persuade the *Landrats* of the four districts through which the “Ślęza” road was to run, to take their responsibility for preparing its detailed plans. The geodesic and design works were agreed to be co-financed by the representatives of Wrocław District. The others refused, on the grounds of lack of resources. The *Oberpräsidenten* ruled out the takeover of this expenditure by the province, and

³⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 5–46.

³⁶ APWr, WSPŚ, ref. 2223, pp. 87, 93.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 94.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 97–101, 128–130.

a *Zweckverband* (purpose association) was therefore being considered³⁹. It should be stressed that the disputes over the amount of several thousand marks needed to elaborate a proper project indicated further complications associated with the financing of the road. The expected annual cost of loan service (225,000 marks) and expenditure on the maintenance of the route (100,000 marks), with revenue from road tolls estimated at a maximum of 247,500 marks, would lead to a considerable deficit (77,500 marks). It is worth noting that the average motorway traffic volume was estimated at 400 cars and motorcycles and 100 trucks and buses per day (in the summer season), i.e. below the current traffic volume on the neighbouring routes: the Świdnica and Kłodzko routes (550 cars and motorcycles and 56 trucks on average). The negative impact of toll collection (1.5 and 3 marks respectively)⁴⁰, was probably taken into account, but it can still be seen from these calculations that the final balance of measures taken was not particularly promising.

The preserved documentation shows that Lower Silesian decision-makers were quite well aware of the technical and organisational solutions discussed and implemented in Germany at the time⁴¹. Such inspiration is also reflected in an article published on 19th February 1932 in “Breslauer Neueste Nachrichten”, in which reference was made several times to the Cologne – Bonn motorway which was currently being finalised⁴². It is worth stressing that it was a text unambiguously favourable to the idea of building a new road. The author referred to the social expectations related to this investment and stressed the inadequacy of roads to the rapidly growing car traffic. He also explained that the planned “Ślęza” road was to be the first stage in the construction of the Wrocław – Kłodzko County Motorway. It was conceived as a transit car route, making it easier for the inhabitants of Wrocław to travel to tourist resorts, but at the same time it gained a tourist dimension because it was supposed to expose the beauty of the mountain surroundings to the travellers already while driving a car⁴³.

At this seemingly predictable stage of preparation, there was an unexpected sharp turn. The worsening economic crisis, mass unemployment and political reshuffling in Berlin in 1932 made the launch of interventional road construction works

³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 111; APWr, Regency, ref. I/9759, p. 55.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 121.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 89–91.

⁴² *Ibidem*, p. 31.

⁴³ APWr, Regency, ref. I/9759, p. 57 (*Die Autostraße Breslau – Glatzer Gebirge*, „Breslauer Neueste Nachrichten”, No. 49, 19 II 1932).

financed from the central budget became realistic, as was persuaded by the President of the Reichsbank, Hans Luther, and the well-known Professor Emil Lederer, among others. Their proposals aroused again the hopes of the Lower Silesian authorities⁴⁴. In mid-June, *Oberpräsidenten* Lüdemann wrote optimistically to the President of the Wrocław Region that the project of a tourist road from Wrocław to the Kłodzko Sudetes, which was dropped for financial reasons, is once again gaining importance and supporters. Wanting to make good use of this opportunity, he convened another meeting (18 June 1932) and, anticipating the launch of major road construction aid programmes, he pointed out the need to quickly prepare projects that could be used in good time. As during previous such consultations, some decision-makers contrasted the Wrocław – Ślęża Massif – Kłodzko County motorway (then known as the Stołowogórska Road – Heuscheuerstraße) with the need for road modernisation. However, it was finally decided to establish the Working Committee on the Promotion of Transport from the Capital City to the Silesian Mountains (*Arbeitsausschuss zur Förderung des hauptstädtischen Verkehrs mit den schlesischen Gebirgen*), which was to bring together the authorities, associations and companies interested in the investment to promote the road and prepare the necessary documentation⁴⁵. The supporters of the project tried again to persuade the Landeshauptmann, but he – who was not present at the meeting (!) – informed the *Oberpräsidenten* that he, as well as the Land Road Construction Councilor Matthias Reumann, could not get involved in the project until it had been approved by the Local Government Department of the Province of Lower Silesia⁴⁶. The decision was not supposed to be made until August, while Lüdemann clearly insisted on speeding up the preparations and was looking for funds to refine the design of the Ślęża section (10,000–12,000 marks). For this purpose, the *Schlesische Zementindustrie* provided 1,000 marks, and Reumann – who was one of the supporters of the projects – tried to unofficially attract more “shareholders” from the road construction industry⁴⁷. All these activities soon lost their importance. In July 1932, Lüdemann was dismissed from the office of the *Oberpräsidenten* of the Province of Lower Silesia, which was connected with the removal of social democrats from the rule in Prussia. The motorway project thus lost its main promoter. The final end was made by the Local Government Department,

⁴⁴ APWr, Regency, pp. 67–68; APWr, WSPŚ, ref. 2223, pp. 125–126, 139–140.

⁴⁵ APWr, WSPŚ, ref. 2223, pp. 127, 132, 137; APWr, Regency, ref. I/9759, pp. 79–84.

⁴⁶ APWr, WSPŚ, ref. 2223, pp. 127, 131; APWr, Regency, ref. I/9759, pp. 69–70.

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 133–136, 141–144, 147.

which on 13th October 1932 – answering Thaeer’s request – took a negative stance on the whole idea. It was stated that the project had no justification at the time and that there was no chance for its implementation (financing) in the foreseeable future either. Potential aid measures should therefore have served to modernise existing roads, the condition of which was deemed unsatisfactory⁴⁸.

The vision of the construction of the Wrocław – Kłodzko County motorway (Ślęża Massif, Owl Mountains, Stołowe Mountains), discussed in Lower Silesia shortly before Hitler came to power, undoubtedly exceeded the possibilities and needs of the time, as was being pointed out by its pragmatic opponents. Similar controversies were also present at that time in other projects of this type, because with limited financial resources, it was inevitable to choose between systematic improvement of the basic road infrastructure and bold concepts that look to the future. At the same time, however, it cannot be said that the construction of ring roads, road viaducts, the alleviation of curve radii and the hardening of the surface of ‘ordinary’ roads did not constitute clear progress in relation to the existing situation. Both strategies were present in Lower Silesia, which proves good discernment and, in a way, maturity of the Lower Silesian authorities, whose representatives were looking for an optimal solution to the crisis situation. In favourable circumstances, with the financial support of the central authorities, the motorway programme had a chance to materialise and in the long term it would probably contribute to the development of the region, but the laborious modernisation of the road network in Lower Silesia also led to it⁴⁹. It was not accompanied by spectacular achievements, however, it found the understanding of road users as expressed by representatives of this environment. The planned road could count on the support of tourism industry circles, but in this case there was competition for the direction of investment. Furthermore, it seems significant in assessing the value of the project that instead of promoting the Karkonosze centres, the strongest in the region, it envisaged support for the weaker Owl Mountain–Kłodzko region.

It was not possible to say who was the author of the idea of a motorway connection between Wrocław and Kłodzko County, nor who and how convinced the

⁴⁸ APWr, WSPŚ, ref. 2223, pp. 137, 148–153.

⁴⁹ Between 1927 and 1929, in the Lower Silesian Province, the length of roads with the best pavement (*Schwere Decken*) increased from 309.7 to 343.5 km, with a medium (*Mittelschwere Decken*) from 49.9 to 115.7 km, and with a light (*Leichte Decken*) from 1673.3 to 1913.4 km. – APWr, General Presidium of the Province of Silesia (Naczelne Prezydium Prowincji Śląskiej we Wrocławiu), ref. 281: Verteilung des Kraftfahrzeugsteuer, Erhebungen über Straßen 1929, pp. 12–14, 32–34.

social democratic *Oberpräsidenten* of the Lower Silesian Province to support it. However, it should be mentioned that Lüdemann's involvement was fundamental. Cautious press releases seem to indicate that the project did not grow out of widespread social expectations. It could not have been otherwise, since in 1929, in the Regency of Wrocław it was recorded in total: 12,475 cars, 212 buses, 3,265 trucks and 19,037 motorcycles⁵⁰. At this stage of development of the automotive industry, in the face of a number of other problems, a motorway with a tourist profile was certainly not one of the most urgent undertakings. Attempts were made to balance its "luxurious" dimension by highlighting the programme to combat unemployment (intervention works) and the potential development of tourism services⁵¹. Similar objectives were later ascribed to the "Hitler's Roads"⁵², which were among the flagship investments of the Third Reich. In the assessment of the "boldness" of the Wrocław plan from 1927–1932, one should generally take into account the fact that as early as 1933 Hitler launched a German-wide motorway programme. As part of this programme, Wrocław was soon linked to Berlin. The works were carried out in the Upper Silesian sections. The Wrocław – Vienna⁵³, motorway was to lead by Kłodzko, and the first sections of the Sudeten Route⁵⁴. The Nazis preferred not to see any analogy with the "republican" projects, and the huge investments – as in the whole of Germany – were to be associated only with Hitler's rule.

The Lower Silesian project is an element of wider efforts and activities preceding the construction of the legendary "Hitler's Roads". Although it failed to move from the consultation phase to actual preparation and implementation in this case,

⁵⁰ In 1925, they were registered in the Wrocław region: 4,246 passenger cars, 70 buses, 1,472 trucks and 3,443 motorcycles, in 1932, respectively 11,344, 242, 2,747 and 25,558 – "Schlesien in Zahlen: Volk und Raum", 2 (1939), p. 48.

⁵¹ Only the richer strata of society could afford their own car. Other tourists could use public transport, which is why *Oberpräsidenten* Lüdemann wanted the buses to be free of charge on the motorway APWr, WSPŚ, ref. 2223, p. 128.

⁵² At this point, it is appropriate to question the view that the German motorways built in the 1930s were intended for military use. See, among others: Tomasz Przerwa, *Wpływ Reichswehry i Wehrmachtu na projektowanie autostrad i modernizację dróg krajowych na Śląsku w latach 30. XX w.*, [in:] *W garnizonie i na kwaterze... Wojskowi i cywile*, eds. Robert Klementowski, Marek Zawadka, Wrocław 2017, pp. 145–154.

⁵³ Tomáš Janda, Václav Líd1, *Německá průchozi dálnice*, díl I: *Severní úsek*, Praha [2008], [in:] http://knihovna.belaujev.net/dokumenty/nemecka-pruchozi-dalnice_Idil.pdf (access: 10 XII 2019).

⁵⁴ The small funds raised in 1932 in connection with the design of the Wrocław – Kłodzko County motorway were spent only in 1938 on the occasion of opening one of the sections of the Sudeten Route. See APWr, WSPŚ, ref. 87: Darlehen v. 1000 RM des Oberprärs. NS zum Bau einer Autostraße Breslau – Glatz, p. 1–8.

yet the same fate was met by most of similar initiatives taken in the 1920s in Germany. The initiative presented confirms that the ‘motorway’ discourse taking place in West and Central Germany was not only closely observed in Lower Silesia, but it was also possible to convert it into a bold intention. However, no innovative concepts and solutions have been developed in Wrocław which would later be more widely applied. Rather, attempts were made to adapt the already known ideas to regional circumstances. In this respect, the project presented allows for an indirect insight into the realities accompanying the development of the Lower Silesian automotive industry at the turn of the 1920s and 1930s.

STRESZCZENIE

W latach 1927–1932 prowadzono na Dolnym Śląsku rozmowy, których przedmiotem była budowa pionierskiej autostrady: Wrocław – hrabstwo kłodzkie. Miała ona połączyć stolicę regionu z ośrodkami turystycznymi położonymi w Sudetach. Ten przyszłościowy projekt wpisywał się w modernizacyjną politykę władz prowincji dolnośląskiej, ale nie doczekał się realizacji m.in. z powodu braku finansowania. Autostradowa soczewka pozwala uchwycić dyskusje na temat rozwoju infrastruktury drogowej w okresie przyspieszonego wzrostu motoryzacji. Oddaje dylematy ówczesnych elit, zmuszonych do wyboru strategii rozwoju prowincji. Wrocławska inicjatywa oddaje regionalne podejście do tematu autostrad, które były w tym czasie przedmiotem analiz w Niemczech i Europie. Dolnośląski projekt przewidywał rozwój turystyki i branży turystycznej, a jego szanse upatrywano w wykorzystaniu funduszy pomocowych do walki z bezrobociem.

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THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE POLISH COAL MINING INDUSTRY TO THE ECONOMY OF INTERWAR EUROPE

POLSKIE GÓRNICTWÓ WĘGLOWE W STRUKTURZE GOSPODARCZEJ EUROPY MIĘDZYWOJENNEJ

ABSTRACT: The article describes the importance and position of the Polish coal mining during the inter-war period in the structure of the European economy. The Polish mining industry at that time was subject to concentration processes in order to establish coal sales companies and cartel organisations for representation before government authorities and joint price setting. Regarding the source base, the basic research material was the archives stored in the State Archives in Katowice and Warsaw, supplemented by statistical data.

KEYWORDS: Upper Silesia, history of economy, Polish industry, Polish coal mines, Polish foreign trade

The end of the First World War and the collapse of the Central Powers coalition resulted in territorial changes, mainly in Central Europe. As a result of the disintegration of Tsarist Russia and Austria-Hungary, the following states were formed: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The consequence was also a change in the social and economic structure, visible in Poland, which emerged from the lands of the three Partitions with varying degrees of economic development. This also applied to coal mining, whose organisational structure varied from advanced forms of commercial companies to individual enterprises without a specific legal status.

Changes also occurred in the global mining industry. The United States became the leader in coal mining, but Great Britain still remained the largest exporter¹.

The role of Upper Silesian industry in the European economy

The First World War and the subsequent partition of Upper Silesia affected its position in the existing economic relations. Previously, it had been one of the three large centres of heavy industry in the Second Reich, whose ownership structure was mostly linked to the estates of local noble families with the backing of banks. However, the geographical location of the deposits in the eastern part of the state and their much smaller resources, in comparison to the Ruhr and Saarland, resulted in its low competitiveness, effectively closing off access to the markets of western countries. Shipping was concentrated in the eastern provinces of Germany and Berlin, as well as to Austria-Hungary and the Russian Empire. This situation collapsed with the outbreak of the First World War, when Germany and Russia found themselves in opposing camps: Triple Alliance and Triple Entente. As a result of switching the economy to the war mode, the losses in coal exports were compensated by higher consumption in domestic and occupied industrial plants. The years 1918–1921, due to the unsettled legal status of the region, left major investment uncertainties among the holders. The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and its subsequent conflict with Poland resulted in the collapse of previous economic ties and export opportunities to the east. Despite Germany's deteriorating economic situation, Upper Silesian mining provided coal shipments after the loss of the Saarland and war reparations quotas. The high level of coal shipments was also maintained in the first years after the partition of Upper Silesia, due to the provisions of the Geneva Convention of May 1922, as a result of which Germany was obliged to receive coal duty-free from the Polish part, in view of the low level of coal consumption in the Polish market (Table No. 1).

¹ *Die Kohlenwirtschaft der Welt in Zahlen*, Essen 1952, pp. 96, 138.

Table No. 1: Comparison of transports of Upper Silesian coal [in tonnes], directed to the Polish^a and German markets in the years 1920–1925

Year	Poland	Germany (with Austria)
1920	2,589,815	1,847,052
1921	2,475,128	2,045,533
1922	1,770,816	1,146,951
1923	3,066,539	2,274,877
1924	3,587,804	2,566,652
1925	4,949,901	2,410,706

^a - applies to all recipients, with the exception of railway employee allowances and Upper Silesian industrial plants.

Source: *Statistik der Berg- und Hüttenwerke in Polnisch-Oberschlesien für das Jahr 1921*, Kattowitz 1921, p. 42; *Statistik der Berg- und Hüttenwerke in Polnisch-Oberschlesien für das Jahr 1923*, Katowice 1924, pp. 69–70; *Statistik der Berg- und Hüttenwerke in Polnisch-Oberschlesien für das Jahr 1924*, Katowice 1925, p. 72 *Statistik der Berg- und Hüttenwerke in Polnisch-Oberschlesien für das Jahr 1926*, Katowice 1927, pp. 71–72.

The situation collapsed in mid-1925, with the expiry of the transitional period associated with the application of the most favoured nation clause in trade with Germany and duty-free imports of Upper Silesian coal. The toughening of the German economic policy resulted from purely political reasons, in connection with the financial reform introduced by Władysław Grabski's government in 1924, as changes were made in the customs policy by increasing duties on a number of imported products². The change in customs tariffs was a flashpoint in relations between the two states, as during the several post-war years, Germany had made the Polish economy dependent on exports of industrial goods. The German side therefore maintained that Poland was a precarious state without a stable economic situation, thus fostering its revisionist attitude and hopes for regaining Upper Silesia. Though both states were aware of the expiry of the period mentioned in Article 264 of the Treaty of Versailles and Article 224 of the Geneva Convention ensuring Poland

² Zbigniew Landau, Jan Tomaszewski, *Gospodarka Polski Międzywojennej*, vol. 2: 1924–1929, pp. 271–276, Warszawa 1971; *Regulation of the President of the Republic of Poland of 9 February 1924 on amendments to the Customs Tariff*, "Dziennik Ustaw" ("Journal of Laws", hereinafter: DU), 1924, No. 14, item 129; *Regulation of the Ministry of Treasury and the Ministry of Industry and Trade of 23 May 1924 on Customs Relief*, DU, 1924, No. 47, item 482; *Regulation of the President of the Republic of Poland of 26 June 1924 on the Customs Tariff*, DU, 1924, No. 54, item 540.

a privileged position in trade with Germany³. However, Germany did not start trade negotiations until January 1925, and the conclusion of the agreement was hindered by the German demand to accept by Poland a most-favoured-nation clause for Germany and the resignation from expelling persons opting for Germany, while at the same time opposing Polish demands for the lifting of the ban on imports of Polish goods and restrictions on coal imports⁴. Whereas Germany, by decree of the German Coal Commissioner had already on 3rd June 1925 limited the import of coal from Poland to 250,000 tonnes in the current month, and from 15th June suspended its total import until the end of negotiations. In response, the Polish government issued a decree on 17th June prohibiting the import of goods from countries applying similar bans⁵. On 1st and 2nd July, Germany banned the import of most Polish goods, charging high customs duties on them. In this state of affairs, the customs war affected the Polish economy much more than the German one⁶, so it was expected on the German side that Poland's payment and export difficulties would force it to make concessions. Instead, its situation improved in October 1926, following the signing of an agreement between the state railways of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria. A reduction in the price of railway tariffs for the transport of Polish coal followed, enabling its export to Austria, Italy and the Balkans⁷. In addition, the outbreak of a miners' strike in Great Britain in May 1926 opened up markets for Polish coal in the Scandinavian countries. This resulted in a revival of Polish coal exports (Table No. 2).

³ See German-Polish Convention on Upper Silesia signed in Geneva on 15th May 1922 (DU, 1922, No. 44, item 371), cf. Witold Marcoń, *Unifikacja województwa śląskiego z II Rzeczypospolitą*, Toruń 2007.

⁴ A. W., *Rokowania handlowe z Niemcami*, "Przemysł i Handel", 1925, p. 1267; Kazimierz Kasperski, *Tymczasowy układ gospodarczy polsko-niemiecki*, "Przegląd Gospodarczy", 3 (1925).

⁵ *Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 17 June 1925 on the prohibition of importation of certain goods*, DU, 1925, No. 61, item 430.

⁶ Polish regulations applied to 47% of German goods imported into the country, but this accounted for only 3% of their annual exports. In turn, German restrictions applied to 57% of Polish goods, which constituted 29% of total annual exports. For the Upper Silesian industry, the closure of the German market came as a shock; coal exports, which still in 1924 accounted for 59% of the exports of the Upper Silesian mines, in the second half of 1925 decreased to 0.6%. Józefa Heinrichówna, *Wojna celna polsko-niemiecka*, Warszawa 1928, typescript at the SGH Warsaw School of Economics (hereafter: SGH); Józef Popkiewicz, Franciszek Ryszka, *Przemysł ciężki Górnego Śląska w gospodarce Polski Międzywojennej (1922–1939)*, Wrocław 1959, p. 143.

⁷ Władysław Gieysztor, *Wojna o niezależność gospodarczą Polski*, "Przemysł i Handel", 30 (1925).

Table No. 2: The volume of Polish coal exports in the years 1923–1928 (in thousand tonnes)

Year	Volume
1923	12,560
1924	11,532
1925	8,227
1926	14,704
1927	11,564
1928	13,394

Source: *Statistik der Berg- und Hüttenwerke in Polnisch-Oberschlesien für das Jahr 1922*, Katowice 1923, p. 38; *Statistik der Berg- und Hüttenwerke in Polnisch-Oberschlesien für das Jahr 1924*, Katowice 1925, p. 72; *Statistik der Berg- und Hüttenwerke in Polnisch-Oberschlesien für das Jahr 1926*, Katowice 1927, pp. 71–72; *Statistik der Berg- und Hüttenwerke in Polnisch-Oberschlesien für das Jahr 1928*, Katowice 1929.

The crisis in relations with Germany led to changes in Polish economic policy, as German goods were replaced by products of domestic industry or from other countries. Moreover, both sides used to import goods by a circuitous route, via Czechoslovakia. It was only in November 1927 that a divergence protocol was signed regarding the volume of Polish coal exports, as well as meat and slaughter animals to Germany. Later, agreements were signed concerning seasonal workers and the export of Polish timber to Germany. As Poland renounced the right to liquidate German estates, a bilateral trade agreement was agreed in Warsaw on 17th March 1930, with a most-favoured-nation clause and a guarantee of Polish coal and bacon quotas. The provisions on quotas gave an advantage to the German side, and the agreement gave the impression of being temporary⁸, yet due to anti-Polish sentiments, it was not ratified by the German Reichstag⁹. In Poland, too, its adoption encountered difficulties, but for internal reasons, due to the existing conflict between the government and the *Sejm*, and it was not ratified until 11th March 1931, at a moment of deep crisis. In Germany, the attempt to ratify the agreement coincided with the introduction of a policy of protectionism and rationing in trade. The government revised the trade agreements: with France, Sweden and Finland, while the one with Poland was unfavourable for Polish coal exports. Since 1st March 1930, there was an agreement concluded for a period of

⁸ Karol Błachut, *Polsko-niemieckie stosunki gospodarcze w latach 1918–1939*, Wrocław 1975, pp. 208–210.

⁹ Jerzy Krasuski, *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie 1926–1932*, Poznań 1964, pp. 274–276.

3 years between the Polish Coal Convention and German coal producers associated with *Oberschlesische Steinkohlen Syndikat GmbH* in Gliwice. It regulated the transport of coal from the German part of Upper Silesia to the Polish Customs Territory and the import of coke by Polish companies. Polish companies agreed not to give hidden discounts and not to sell German coal and coke at prices lower than those of its purchase from a German supplier. However, in the absence of ratification of the agreement of 17th March 1930, Polish-German relations deteriorated again and in December 1931 and January 1932 mutual maximum customs duties were introduced¹⁰. An exception was the bilateral protocol of March 1932 on the admission of quotas for coal and pigs. A change in mutual relations took place only after Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany, and in October 1933 economic negotiations were undertaken, which ended with the conclusion of agreements concerning the export of Polish agricultural products to Germany and the lifting of bilateral restrictions¹¹. The final agreement normalising economic relations was concluded on 4th November 1935¹².

Long-term effects of the strike of English miners and the dominant role of Polish coal in Scandinavian markets

The sustained boom in the coal trade after the war led to an increase in workers' demands for improved social conditions in most mining districts. Faced with the resistance of the mine owners, the trade unions organised strikes resulting in the suspension of coal mining¹³. In Great Britain, the termination of the previous collective agreement by the mine owners, with the simultaneous announcement of wage reductions and extensions of working hours, caused an outbreak of a miners' strike on 1st May 1926. Suspension of production and export of coal by Europe's largest producer created opportunities for Poland's export policy, which, due to the German-Polish tariff war, was looking for other recipients of coal. A small domestic market forced the Polish mining industry to increase exports, and thanks to a strike of British miners, at their expense, Polish exporters in the years 1926–1929 captured the markets of the Scandinavian countries after the Polish government

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 20–21, 283–284.

¹¹ *Polsko-niemiecki układ żytni*, "Polska Gospodarcza", 48 (1933); Stanisław Gryziewicz, *Polsko-niemieckie porozumienie rolnicze*, "Przegląd Gospodarczy", 11 (1934); Tadeusz Garczyński, *Układ kompensacyjny polsko-niemiecki*, "Przegląd Gospodarczy", 20 (1934).

¹² DU, 1935, No. 83, item 512.

¹³ *Strajk węglowy w Pensylwanii*, "Przegląd Gospodarczy", 8 (1926), pp. 390–392.

concluded trade treaties with Norway¹⁴, Estonia¹⁵, and Latvia¹⁶. Moreover, thanks to the agreement with Czechoslovakia concluded on 21st April 1926, Poland obtained the opportunity to export coal to southern Europe bypassing Germany. The Polish mining industry gained two interesting directions of sales: Scandinavia and the countries of Central and Southern Europe (Table No. 3)¹⁷.

Table No. 3: Directions of Polish coal exports in the years 1923–1937 (in %)

Year	Region of Europe				
	Scandinavia	Baltic countries	Southern Europe	Central Europe	Western Europe
1923	0.33	0.02	1.19	-	1.23
1924	0.09	0.12	1.84	-	0.54
1925	6.86	1.75	3.6	-	0.30
1926	22.38	7.62	9.30	32.02	25.21
1927	35.68	6.73	14.60	40.22	4.10
1928	36.83	8.77	7.48	40.13	4.88
1929	52.29	4.09	40.68	10.27	
1930	49.99	3.80	25.97	13.54	
1931	52.49	-	23.35	17.81	
1932	52.50	1.82	8.62	18.03	12.50
1933	45.51	1.17	11.45	14.81	19.00
1934	32.93	0.21	17.63	13.56	25.59
1935	38.14	0.55	17.73	12.72	17.90
1936	36.95	0.60	13.42	9.46	23.59
1937	31.76	1.20	15.56	7.58	24.97

Source: *Statistik der Berg- und Hüttenwerke in Polnisch-Oberschlesien für das Jahr 1921*, Kattowitz 1921; *Statistik der Berg- und Hüttenwerke in Polnisch-Oberschlesien für das Jahr 1923*, Katowice 1924; *Statistik der Berg- und Hüttenwerke in Polnisch-Oberschlesien für das Jahr 1926*, Katowice 1927; *Statistik der Berg- und Hüttenwerke in Polnisch-Oberschlesien für das Jahr 1928*, Katowice 1929; *Statystyka przemysłu węglowego w państwie polskim za rok 1933*, Warszawa 1934; *Statystyka przemysłu węglowego w państwie polskim za rok 1934*, Warszawa 1935; *Statystyka przemysłu węglowego w państwie polskim za rok 1936*, Warszawa 1937; *Statystka przemysłu węglowego w państwie polskim za rok 1937*, Warszawa 1938.

¹⁴ Signed on 22nd December 1926, DU, 1927, 84 item 747.

¹⁵ Signed on 19th February 1927, DU, 1931, No. 38, item. 298. The treaty was supplemented by the protocol of 5th July 1929, DU, 1931, No. 38, item. 298; DU, 1931, 38 item 300.

¹⁶ Provisional treaty signed on 22nd December 1927, DU, 1931, 30, item 209. Treaty signed on 12th February 1929, DU, 1931, 31, item 217.

¹⁷ *Obecna faza zagadnienia węglowego*, "Przegląd Gospodarczy", 10 (1926), pp. 480–484; *Wobec konfliktu w angielskim przemyśle węglowym*, "Górnolaskie Wiadomości Gospodarcze", 8 (1926).

Exports, however, generated a number of difficulties due to the long distance between the mines and the Baltic Sea, with the greatest financial burden being the high cost of transport and the overloading of the railway lines to Gdańsk and Gdynia. There was also a lack of an adequate number of freight wagons which caused delays in deliveries. In view of the renewed competition with British exporters for markets in the Scandinavian countries, the proper fulfilment of contracts was of great importance to Polish companies. The high level of sales of Polish coal was also important for the government, which was keen to obtain foreign currency. This was particularly evident during the Great Depression, when the government agreed to maintain high prices on the domestic market at the expense of covering losses in dumped exports. For this reason, the Polish State Railways lowered the railway tariff and public funds were involved in the construction of a coal main line connecting Upper Silesia with the port of Gdynia. In turn, the coal companies: Robur, Progress, Skarboferm, Giesche, interested in the extraction and wholesale trade of coal, concluded agreements with the Ministry of Industry and Trade to lease the wharves of the port of Gdynia, in exchange for equipping them with coal handling facilities¹⁸.

The great economic depression and pressure from many countries forced the Polish authorities to renegotiate the existing agreements. As a result, new agreements were concluded or existing ones were modified with: Belgium¹⁹, Sweden²⁰, the Netherlands²¹, Denmark²², Switzerland²³, Estonia²⁴, Persia²⁵, Finland²⁶, Spain²⁷, Abyssinia²⁸,

¹⁸ Adam Staniszewski, *Po dwóch stronach Bałtyku: polityczno-gospodarcze stosunki polsko-szwedzkie w latach 1918–1932*, Toruń 2013.

¹⁹ Additional Agreement to the Trade Treaty of 10th June 1933. (DU, 1934, 27 item 212; DU, 1934, 78 item 726); *Rokowania handlowe*, "Polska Gospodarcza", 40 (1933), p. 1224.

²⁰ Protocol of 21st October 1933, (DU, 1934, 26, item 197; DU, 1934, 70 item 671–672); *Układ handlowy ze Szwecją*, "Polska Gospodarcza", 43 (1933), p. 1326.

²¹ Tariff agreement of 11th December 1933 (DU, 1935, 22, item 124; DU, 1934, 79 item 489–490); *Traktat handlowy z Holandią*, "Polska Gospodarcza", 47 (1933), pp. 1465–1466.

²² Protocol on commercial relations with Denmark of 10th January 1934. (DU, 1934, 30, item 267; DU, 1934, 70, item 673–674).

²³ Additional Agreement to the Commercial Convention with Switzerland of 3rd February 1934, (DU, 1935, 26, item 187; DU, 1934, 46, item 312–313, DU, 1934, 80, item 493–494).

²⁴ Convention of 26th September 1933 (DU, 1934, 30, item 264; DU, 1934, 63 items 528–529).

²⁵ Protocol of 22nd May 1934 (DU, 1935, 23, item 150; DU, 1935, 45, items 303–304).

²⁶ Tariff protocol with Finland of 30th March 1934 (DU, 1935, 24, item 160; DU, 1935, 87, items 540–541); *Umowa handlowa polsko-fińska*, "Polska Gospodarcza", 16 (1934), pp. 591–592.

²⁷ Trade Convention with Spain of 14th December 1934 (DU, 1936, 5, item 39; DU, 1936, 35, item 273).

²⁸ Treaty of friendship, trade and settlement with Abyssinia of 26th December 1934, has not been ratified due to Italian aggression (DU, 1935, 26, item 188).

Romania²⁹, Norway³⁰, Hungary³¹, and Canada³². They included duty reductions in exchange for allowing a number of their products to enter the Polish market³³. The overall changes were meant as a response to competition from third countries, mainly Germany and the United Kingdom.

UK-Poland coal agreement

The involvement of Polish mining companies in coal exports to Scandinavia began during the coal crisis in Great Britain. With its dumped prices and low own costs, the Polish mining industry held more than a 50% share of the northern European coal market at the outbreak of the global economic crisis (Table No. 4).

Table 4: Poland's contribution to coal exports to northern countries in the years 1930–1937

Year	Poland		Germany		Great Britain	
	in thousand tonnes	in %	in thousand tonnes	in %	in thousand tonnes	in %
1930	6,403	51.22	618	4.94	5,480	43.84
1931	7,443	63.12	676	5.73	3,673	31.15
1932	5,629	48.97	647	5.63	5,219	45.40
1933	4,529	37.68	581	4.83	6,910	57.49
1934	3,448	27.13	615	4.84	8,646	68.03
1935	3,548	28.22	784	6.24	8,240	65.54
1936	3,313	23.62	1,553	11.08	9,158	65.30
1937	3,727	23.27	1,902	11.88	10,385	64.85

Source: *Statystyka przemysłu węglowego w państwie polskim za rok 1931*, Warszawa 1932, p. V; *Statystyka przemysłu węglowego w państwie polskim za rok 1933*, Warszawa 1934, p. X; *Statystyka przemysłu węglowego w państwie polskim za rok 1934*, Warszawa 1935, p. XII; *Statystyka przemysłu węglowego w państwie polskim za rok 1937*, Warszawa 1938, p. XVI.

²⁹ Quota Agreement with Romania of 14th December 1934; *Układ z Rumunią*, „Polska Gospodarcza”, 51–52 (1934), pp. 1584.

³⁰ Tariff protocol with Norway of 8th January 1935, introduced as provisional in February 1935. (DU, 1935, 26, item 190; DU, 1935, 74 item 463–464); *Układ taryfowy z Norwegią*, „Polska Gospodarcza”, 4 (1935), p. 127.

³¹ Quota agreement with Hungary of 28th April 1935; F. S., *Porozumienie polsko-węgierskie*, „Polska Gospodarcza”, 18 (1935), p. 581.

³² Trade Convention with Canada of 3rd July 1935 (DU, 1936, 15 item 135; DU, 1936, 41 items 446–447).

³³ Stefan F. Królikowski, *Zarys polskiej polityki handlowej*, Warszawa 1938, p. 217; Jakub Lubelski, *Związek Bałtycki i Trzecia Europa. Koncepcje reorganizacji Europy Środkowej w polityce zagranicznej II Rzeczypospolitej*, „Nowa Europa”, 2010, pp. 195–196.

The significant position of Poland in the Scandinavian market and the subsequent efforts of the British to regain their lost influence resulted in the efforts of the Polish authorities to regulate the Polish-British trade relations. As the beginning of the talks it should be regarded the visit of the representatives of the British Central Collieries Commercial Association (CCCA) to Upper Silesia in June 1928. In fact, the British came in order to discern the local conditions of coal exploitation allowing low sales costs³⁴. This discernment resulted in interventions made by the United Kingdom in the years 1928–1930 through the International Labour Office, with demands for the conclusion of an international convention regulating working conditions. The pretext was a desire to ameliorate the situation of workers during the coal crisis, including improving the working conditions and pay of Polish miners. In fact, they were concerned that the competitive price of coal sold by Poland was driven by low wages and the high productivity of workers employed in the mining industry. In the absence of an agreement at the international forum, the British made certain efforts in Scandinavia, but these did not bring any significant results³⁵. As the worsening economic crisis meant an increase in competition, and the awareness that the British mining industry extracted much more coal and had the means of non-economic pressure on other countries, deprived of this raw material, forced Polish exporters to look for other solutions. The lowering of the costs of coal extraction was to be facilitated by the finalisation of commenced investments and efforts were also made to conclude an international agreement. Their first effect was the conclusion on 10th January 1930 of an agreement under the All-Poland Coal Convention (representing about 98% of coal producers in Poland) with the CCCA, extracting in Great Britain about 40% of coal³⁶. The main result of the agreement was that the Polish and British coal industries ceased to sell coal on foreign markets at prices lower than those prevailing in their own countries. The agreement also provided for the creation of a permanent 10-person Joint Consultative Committee and International Coal Bureau, based in Copenhagen. Its purpose

³⁴ The CCCA brought together mines in the counties of Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Lancashire, Cheshire, North Staffordshire, Connock Chaser, Leicestershire, Warwickshire. Witold Paszkowski, *Organizacja polskiego przemysłu węglowego, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem Zagłębia Górnśląskiego*, Warszawa 1931, pp. 190, 222.

³⁵ *Statistik der Berg- und Hüttenwerke in Polnisch-Oberschlesien für das Jahr 1930*, pp. 6–7; Popkiewicz, Ryszka, *Przemysł ciężki*, pp. 344–345.

³⁶ The State Archives in Katowice (Archiwum Państwowe w Katowicach, hereinafter: APK), coll. 331, ref. 144, pp. 76–85.

was to collect statistical data on the quantities of coal exported, its grades and prices. The English side tried to ensure the participation of the South Wales Basin and Northumberland and Durham counties in the Committee, which participated in the signing of the agreement as observers, but due to their resistance no English representatives were appointed and the agreement did not enter into force³⁷. Despite this, representatives of the Polish Coal Convention, established in 1931, continued, but unsuccessfully, to apply to the Mining Association of Great Britain – the compulsory organisation of the British coal industry – for the conclusion of an agreement. In their view, an agreement was only possible once the Scandinavian markets had been regained by them³⁸. They had some success in this endeavour, as in 1933 they concluded an agreement with the Federation of Scandinavian Importers, as a result of which they gained greater influence on the Scandinavian market and the possibility of depositing larger quantities of coal³⁹. The devaluation of the English pound on 21st September 1931 also had a significant impact, increasing the competition of the English mining industry in relation to other exporters⁴⁰. The devaluation of the British currency facilitated the conclusion of trade treaties with the Scandinavian countries in 1933. Under these agreements, Great Britain, in exchange for quotas of agricultural products, secured for itself market shares: 80% in Denmark, 47% in Sweden, 70% in Norway and 75% in Finland, as so-called carbon clauses⁴¹. In effect, Polish exporters, threatened with the loss of influence in the market of northern Europe, exerted pressure on the government to intensify efforts to regulate trade relations with the British⁴². Polish negotiators had managed to link treaty negotiations concerning the export of bacon and timber to Great Britain with negotiations on the sharing of the coal market. Their result was the conclusion of a trade agreement on 27th February 1935, which guaranteed Polish exports at

³⁷ *Ibidem*.

³⁸ Andrzej Jałowicki, *Konkurencja węglowa polsko-brytyjska na rynkach skandynawskich*, Toruń 1935, pp. 70, 179, 120–121, 181; Zenon Szmidtke, “Skarboferm” 1922–1939: *związki polityki z gospodarką*, Opole 2008, pp. 263–264.

³⁹ APK, coll. 331, ref. 126, Export Commission 1932–1939, Minutes of the meeting of 23rd November 1933, pp. 1–10.

⁴⁰ Janusz Kaliński, *Historia gospodarcza XIX i XX wieku*, Warszawa 2004.

⁴¹ Jan Kostanecki, *Polityka handlowa Anglii*, “Polityka Narodów”, 5 (1934), pp. 327, 404–407.

⁴² Rondo E. Cameron, *Historia gospodarcza świata. Od paleolitu do czasów najnowszych*, Warszawa 1996, pp. 390–392.

a minimum level of 41.5% of the quantity transported in 1932⁴³. In return, Polish exporters were to reduce their coal shipments to Scandinavian countries.

The pushing of Polish coal out of Scandinavian markets from the end of 1932 resulted in a shift of coal exports to southern European markets, which threatened the position of the Welsh mines. However, this threat led to breaking the resistance of the British and to the conclusion of negotiations⁴⁴, after which the representatives of the Polish and British coal industries signed an agreement in London on 6th December 1934, which ended the mutual competitive struggle for a period of 3 years⁴⁵. It was agreed that Polish exports, excluding Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary and Germany, and ship's coal loaded at the ports of Gdynia and Gdańsk, were calculated as: 1) 21% of English exports in the previous quarter excluding Ireland and the Americas, up to 8.75 million tonnes per quarter, and 2) a 10% surplus on English exports exceeding 8.75 million tonnes per quarter⁴⁶.

The exclusion of British coal exports to Ireland, following the conclusion of a compensation agreement between British coal exporters and Irish cattle exporters, which increased British exports to that market by about 550,000 tonnes, at the expense of a decline in Scandinavian markets included in the agreement⁴⁷. The conclusion of the agreement in the mid-1930s was too late and disadvantageous to Polish companies in view of the decline in British exports. It was the result of the passive stance of the government, in the face of the increased expansion of German exporters and the closure of the Italian market, due to the economic sanctions of the League of Nations after the aggression against Ethiopia and the increase in coal consumption on the domestic market due to the economic boom caused by the intensification of armaments. Polish companies, bound by the agreement, had to limit their exports, leaving the space for German mining. However, the decline in trade with Great Britain resulted in a renegotiation of the previous agreement and on 15th December 1937 a new two-year Polish-British coal treaty was concluded. The 21% level of Polish coal exports in relation to British exports in the previous quarter was maintained, excluding Ireland⁴⁸. The coal agreement could only

⁴³ Trade Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of Poland and the United Kingdom of 27th February 1935 (DU, 1935, 59, item 380).

⁴⁴ Jałowicki, *Konkurencja*, pp. 173–174.

⁴⁵ APK, coll. 334, ref. 373; “Polska Gospodarcza”, 45 (1934), p. 1376; Szmidtke, “*Skarboferm*”, pp. 289–291; Jałowicki, *Konkurencja węglowa*, p. 173.

⁴⁶ APK, coll. 331, ref. 145, pp. 22–26.

⁴⁷ “*Śląskie Wiadomości Gospodarcze*”, 1 (1935), p. 8.

⁴⁸ APK, coll. 331, ref. 145, pp. 3–4.

be beneficial if British coal exports increased, but this did not happen. The agreement was still unfavourable for Poland, due to the dominance of agriculture in the Polish economy and Poland's striving to obtain the most favourable conditions for exporters of agricultural and timber products.

Negotiations on the International Coal Agreement (1937–1939)

The issue of concluding an international coal agreement emerged in the late 1920s. The Economic Committee of the League of Nations, in 1929, appointed a group of international experts to investigate coal production, coal mining labour and levels of coal trade and consumption. At the same time, it was assumed that discussions would be conducted by major European manufacturers: Great Britain, Germany, France, Poland, Belgium and the Netherlands producing together about 80% of coal⁴⁹.

The economic depression and increasing competition among coal exporters on European markets made it necessary to regulate economic relations. On 30th September 1931, on the initiative of the British Central Council of Colliery Owners, an international coal conference was held in London with the participation of representatives from England, France, Poland, Belgium, the Netherlands and Czechoslovakia. Germany was represented, as observers, by representatives of the Rhine-Westphalian Coal Syndicate⁵⁰. Despite divergent interests, the participants presented a draft of an international agreement, but further negotiations were halted⁵¹. The devaluation of the British pound in September 1931 caused a spike in the competitiveness of English coal against other countries and the negotiations were deliberately protracted. In turn, the Germans postulated the rationing of coal mining, which provoked opposition on the part of Polish exporters. Representatives

⁴⁹ Tadeusz Borkowski, *O międzynarodowe porozumienie węglowe II*, "Przegląd Gospodarczy", 7 (1934), pp. 244–248.

⁵⁰ APK, coll. 334, ref. 383, p. 88.

⁵¹ The agreement was concluded between producer groups for the production and sale of coal, coke and briquettes. The division into quotas was to be done within a given raw material on a quarterly basis. It was important to differentiate the agreements into two markets: those with and without their own production. In the case of markets with their own coal production, local groups demanded the reservation for them to have priority in supply. Convention penalties were also reserved, in the form of reduced quotas and the possibility of allocating part of the quota for a longer period of time, in order to conclude long-term trade agreements (APK, coll. 331, ref. 144, pp. 7–9: Draft agreement between producer groups, dated 1st October 1931).

of companies from Great Britain, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands and Belgium returned to the talks in 1936–1937 and negotiated the International Coke Convention agreement, under which Polish coking plants were allowed 3.2% of the participants' total production. The agreement was monitored by the Executive Committee, which collected statistical data and imposed fines in case of quota overruns⁵². The low quota share placed Polish producers as outsiders, being represented by only one vote in the Executive Committee.

The conclusion of the agreement on the sale of coke made possible negotiations on the coal treaty in late 1937. The seven largest coal producers participated in them: Great Britain, Germany, Poland, France, Belgium, Czechoslovakia and the Netherlands: Britain, Germany, Poland, France, Belgium, Czechoslovakia and the Netherlands, but the talks were limited to Britain, Germany and Poland, whose negotiating position was very weak. Detailed talks were held in the spring of 1939 in Paris and Berlin, during which a consensus was attempted. The British negotiators, as in previous years, tried to force a reduction in the supply of coal on the market in order to raise prices. The Polish delegation, on the other hand, negotiated its share of exports at the level of 11.5% and at the same time demanded that the existing agreement with the British be suspended until a new broader international agreement was adopted. The negotiations were interrupted due to the tense political situation, after Germany had occupied Czechoslovakia and made territorial claims to Poland⁵³.

Establishing business contacts with southern Europe

In the interwar years, Polish coal exporters focused on maintaining their current markets. From the Upper Silesian companies, apart from the traditional German market, coal was sent to Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. It was only the closing of the German market in mid-1925 that forced the company to look for new recipients. The solution was the opening of Scandinavian markets,

⁵² Poland was represented by the companies: Skarboferm, Robur, Katowicka S.A., and Zjednoczone Huty Królewska i Laury. The voting distribution in the Executive Committee was as follows: Germany – 3 votes, Great Britain and the Netherlands – 2 votes each, Belgium and Poland – 1 vote each (APK, coll. 331, ref. 168: International Coke Convention (Międzynarodowa Konwencja Koksowa) 1936–1937).

⁵³ APK, coll. 331, ref. 30, Minutes of General Assemblies 1938–1939, pp. 1–6: Minutes of the General Assembly of the Polish Coal Convention (Polska Konwencja Węglowa, hereinafter: PKW) of 30th March 1939.

but Polish producers also sought out sales opportunities in the Baltic countries and southern Europe. A new destination for coal shipments since the 1920s was Italy, which introduced a policy of diversifying supplies by moving closer to Britain and entering into talks with Poland⁵⁴. English coal was delivered through the ports of Trieste and Genoa. Whereas in Poland Italian representatives of the coal trade conducted in the years 1920–1921 negotiations on the purchase of a mining field in the area of Spytkowice near Kraków and the export to Italy of 300,000 tons of coal per year⁵⁵. After the partition of Upper Silesia in 1922, the Italian consortium of trade and banking representatives was interested in acquiring shares in the Rybnik Coal Guards (Rybnickie Gwarectwo Węglowe). Yet the project did not come to fruition due to the resistance of German industrialists and the growing role of French capital. On the other hand, the markets of the Mediterranean and Balkan countries, close in terms of communication, were dominated by good quality though expensive English coal⁵⁶. Therefore, the contracts were concluded for small supplies of Polish coal, which brought losses, because only the coarse sort was exported at the price of fine coal.

The early 1930s saw a change in coal exporters in the Mediterranean market. The agreement with the Czechoslovak railroads lowered the tariff on the carriage of Polish coal and enabled an increase in its exports to both Austria and the countries of southern Europe. In addition, price differences between Polish and Welsh coal displaced the latter⁵⁷ and the Polish concerns, Robur and Skarboferm, engaged in early 1932 in exporting coal to Italy and Greece, abandoning previous shipments to Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia. Table No. 5⁵⁸ shows the evolution of trade in coal and related products within European countries during the interwar period.

⁵⁴ Bogdan Koszeł, *Niemcy w polityce Włoch w latach dwudziestych XX wieku*, [in:] *Niemcy w polityce międzynarodowej 1919–1939*, vol. 1, ed. Stanisław Sierpowski, Poznań 1990, pp. 277, 279–280.

⁵⁵ Zbigniew Landau, Jan Tomaszewski, *Misja Profesora Artura Benisa*, “Teki Archiwalne”, 6 (1959), pp.29, 42–43.

⁵⁶ Jałowiecki, *Konkurencja węglowa*, pp. 173–174.

⁵⁷ Szmidtko, “*Skarboferm*”, pp. 270–271.

⁵⁸ APK, PKW, coll. 331, ref. 155 Export [to] Hungary 1939.

Table No. 5: Polish export of coal, coke and briquettes to Central and Southern European countries between 1921 and 1937 [in thousands of tons].

Year	Countries						
	Hungary ^b	Italy	Yugoslavia	Romania	Bulgaria	Greece	Spain
1921 ^a	98.9	368.7	-	-	-	-	-
1922 ^a	138.0	534.6	3.3	3.7	-	-	-
1923 ^a	341.7	8.4	29.1	121.1	-	-	-
1924 ^a	626.1	13.3	59.3	137.7	0.5	-	-
1925 ^a	631.2	85.9	117.7	89.8	0.5	-	-
1926 ^a	483.2	871.3	194.2	123.8	1.9	-	-
1927 ^a	512.5	1,117.4	291.8	161.3	0.3	-	-
1928	709.7	501.1	316.8	184.1	0.2	0.5	-
1929	881.8	494.3	199.0	117.4	-	-	-
1930	474.7	494.2	78.7	77.6	-	-	2.3
1931	297.2	882.7	75.0	42.7	-	-	30.0
1932	15.0	837.0	25.9	8.0	-	4.8	-
1933	6.4	998.0	16.5	25.0	-	79.6	-
1934	9.0	1,668.8	49.1	17.7	-	84.4	6.8
1935	5.7	1,436.1	72.2	6.5	-	81.6	4.2
1936	11.7	1,024.0	13.8	6.7	-	93.3	4.8
1937	15.9	1,610.3	6.0	0.4	-	93.0	-

^a - data for the years 1921–1927 relate only to exports from the Polish part of Upper Silesia.

^b - Hungary was a natural outlet, covered between 1925 and 1939 by the convention agreement of exporters under the All-Poland Coal Convention, and the Polish Coal Convention after 1931.

Source: *Statistik Berg- und Hüttenwerke in Polnisch-Oberschlesien für das Jahr 1922*, Katowice 1923, pp. 38, 40; *Statistik Berg- und Hüttenwerke in Polnisch-Oberschlesien für das Jahr 1924*, Katowice 1925, p. 72; *Statistik Berg- und Hüttenwerke in Polnisch-Oberschlesien für das Jahr 1925*, Katowice 1926, p. 72; *Statystyka Zakładów Górniczych i Hutniczych na Polskim Górnym Śląsku za 1927 rok*, Katowice 1928, p. 77; *Statistik Berg- und Hüttenwerke in Polnisch-Oberschlesien für das Jahr 1930*, Katowice 1931, p. 92; *Statystyka przemysłu węglowego w państwie polskim za rok 1931*, Warszawa 1932, p. 64; *Statystyka przemysłu węglowego w państwie polskim za rok 1933*, Warszawa 1934, pp. 64–65; *Statystyka przemysłu węglowego w państwie polskim za rok 1935*, Warszawa 1936, s. 64; *Statystyka przemysłu węglowego w państwie polskim za rok 1937*, Warszawa 1938, p. 62.

It should be added that gaining the southern European markets also enabled Poland to export coal to Egypt, Algeria, as well as to Brazil and Argentina⁵⁹. In addition to “Robur”, a significant position as an exporter in the aforementioned outlets was gained by “Skarboferm” mine companies, which entered into cooperation with “Vlasov”⁶⁰ and through this company obtained a contract for servicing Italian gas plants in Naples, Rome, Milan and Bologna. In turn, the mine companies “Robur” and “Progres” established cooperation with the company “Consorzio Carbonifero Italiano”, and a significant expansion of the sales possibilities of Polish coal in Italy occurred after the conclusion of the contract on 13th December 1933 by the Upper Silesian mines with the company “Ferrovie dello Stato S.p.A.” for the delivery of 1,600,000 tonnes of coal as a payment for the building of two deep-sea passenger ships for the Polish Transatlantic Shipping Company (they later became MS Batory and MS Piłsudski) by the Monfalcone shipyard in Trieste⁶¹.

Conclusion

Polish hard coal mining in the interwar period functioned on the basis of the organization of production and trade developed back in the second half of the 19th century. Large mines operated as joint stock and limited liability companies. At the same time, in terms of organisational development, as well as mining and export rates, Upper Silesian mining played a leading role. Despite the partition of Upper Silesia, the majority of heavy industry plants remained within the Polish borders, linked by ownership relations and mutually supplying each other with raw materials or semi-finished products. The Geneva Convention, which was in force for fifteen years, ensured that the owners of the mines continued to be predominantly German capital. In addition, the owners of the mines associated themselves in branch organisations whose activities concerned the development of technological potential and joint representation in employee matters before public administration bodies and the government. Of major importance was also the

⁵⁹ The main customers for coal in overseas markets were state-owned public institutions, primarily railways. Jałowicki, *Konkurencja węglowa*, pp. 175–176.

⁶⁰ The company was based in Bucharest, acting as an intermediary in the coal trade. It belonged to Alexander Vlasov, who in the interwar years created, within it and a number of his own companies, a merchant fleet for the transport and sale of Polish and Turkish coal in Romania and the Mediterranean countries. Cf. Szmidtke, “*Skarboferm*”, pp. 272–273.

⁶¹ Jerzy Gołębiowski, *Sektor państwowy w gospodarce Polski międzywojennej*, Warszawa–Kraków 1985, p. 94.

entrusting this trade in Upper Silesian coal to separate companies, which formed a sales network by developing cooperation with smaller traders and intermediaries abroad. The peak of the Upper Silesian mining industry's activity as an exporter in the interwar period came at the turn of the 1920s and 1930s. In subsequent years, as a result of the Polish-British agreement allowing Polish agricultural products, the export of Polish coal to Scandinavian markets was limited in order to re-allow British coal. The pressure of the Polish government to conclude an unfavourable agreement with the British led to the gradual displacement of Polish coal from northern markets. This situation was exacerbated in the second half of the 1930s by a rapid increase in coal exports from Germany as a compensation for Swedish iron ore. Difficulties in coal exports forced Polish exporters to look for new outlets in southern Europe but also on other continents: in Africa and South America. These efforts were interrupted by the outbreak of the Second World War.

STRESZCZENIE

Celem artykułu jest określenie roli i miejsca polskiego przemysłu węglowego w gospodarce europejskiej w latach międzywojennych w warunkach zmian na mapie politycznej kontynentu i rozmaitych komplikacji spowodowanych powstaniem nowych organizmów państwowych. Analiza dotyczy trzech zagłębi przemysłowych, reprezentujących różny stopień rozwoju, a wcześniej należących do Niemiec, Austrii i Rosji. W obliczu niskiej chłonności rynku wewnętrznego, niepodległa Polska podjęła starania o zwiększenie sprzedaży węgla na rynkach zagranicznych, zdominowanych przez eksporterów brytyjskich i niemieckich.

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PROVINCIAL CITY OR REGIONAL CAPITAL? CONCEPTS AND BARRIERS TO THE REBUILDING OF WROCLAW IN 1945–1947 FROM WARTIME DESTRUCTION

PROWINCJONALNE MIASTO CZY REGIONALNA STOLICA? KONCEPCJE I BARIERY ODBUDOWY WROCLAWIA ZE ZNISZCZEŃ WOJENNYCH 1945–1947

ABSTRACT: The destruction suffered by Wrocław as a result of warfare in 1945 threatened the further existence of the city, which from May of that year constituted the largest urbanised area of the western and northern lands ceded to Poland by the Allies. The main challenge faced by the Polish administration in the capital of Lower Silesia in the first period of its functioning, i.e. between 1945 and 1947, was to make an inventory of losses in the urban substance, develop a reconstruction concept for the city and begin its implementation.

KEYWORDS: Wrocław, Festung Breslau, war damage, reconstruction plan

The Second World War had a particularly harsh impact on the Polish lands. The war caused the death of 6 million citizens of the Polish Republic, which, from an area of 400,000 km² and over 35 million citizens in 1939, decreased to just over 300,000 km² and a population estimated in 1950 at 25 million. This meant the loss of 20% of the territory and almost 10 million citizens¹, with particularly high losses in urban population. Of the 6 pre-war big-city centres, i.e. Warsaw, Kraków, Poznań, Łódź, Lviv (Lwów) and Vilnius, Vilnius and Lviv were lost to the USSR,

¹ Waldemar Grabowski, *Straty osobowe II Rzeczypospolitej w latach II wojny światowej*, "Pamięć i Tożsamość. Biuletyn IPN", 9 (154), September 2018, pp. 28–33.

while Warsaw was destroyed in 80%. In the remaining 3 cities, elites representing their real intellectual value and professional potential, such as teachers, lawyers or entrepreneurs, were destroyed². Other social groups, such as landowners, experienced the open hostility of the new authorities and the loss of their property, while a large part of the intelligentsia found themselves under the watchful eye of the authorities of the forming “people’s” Poland. Overall, Poland’s losses in national property amounted to 38–39% of the 1939 level. The Germans destroyed 162,190,000 buildings, 353,876 homesteads, nearly 200,000 shops, 84,436 workshops and 14,000 factories. In chemical industry losses reached 64.5%, in printing industry – 64.3%, in electrical engineering – 59.7%, in clothing industry – 55.4%, in food industry – 53.1%, and in metallurgical industry – 48%. As for the transport infrastructure, for example, 2/3 of the railway viaducts and bridges, 1/3 of the railway tracks, and 80% of the rolling stock were destroyed. Gdynia, as well as Gdańsk and Szczecin, which were ceded to Poland after the war, lost more than half of their port facilities³.

As a result of the war, Poland lost the eastern half of the country, i.e. 47% of the area, to the USSR. It was to be compensated with the so-called Recovered Territories, which until 1945 had been the German eastern borderlands. The decision of the Allied Powers, the so-called Big Three, made only at the beginning of 1945 in Yalta, placed “under Polish administration” 103,000 km², i.e. 24% of the German territory of 1937, inhabited by 8.5 million people. At that time, these lands generated 6% of Germany’s industrial output, 23% of its agricultural production, and their share of GDP was 12% in 1937. Their deposits of various natural resources were particularly rich⁴. For Poland, however, the value of this “territorial compensation” was significantly reduced by war damage, as these lands suffered direct war losses as well as deliberate German destruction and evacuation, and post-war Soviet looting⁵. The discussion about the real value of the acquired territories continues to this day. The object of dispute is not so much the absolutely higher

² *Sprawozdanie w przedmiocie strat i szkód wojennych Polski w latach 1939–1945*, Warszawa 1947, <https://www.wbc.poznan.pl/dlibra/publication/52713> (access: 11 XII 2019).

³ *Ibidem*.

⁴ Janusz Kaliński, *Wpływ zmiany granic politycznych na gospodarkę Polski powojennej*, [in:] *Kresy Zachodnie. Gospodarcze i społeczne znaczenie polskich kresów*, ed. Tomasz Głowiński, Wrocław 2015, pp. 127–128.

⁵ Hubert Modrawski, *Ziemia Odzyskane 1945–1956*, Brzezina Łąka 2015, pp. 34–48. Jędrzej Chumiński, *Stan przemysłu wrocławskiego w 1945 r. (wybrane zagadnienia)*, [in:] *Studia nad społeczeństwem Wrocławia 1945–1949*, eds. Bożena Kilmczak, Waław Długoborski, Wrocław 1990, p. 59.

economic potential of these areas before the war, as their actual state in 1945 and also to what extent Poland was able to use their potential effectively⁶. For it was an indisputable fact that in the “new” Polish territories 40% of the urban buildings were destroyed and only in the south of Lower Silesia, Jelenia Góra or Wałbrzych, were basically untouched by the war. While Wrocław and Szczecin were seas of ruins, the rich and varied industry of the “Recovered Territories” was hit to the same degree by both the war and the post-war plunder.

The urban network of the “Recovered Territories” comprised 252 centres, of which 112 had to be classified as small towns and tiny towns. The most important city was Wrocław. From the time the Soviet-protected Polish Committee of National Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego – PKWN) installed a surrogate government in Lublin in July 1944, which explicitly renounced its aspirations for the pre-war eastern half of the country, it became clear that the capital of Lower Silesia would be a kind of compensation for lost Lvov and Vilnius. By the end of 1944, Warsaw was already in ruins, while Breslau was still untouched by the war. Thus it began to be considered as the first city of the “new” lands and potentially the second capital of Poland. These ideas were echoed during Bolesław Bierut’s August 1945 visit to Wrocław, when he referred to the capital of Lower Silesia as “the second Polish city after Warsaw”⁷.

For Wrocław, the first half of 1945 was the most dramatic time in the city’s history. Among the German cities bombed since 1942, the capital of Lower Silesia was regarded as “the Third Reich’s air-raid shelter”. Though the first bombs fell on Breslau already in November 1941, yet it was only a “propaganda” raid⁸. The first large air raid on Breslau took place on 7th November 1944, and was followed by others, but the losses were not severe⁹. It was not until mid-February 1945 that the destruction of the city began. The battle for Festung Breslau lasted 3 months, until 6th May 1945. The crew of the fortress resisted the Soviets effectively and managed to persevere for so long. However, the city paid for its determined defence with destroyed buildings and infrastructure. The most devastated areas of Wrocław were

⁶ Yaman Kouli discusses this from a German perspective in his recently published book *Dolny Śląsk 1936–1956. Szybki rozwój i nieudana odbudowa. Wpływ wiedzy na produkcję przemysłową*, Warszawa 2018.

⁷ Gregor Thum, *Obce miasto. Wrocław 1945 i potem*, Wrocław 2007, p. 185.

⁸ Alfred Konieczny, *Śląsk w wojnie powietrznej 1940–1944*, Wrocław 1996, p. 166.

⁹ Tomasz Głowiński, “Nalot wielkanocny” 1945 roku – największa apokalipsa w tysiącletniej historii Wrocławia, [in:] *Przedmieście Piaskowe we Wrocławiu*, eds. Tomasz Głowiński, Halina Okólska, Wrocław 2015, pp. 214–216.

those where the main fights took place, i.e. in the south and west of the city. The greatest losses, however, were suffered in the historical centre, as the area of Ostrów Tumski, Sand Island (Wyspa Piasek) and the area surrounding the Old Town Square, was almost razed to the ground as a result of the so-called Easter air raids¹⁰.

Apart from direct war damage, Wrocław also suffered from arson, looting and vandalism. They affected the city mainly because of the Soviet “liberators”¹¹. The total loss of urban substance in Wrocław was 68%, although some districts were almost untouched by the war, such as Biskupin and Sępolno. Whereas the southern and western districts were destroyed in 90%, the Old Town and Downtown (Śródmieście) suffered an average of 50% damage, but other parts of the city were destroyed in 10 to 30%. In many cases, however, lightly damaged houses turned into ruins within 2–3 years due to lack of proper care and reconstruction. The lighting system of the city was destroyed in 100%, the tramway network in 80%. The gasworks and power plant suffered severely – both were devastated in 60%. The sewage and water supply systems of the city did not work and the gas network was destroyed in 80%. All of Wrocław’s industry was damaged in 60%, and 30% was destroyed in half. Monuments suffered to an even greater extent¹². The city was initially impassable, as 300 km of Wrocław’s 658 km of streets were covered with rubble¹³.

Works on the organisation of an administrative structure that would prepare and be responsible for the rebuilding of Wrocław began in March 1945. The Planning and Reconstruction Office at the Presidium of the Council of Ministers undertook this work in Warsaw, commissioning a Poznań architect, Roman Feliński, to organise an operational group for Lower Silesia. This group was initially based in Trzebnica and constituted the beginning of the Voivodship Reconstruction Office (WBO)¹⁴. In the summer of 1945, a Regional Spatial Planning Office was established in Wrocław, subordinate to the WBO, later renamed the Regional

¹⁰ Radosław Szewczyk, *Naloty wielkanocne*, “Pamięć i Przyszłość”, 4 (2019), (46), pp. 30–37.

¹¹ For a long time the “only right” interpretation of the issue of arson was accepted, i.e. the claim that their perpetrators were “an illegal Nazi organisation, the so-called Wehrwolf formed as late as March 1945”. Marek Ordyłowski, *Życie codzienne we Wrocławiu 1945–1948*, Wrocław 1991, p. 15.

¹² The condition of Wrocław’s monuments and their reconstruction was most fully described by: Marcin Bukowski, *Wrocław z lat 1945–1952. Zniszczenia i dzieło odbudowy*, Wrocław 1985.

¹³ Edmund Małachowicz, *Stare Miasto we Wrocławiu. Zniszczenie, odbudowa, program*, Warszawa–Wrocław 1976, pp. 86–87; Ordyłowski, *Życie codzienne*, p. 11.

¹⁴ Daria Przyłęcka, *Nie od razu Wrocław odbudowano. Plany zagospodarowania przestrzennego, koncepcje oraz projekty urbanistyczne i architektoniczne a ich realizacja w latach 1945–1989*, Wrocław 2012, pp. 11–12.

Spatial Planning Directorate (RDPP). Another change took place in March 1946, when the Wrocław Planning Bureau (BPW), headed by architect Tadeusz Ptaszycki, was established within the structure of the RDPP¹⁵. However, before the rebuilding of the city could be planned, both of these institutions first had to assess its condition. To this end, a new structure was established as part of the Wrocław administration¹⁶, that was being formed from 10th May 1945. It was the Building Department of the City Board, headed by engineer Józef Rybicki¹⁷. It was its employees, as the executive department operating under the management system, who were the first to start protection measures and sometimes also repair works in the city. They were complemented by work undertaken by other operational groups, which operated in the city in a kind of “sectoral” fashion, on behalf of the Warsaw ministries, taking over, for example, banks, schools and industrial plants¹⁸.

The first qualitative change in the approach to rebuilding of Wrocław took place in the summer of 1945, after a visit of Michał Kaczorowski, head of the Ministry of Reconstruction, when the Delegation of the Ministry of Reconstruction was established in the city, and in September of that year the first funds were allocated by the government, making it possible to launch tenders for removing the rubble. Whereas responsibility for repair and protection works throughout the city was taken over by the Wrocław Branch of the Ministry of Reconstruction, headed by Józef Zaremba¹⁹. The second significant change was brought by the creation of the Wrocław Reconstruction Directorate (WDO) on 12th January 1946. It was directly subordinate to the Ministry of Reconstruction, but the Programme Commission supervising its work included representatives of the municipal and voivodship authorities. The director of WDO became the aforementioned engineer J. Rybicki, whose contribution to the reconstruction of Wrocław at that time cannot be overestimated²⁰.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 12.

¹⁶ The State Archives in Wrocław (Archiwum Państwowe we Wrocławiu, hereinafter: APWr), Municipal Authority of the City of Wrocław (Zarząd Miejski m. Wrocławia, hereinafter: ZMMw), ref. 64, pp. 1–25.

¹⁷ Bukowski, *Wrocław z lat 1945–1952*, p. 187.

¹⁸ Jakub Tyszkiewicz, *Wrocławska Dyrekcja Odbudowy. Próba ratowania tkanki miejskiej w latach 1946–1949*, “Śląski Kwartalnik Historyczny Sobótka”, 54 (1999), 3, pp. 421–422.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 422.

²⁰ APWr, Wrocław Reconstruction Directorate (Wrocławska Dyrekcja Odbudowy, hereinafter: WDO), ref. 239, pp. 30–32.

Within the structure of the WDO there were 4 departments: construction, technical, commissioning and inspection departments, which dealt with the renovation of public buildings and monuments, as well as with cleaning and demolition issues in the city. The WDO also supervised renovations carried out by state and private companies²¹. The creation of the Directorate did not bring about any breakthrough in the rebuilding of Wrocław, although this institution rendered great service in saving its monuments. The WDO was subordinate to the Ministry of Reconstruction and had no administrative or financial independence. Due to the enormity of the war damage on a national scale, the funds received from the Ministry for the reconstruction of Wrocław were very limited, so even the necessary tasks were carried out too slowly and insufficiently²².

Two parties were politically involved in the activities of the new Wrocław authorities indicated here: the Polish Workers' Party (PPR), which, after the Red Army's entry into Poland in 1944, seized power with its help and established the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN). Some members of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) joined its structures to form a joint Provisional Government of National Unity. With the consent of the Soviet Command, a day after the capitulation of the Festung Breslau, a group of the PPS, led by Kraków-born Dr Bolesław Drobner, who had been envisaged as Mayor of Wrocław from 14th March 1945, "installed" themselves in the ruined city and set about assessing the state of the urban fabric. This work was entrusted to people of varying degrees of professional competence, employed by the Building Department of the City Board²³, and a preliminary picture of the city's condition was drawn up on 15th June 1945. Before its destruction, there were 32,000 residential, 19,000 industrial and 620 public buildings in Wrocław. Of these, as many as 50.4%, in the first two mentioned categories and 46% in the third, were considered destroyed²⁴. As 21,600 residential buildings were counted as damaged or destroyed, one of the first tasks of the Polish authorities in Wrocław was to start removing the rubble from the city, since almost its entire surface was covered with debris from broken and damaged

²¹ APWr, WDO, ref. 241, pp. 13–15.

²² The activity of WDO is assessed in a similar way by Tyszkiewicz, *Wrocławska Dyrekcja*, pp. 433–434.

²³ APWr, ZMmW, ref. 64, pp. 12–13.

²⁴ APWr, Wrocław Voivodship Office (Urząd Wojewódzki Wrocławski, hereinafter: UWW), ref. 12.1 XIII/38, p. 5; XIII/45, p. 2.

buildings²⁵. It was estimated at about 18 million m³, but in the years 1945–1947 no plan for its removal was worked out²⁶. The emergency removal of rubble in the first months after the capitulation of Festung Breslau concerned mainly the main traffic routes and squares²⁷. By the end of 1945, around 150 tenements assessed as being in ruins had been demolished in Wrocław²⁸. Later, however, until the end of 1947, the clearing works were largely of an interventionist nature and therefore, even 3 years after the war, heaps of rubble still lay everywhere²⁹. The damaged buildings posed a real threat, as evidenced by a series of their collapses in the autumn of 1947, which were made public in the local press³⁰. Until 1949, approximately 200 buildings that could not be renovated were demolished every year. However, even later, their number did not decrease, as a result of post-war negligence and lack of renovations³¹.

From the second quarter of 1946 to the beginning of 1949 the demolition and cleaning activities in the city were taken over by the WDO Technical Department, which – apart from removing the rubble – was obliged to obtain building material (bricks) from it to cover the investments being carried out at that time³². The lack of an action plan did not mean that the gradual removal of rubble from the city did not progress. It was visible, especially in the historic centre. There, in place of debris, new squares appeared, which for a shorter (such as Youth Square) or longer time (like Dzierżyński Square) became part of the city landscape. The scale of these actions to clean up the city space is evidenced by the fact that in 1947 alone 82,547 m³ of rubble were removed from Wrocław³³.

Removal of rubble on a larger scale began in the city only at the end of 1947, in connection with preparations for the Recovered Territories Exhibition, but the focus was then on those areas which were to be the “showpiece” of Polish

²⁵ APWr, WDO, ref. 30, p. 87.

²⁶ Przyłęcka, *Nie od razu Wrocław*, p. 66. For example, in August 1945, the City Cleaning Service cleaned up 1,500 m³ of rubble, and in November 3,000 m³ (APWr, ZMmW, ref. 67, pp. 8, 16).

²⁷ APWr, ZMmW, ref. 64, p. 13. In this period, the main burden of clearing debris fell on the shoulders of the German population. Norman Davies, Roger Moorhouse, *Mikrokosmos. Portret miasta środkowoeuropejskiego*, Kraków 2002, pp. 449–450.

²⁸ APWr, WDO, ref. 239, p. 62.

²⁹ These heaps were still to be found frequently in the city centre until the early 1970s. See Eduard Mühle, *Historia Wrocławia*, Warszawa 2016, p. 240.

³⁰ APWr, WDO, ref. 30, pp. 37–41, 43–54; Tyszkiewicz, *Wrocławska Dyrekcja*, p. 429.

³¹ Małachowicz, *Stare Miasto*, p. 117.

³² APWr, WDO, ref. 2, p. 5.

³³ Małachowicz, *Stare Miasto*, p. 116.

achievements in the city. These activities were heralded by the opening of a special railway line through the Old Town to service the removal of rubble³⁴. The removal of rubble, and in fact the recovery of bricks, began on a larger scale at the beginning of 1949, when, following the liquidation of the WDO, the Independent Department of Rubble Removal and then the Municipal Demolition Company were established. At that time, activities were undertaken which soon earned the capital of Lower Silesia the title of “the largest brick mine” in Poland³⁵. As early as in January 1949, up to 1 million bricks were “excavated” daily in Wrocław, both from rubble and demolition of destroyed buildings and also from buildings in good condition. It is known that in 1949 Wrocław “donated” 140 million bricks, mainly to the rebuilding city of Warsaw³⁶.

Alongside the removal of debris, the repair of buildings considered important began, which included public and housing buildings. In 1945, as mentioned earlier, the first renovations were carried out in the management system, i.e. the work was undertaken by working groups of the Building Department of the City Board, the Delegation of the Ministry of Reconstruction, and central institutions taking over specific buildings in the city for their own headquarters³⁷. By the end of 1945, several dozen buildings had been renovated, 20–30 of which were subject to major repairs. Among them were the City Hall, buildings of the University and Polytechnic, 2 hospitals and 2 hotels, a prison, the Court and several schools, banks and buildings for the administration³⁸. At the beginning of 1946, renovations were carried out in the building of the Voivodeship Office, the complex of buildings on Sądowa Street was restored, and the 11 most damaged churches and the cathedral were secured³⁹. In the case of the latter activities, there was considerable spontaneous public participation. However, due to the cold winter and scarce credit resources, it was not possible to launch renovation investments on an appropriate scale regarding the reconstruction of facilities for schools, hospitals, clinics and housing⁴⁰.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 116–117.

³⁵ Włodzimierz Suleja, *Historia Wrocławia*, vol. 3, Wrocław 2001, p. 38. APWr, ZMmW, ref. 863, pp. 6–22.

³⁶ Modrawski, *Ziemie Odzyskane*, p. 499.

³⁷ APWr, ZMmW, ref. 64, pp. 12–13.

³⁸ APWr, WDO, ref. 239, p. 27.

³⁹ APWr, WDO, ref. 12, p. 25.

⁴⁰ Tyszkiewicz, *Wrocławska Dyrekcja*, p. 425.

The year 1947 was supposed to be a year of investments in the housing substance in Wrocław⁴¹, due to the disastrous condition of residential buildings in the city and its growing population. Yet the WDO in that year had to join in the implementation of the nationwide Three-Year Plan⁴², which envisaged investments in housing, but only in its final phase, i.e. in 1949. Initially, priority for loans was given to the industrial and transport sectors, but in 1947, due to the harsh winter and delays by the Ministry of Reconstruction in transferring funds for investments, these were suspended until mid-year⁴³. In turn, from September it was recommended that no new investments should be started before winter, which meant an impasse in the rebuilding of Wrocław⁴⁴. Although the renovation of public buildings and monuments progressed, their total number, due to the lack of funds, was not impressive and amounted to 120. As estimated by the WDO, the city needed about 2 billion zlotys for repairs and reconstruction in 1947, but it received merely 339 million zlotys⁴⁵.

The impasse in the rebuilding of Wrocław in 1947, for whatever other reason, was also caused by a lack of a concept of what the city should become and what role it should play. In government circles in Lublin, prior to the start of the battle for Festung Breslau, it was assumed that Wrocław would be the second “capital” of Poland. Although of the big cities, Kraków and Łódź were also undamaged, but both could not be taken into account. The former was considered politically “reactionary” and was the “capital” of the Nazi General Government until 1945. Łódź, on the other hand, although it was a city of workers and with a “red” reputation, did not have the splendour of a metropolis. It turned out that also Wrocław could not be the “capital”, as between February and May 1945 it served as a Nazi fortress and its destruction was so great that it was compared with that of Warsaw. Thus, from a potential “war prize”, the capital of Lower Silesia became a problem for

⁴¹ APWr, WDO, ref. 30, pp. 107, 127.

⁴² Participation of the regional Reconstruction Directorates in the activities of the Three-Year Plan was already announced during the so-called Reconstruction Convention organised by the Ministry of Reconstruction in Warsaw on 13–14 II 1947. APWr, UWW, ref. 17.1 XVIII/2, pp. 1–5.

⁴³ APWr, WDO, ref. 30, p. 36.

⁴⁴ The awareness that 1947 was a failure in reconstruction was already apparent at the beginning of 1948, when this was articulated, for example, at a voivodship-level conference held in Wrocław on 9 II 1948. APWr, UWW, ref. 17.5 XVIII/120, pp. 2–8.

⁴⁵ APWr, WDO, ref. 30, p. 76. Tyszkiewicz, *Wrocławska Dyrekcja*, p. 429. In total, the WDO renovated 500 structures by 1948, of which 276 were residential houses (Thum, *Obce miasto*, p. 194).

Poland. Its further fate depended not only on the government in Warsaw, but also on a number of local factors, including barriers blocking the rebuilding and development of the city.

The first of these was political, as Wrocław and the pre-war German territories up to the Oder and Lusatian Neisse rivers were given to Poland in 1945 to administer, but not to own permanently⁴⁶. This matter was to be settled only by a peace conference, which never took place, and the “Recovered Territories” remained under Polish rule, but their international legal status remained unregulated for a long time⁴⁷. This gave rise to specific concerns as to whether it was worth investing in areas that could be taken away⁴⁸. This was an important issue, especially in a situation where indisputably Polish lands had also been destroyed and required a great deal of investment, and the ruined country could take only limited restoration measures. Warsaw had priority, but apart from the capital the “queue” of cities was very long, and Wrocław was not one of the first. The reconstruction of the capital was beyond discussion – it legitimised the authorities installed in the country “on Soviet bayonets”. In Wrocław’s case, the question was how many inhabitants could this ruined city accommodate in a relatively short period of time? Before the war it was inhabited by 650,000 people, but after the loss of 68% of its urban fabric, it could only support around 200,000–210,000 inhabitants. The settlement development of the city beyond this number required considerable investment. For these reasons, as Gregor Thum wrote, an “unofficially considered” concept of developing Wrocław as a city with an assumed population of around 200,000 appeared⁴⁹. This size should not be overestimated as a future plan for the capital of Lower Silesia, but it is worth noting.

It arose rather from the constraints faced by the Polish takeover of post-German lands than from Polish expectations. It turned out that already in autumn 1944, when the Polish Committee for National Liberation (PKWN) in Lublin was considering territorial “compensation” for Poland at the expense of Germany, one of the most important factors that seemed to hinder such a “westward relocation” of the country was the question of population. It was mentioned earlier that Poland had suffered great population losses during the war, weakening its demographic

⁴⁶ Mühle, *Historia Wrocławia*, p. 241.

⁴⁷ Elżbieta Kaszuba, *Między propagandą a rzeczywistością. Polska ludność Wrocławia w latach 1945–1947*, Warszawa–Wrocław 1997, s. 15; Ordyłowski, *Życie codzienne*, pp. 235–247.

⁴⁸ Davies, Moorhouse, *Mikrokosmos*, pp. 451–453; Thum, *Obce miasto*, p. 186.

⁴⁹ Thum, *Obce miasto*, p. 185.

potential to settle new lands⁵⁰. The number of local Poles (original inhabitants) living there could not be overestimated. Pre-war Poland was an agricultural-industrial country in which 60% of the population lived and worked in the countryside⁵¹. In the overall balance, the urban element was not only in the minority, but was also more strongly affected by the wartime tragedies. It should also not be forgotten that in the cities of the Second Republic a significant part of the population was of Jewish and German nationality, and after the war, both these communities could not be taken into account.

As part of the work of the Bureau for Western Territories (BZZ), it was calculated that before the war the urban population of the “Recovered Territories” amounted to 4.1 million people. It was optimistically estimated that the Polish urban population reserves could reach 1,793,000 people, i.e. 43.8% of needs⁵². This optimism was unfounded, so in late May and early June 1945, the plans were modified and it was assumed that 2.5 million Poles would appear in the lands from which it was planned to expulse 7 million Germans. This meant accepting the fact that Poland would not restore the pre-war population density, particularly in the cities, with Wrocław above all. This issue was addressed by Professor Eugeniusz Romer at the First Session of the Scientific Council for the Recovered Territories, organised in Cracow in the summer of 1945. He noted that the destruction of towns in the “new” lands could be favourable to Poland and argued: “if there was a 60% or 70% urban population there, now there will be 30%”, as the ruined towns would not accommodate more anyway⁵³. During this session, Wrocław was discussed and two possible settlement scenarios were considered. In the first one, the city was to be settled in groups, in a compact way, by settlers coming basically from one centre (Lviv) or at most from two (Warsaw). In the second scenario, settlers were to come from all over Poland, selected for their skills, in order to create, as quickly as possible, a new quality – a Polish community of Wrocław⁵⁴. None of these concepts prevailed, and Wrocław took over from Lviv the legend and culture of a borderland city. It was not, however, settled by the planned “professionals” nor by the former inhabitants of Lviv, as it was clearly shown by the case of the 30,000 of them who arrived at the turn of 1945/1946 at the Odra river and later left

⁵⁰ Kaszuba, *Między propagandą*, p. 14.

⁵¹ Wojciech Morawski, *Dzieje gospodarcze Polski*, Warszawa 2010, pp. 215–216.

⁵² Kaszuba, *Między propagandą*, p. 16.

⁵³ *Ibidem*, p. 17.

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*.

in large numbers for central Poland in search of better conditions⁵⁵. Also the people from Warsaw, who had been counted on in the plans as urban settlers, only in small numbers decided to settle in Wrocław, which was not only destroyed almost as much as Warsaw, but was also foreign and “full of Germans”⁵⁶.

Thus, the capital of Lower Silesia was settled, without a plan, by villagers from central Poland. This process, largely spontaneous, did not proceed as quickly as expected, as by the end of 1945 there were still about 30,000 Poles and over 180,000 Germans in the city⁵⁷. The situation resulted not only from problems with reaching the ruined city by rail (until 1946 the Wrocław Main Station was inoperable and instead the suburban Brochów station was used), which slowed down the pace of settling the city⁵⁸. The situation did not change until 1946, when after the Potsdam Agreement sanctioning Polish presence in the new territory, the expulsion of Germans began and new groups of Poles from the lands taken by the Soviet Union began to arrive in Wrocław in railway transports. In the autumn of that year, there were fewer than 30,000 Germans and more than 150,000 Poles. Six months later, only 17,500 of Wrocław’s 214,000 inhabitants were of German nationality⁵⁹.

One of the most important barriers to the reconstruction of the Polish Wrocław as a large city and local metropolis was the issue of employment in the city⁶⁰. In German times it had been a major industrial centre, and this position of the city was legitimised by Linke-Hofmann Werke, which was part of the largest German “metal” concerns. Yet in the spring of 1945, the industry of Wrocław was left in ruins⁶¹. The most valuable machines had already been taken away by the Germans in 1944, the buildings were destroyed in 1945 and what had survived was taken by the Soviets⁶². In these conditions, the restoration of Wrocław as an industrial centre was extremely difficult in 1945. We can find in some studies the opinion that the post-war plans did not include Wrocław as a large industrial city and instead

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 21.

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 20.

⁵⁷ APWr, ZMmW, ref. 64, p. 36

⁵⁸ APWr, ZMmW, ref. 67, pp. 11–12, 18.

⁵⁹ Davies, Moorhouse, *Mikrokosmos*, p. 454.

⁶⁰ Ordyłowski, *Życie codzienne*, pp. 45–50.

⁶¹ Chumiński, *Stan przemysłu*, pp. 57–59.

⁶² When the fighting ended, the Soviets selected 212 Wrocław industrial plants to be dismantled and taken away. Modrawski, *Ziemia Odzyskane*, pp. 93–95; Dolny Śląsk. *Monografia historyczna*, ed. Wojciech Wrzesiński, Wrocław 2006, p. 635.

gave it the role of an administrative and cultural centre⁶³. This, however, was not a planned concept, but a result of the situation after the war. The uncertain status of the “new” territories, and the undoubted needs of the “old” ones, did not encourage the rebuilding of industry in Wrocław. This was to remain the case for several more years and meant that the Polish population arriving here could not count on higher employment⁶⁴. Another barrier to the rebuilding of Wrocław, particularly important at the turn of 1945/1946, was the presence of a large German community in the city, who occupied the surviving houses and flats that the settlers had been deprived of. They saw that the Germans, as professionals, were employed by the Russians, in better (as it was believed) positions, while they, the Poles, often had to do the hardest work⁶⁵.

The presence of Germans, after 5 years of occupation, irritated Poles⁶⁶, and the aversion towards them was significantly strengthened by the relationship that developed between Germans and Russians. It had a practical reason, because German unpaid workers were a valuable labour force for the Soviets and for this reason they were protected from Poles and the Polish administration⁶⁷. In the first period after the capitulation of the Festung on 6th May 1945, Poles arriving in the city in order to settle could either apply to the authorities for a flat or choose their own accommodation, often moving into houses in which their previous occupants were still staying. For the newcomers, the prospect of living together with Germans was difficult to accept⁶⁸. For there was not a family that did not suffer from them during the war.

Other reasons for dislike should also be taken into account, as many Russians found it difficult to show sympathy for the Poles. They often thought that the defeated Germans were a serious adversary and that the Poles, although they had not won the war, were coming for the spoils, and this built up a short-lived alliance of

⁶³ Przemysław Dudek, *Koncepcje odbudowy powojennego Wrocławia 1945–1956 – między miastem prowincjonalnym a drugą metropolią*, “Przegląd Administracji Publicznej”, 2 (2013), p. 61.

⁶⁴ For example, it was not until June 1945 that the Soviets handed over the first 45, already looted industrial enterprises to the Poles. Davies, Moorhouse, *Mikrokosmos*, p. 450. In March 1946, there were 439 people working in industry in Wrocław, and 302 more were needed. APWr, ZMmW, ref. 64, p. 36.

⁶⁵ Ordyłowski, *Życie codzienne*, pp. 46–47.

⁶⁶ Davies, Moorhouse, *Mikrokosmos*, pp. 454–461.

⁶⁷ APWr, ZMmW, ref. 67, p. 5.

⁶⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 466–467. Beata Halicka, *Polski Dziki Zachód. Przemysłowe migracje i kulturowe oswojanie Nadodrza 1945–1948*, Kraków 2015, p. 208.

former enemies⁶⁹. Considering this, it is not surprising that many Wrocław residents were relieved when the forced deportation of Germans began on 1st October 1945⁷⁰. The departure of the Germans from Wrocław did not solve the main problems of the ruined city, apart from the housing issue, as from then on Wrocław could still provide shelter for about 200,000 people. In those post-war years, few new housing units were being built⁷¹, and, in addition, as early as in 1946 a problem with the progressing degradation of the existing substance became evident⁷². As already mentioned, the Three-Year Plan, entering into force in 1947, assumed the primacy of investment in public and communication infrastructure, while the subsequent Six-Year Plan emphasised heavy industry⁷³. At that time, the construction of new housing remained only a distant second. This also applied to Wrocław, which only reached its pre-war population number 40 years after the war⁷⁴.

Many more barriers to the post-war reconstruction and expansion of Wrocław could be mentioned. A large number of them were cumulated in the first months of Polish rule in the city and were typical for the entire “Recovered Territories”. These included problems with transport, which was virtually nonexistent in an organised manner, problems with provisions, typical of lands directly affected by military operations, and threats to life and property resulting from widespread banditry and looting⁷⁵. Most of these were resolved, or at least reduced, over time. However, in the following years the fundamental question remained – would Poland manage to fully utilise the “Recovered Territories” and would Wrocław remain its capital?

As early as 1947, as signalled earlier, an impasse in the rebuilding of Wrocław became evident, and one of the important reasons for this was the natural process of wearing out the social enthusiasm which had enabled many difficult problems to be solved in the first years after the war. The new inhabitants of the capital of

⁶⁹ Thum, *Obce miasto*, pp. 68–74.

⁷⁰ Davies, Moorhouse, *Mikrokosmos*, p. 456.

⁷¹ For example, in 1949 only 453 flats were provided in new buildings in the whole of the “Recovered Territories”. Modrawski, *Ziemie Odzyskane*, p. 498.

⁷² Ordyłowski, *Życie codzienne*, p. 69.

⁷³ Thum, *Obce miasto*, p. 197.

⁷⁴ *Raport z wyników spisów powszechnych województwo dolnośląskie 2002*, Wrocław 2003, I. *Ludność*, <https://wroclaw.stat.gov.pl/publikacje-i-foldery/spisy-powszechnie/raport-z-wynikow-woj-dolnoslaskiego-171/i-ludnosc-714/> (access: 14 XII 2019).

⁷⁵ *Dolny Śląsk. Monografia*, pp. 629–636; Ordyłowski, *Życie codzienne*, pp. 76–87, 106–110.

Lower Silesia were already tired of these problems⁷⁶, and their city, still scarred by the war, was increasingly placed in the second “suit” of cities in the country. In 1947 Wrocław was threatened with the fate of playing the role of a provincial town⁷⁷, a threat which became all the more real as the initially vigorous propaganda of the “Recovered Territories” and their “capital” of Wrocław had, by the middle of that year, clearly diminished⁷⁸. This was due to two reasons. Firstly, it was recognised in government circles that Western Pomerania and the port of Szczecin should be distinguished among the new lands, as the culmination of the Oder waterway, linking Silesia and its industrial region with the Polish coast. This shift in socio-political emphasis was evidenced, for example, by the Third Industrial Congress of the Recovered Territories organised in Szczecin, which promoted the idea of making this city the “main port of Central Europe”⁷⁹. The second reason was more serious, as government propaganda began to present the rather correct thesis that further emphasising the distinctiveness of the “new” lands was unfavourable and hindered their integration with the rest of the country. However, instead of continuing to show the “Recovered Territories” as war reparations and an economically valuable gain for the development of the country as its integral part, it was postulated to show them as areas previously deficient in the German economy⁸⁰.

In 1947, despite the stagnation in the process of rebuilding Wrocław, there were also some good signs for the city. The most important of these was the decision taken in the summer of that year to organise the Great Exhibition of the Recovered Territories (WZO) in the city in 1948, for which, in various conceptual forms, the local authorities had been striving since 1945⁸¹. The final decision to organise the WZO in Wrocław was taken in autumn 1947⁸² and this meant that the long-awaited additional funds were directed to the city⁸³. The planned Exhibition was a clear announcement of a change in the authorities’ policy towards Wrocław,

⁷⁶ This fatigue was caused not only by the living situation, but also by the “class struggle” exacerbated by the domestic communists and the social climate associated with it (Kaszuba, *Między propagandą*, pp. 214–266).

⁷⁷ APWr, WDO, ref. 30, p. 70.

⁷⁸ Jakub Tyszkiewicz, *Sto wielkich dni Wrocławia: wystawa Ziem Odzyskanych we Wrocławiu a propaganda polityczna ziem zachodnich i północnych w latach 1945–1948*, Wrocław 1997, pp. 15–54.

⁷⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 51–52.

⁸⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁸¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 71–94.

⁸² *Ibidem*, pp. 97 ff.

⁸³ APWr, WDO, ref. 30, pp. 9–23.

which gained a chance to obtain funds from the central budget that would enable the city to rebuild faster⁸⁴. The investments made in Wrocław, especially at the turn of 1947/1948 in connection with the WZO, should also be considered important, from the point of view of rebuilding the city from war damage⁸⁵. Although their traces, like “scars”, were still visible in the city for decades to come⁸⁶.

The organisation of the WZO for the capital of Lower Silesia had mainly a social and future dimension. From this perspective, it is hard to agree with G. Thum’s opinion that, although the WZO was an “important impulse” for the reconstruction of the city, “as soon as the event came to an end, the pace of work clearly slowed down” and “you cannot rather speak of a dynamic process of reconstruction in Wrocław”⁸⁷. On the other hand, following Jakub Tyszkiewicz, it should be stated that even without the Exhibition, a strictly propaganda undertaking, and without the developmental impulse it gave the city, it would have been rebuilt anyway. Wrocław was “destined for revival”⁸⁸, as the capital of the region and a centre with an excellent communications location. However, without the WZO the process of formation of the Polish city and its society would certainly have been slowed down. One might therefore be tempted to say that although 1948 did not bring a permanent return to the idea of rebuilding Wrocław as a great Polish metropolis, it did revive this idea, which was to be very useful in later years⁸⁹, decisively reversing the earlier policy of marginalising the city.

STRESZCZENIE

Wrocław w 1945 r., w wyniku trzymiesięcznych walk o Festung Breslau, zniszczony został w 68%. Miasto było największym na ziemiach niemieckich przyznanych Polsce jako rekompensata wojenna. Jego wartość poważnie obniżyły zniszczenia wojenne. Przybywające do miasta polskie władze musiały sprostać szeregowi problemów. Wiele z nich miało charakter doraźny – dotyczyły bezpieczeństwa, aprowizacji, uruchomienia

⁸⁴ Tyszkiewicz, *Wrocławska Dyrekcja*, p. 430.

⁸⁵ These are well illustrated by the minutes of coordination conferences held during the WDO with extensive participation of other institutions. APWr, UWW, ref. 17.5 XVIII/120, pp. 2–19.

⁸⁶ APWr, WDO, ref. 30, p. 57.

⁸⁷ Thum, *Obce miasto*, p. 197.

⁸⁸ Tyszkiewicz, *Sto wielkich dni*, pp. 149–150.

⁸⁹ Wojciech Wrzesiński, *Metropolia czy prowincja? Wrocław po II wojnie światowej*, “Śląski Kwartalnik Historyczny Sobótka”, 54 (1999), 3, p. 440. He pointed out that it was particularly important that the process of provincialisation of Wrocław, imposed on the city by the central authorities in the late 1940s and early 1950s, was much slower in the minds of its inhabitants. One cannot but connect this with the effects of the WZO.

infrastruktury miejskiej, czy wreszcie koegzystencji wyjeżdżających Niemców z przybywającymi Polakami. Inne towarzyszyć miały historii miasta przez dziesięciolecia. Do najważniejszych wyzwań zaliczyć należy deficyt mieszkań, zniszczenie przemysłu, obcą tożsamością miasta czy wreszcie jego odbudowę i rozbudowę. Jeden jednak problem leżał u podstaw innych – była to kwestia, jakim miastem ma być Wrocław? Lokalnym centrum kultury i administracji Dolnego Śląska, czy też metropolią ziem włączonych do Polski po II wojnie, a więc miastem z pierwszej piątki w RP? Szczególnie ważne dla ukształtowania roli Wrocławia okazały się lata 1945–1947.

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ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SITUATION IN WROCLAW AND SILESIA BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR – A DOCUMENT FROM THE WROCLAW ARCHIVES

SYTUACJA GOSPODARCZA I SPOŁECZNA WE WROCLAWIU I NA ŚLĄSKU PRZED II WOJNĄ ŚWIATOWĄ – DOKUMENT Z WROCLAWSKIEGO ARCHIWUM

ABSTRACT: The document from February 1939 presented here concerns aid from the Reich authorities to the eastern provinces of Germany. It clearly informed about the war plans of the Third Reich.

KEYWORDS: Lower Silesia, Wrocław (Breslau), economy, unemployed population, magistrate

After the First World War, Wrocław (Breslau) found itself in crisis as a result of significant and prolonged wartime financial contributions to the army and as a result of the city's unfavourable economic structure, including the predominance of small or dwarf craft enterprises, most often one-man businesses. Due to the crisis, there was also an exodus of skilled workers from Wrocław to the West and in their place new, less professionally trained labourers came from the provinces. The housing situation in the city also deteriorated considerably, especially from 1921, when, after the plebiscite held in Upper Silesia on 20th March, Upper Silesians, opting for Germany, arrived in the city. The population of Wrocław came to about 600,000, because at the same time, in accordance with the results of the plebiscite, the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and the Geneva Convention, part of

Upper Silesia was incorporated into Poland, which was something that they wanted to escape.

The influx of new inhabitants caused a sudden increase in the population of Wrocław, which in the centre (within the city moat) reached 380 people per 1 ha of built-up area and 1,022 people in the area of the industrialised Nikolai Suburb (Nikolai Vorstadt). This political-national and livelihood context created anti-Polish sentiments which were exploited, above all, by the Nazi movement. The city authorities associated with it, although acknowledging the many years of systemic deficiencies and negligence of previous governments in the city's economy, looked forward from 1933 to political and economic change and the creation of the "Greater Germany" announced by Hitler.

Both the inhabitants and the Wrocław authorities approved of the project to build the Oder–Danube canal and the motorway network, seeing it as a beneficial integration of Silesia, situated on the south-eastern edge of the Reich, into the modern system of goods and passenger traffic in the vast area of Eastern Europe. It was obvious that its capture and further development meant war, which was, however, approvingly and neutrally described as "expansion to the south and east of Europe". There was also no hiding the fact that the proposed solutions also meant the possibility of favourable territorial changes at the expense of the neighbour Polish state.

The part of the document presented here was written in February 1939 in connection with a decree issued by Hitler on 1st February 1939 formally concerning assistance from the Reich authorities to the eastern provinces of Germany. Its full content was known only to a small number of trusted state administration personnel, from whom a reaction was expected. This document was not published, presumably because it unequivocally reported on the imminent warfare of the Third Reich, within *Grossdeutschland*. Its full text was known only to the President of the Wrocław *Regierungsbezirk* (governmental district), and his staff were informed of the entire task by him in the form of a *mündliche Rücksprache*. Only copies of the parts of the document corresponding to their competences were given to them to work on. It is known that *Regierungsbezirk* Councillor Dr. Ehrlicher received a copy of the section on cultural affairs and Councillor Matzker a copy of the section on construction. The final report was signed by *Oberbürgermeister* Dr. Hans Fridrich and Dr. Georg Kroll, President of the Wrocław *Regierungsbezirk*.

Fragment of the Secret Report of 1st Februar 1939 from the Magistrate of the City of Wrocław to the President of the Wrocław *Regierungsbezirk* about the economic and population situation of the city and Silesia in the years 1938-1939.

The State Archives in Wrocław (Archiwum Państwowe we Wrocławiu), Wrocław Governmental District, No. 46, original in German, fragment typescript, no pagination.

Economy

[...] The Job Centre Magistrate of the City of Wrocław has estimated that there are currently around 14,000 job seekers, including around 3,000 women, and that migration to other German lands has not been stopped at all.

I therefore ask for intervention in this situation in order to carry out in Wrocław in full the indications provided for in the decree of the Führer and Chancellor of the Third Reich of 1st February 1939, because the general situation in Wrocław and the emigration movement observed here require this.

General matters

To find reasons why it is necessary to intensify the economy in Wrocław, one should consider, among other things, lagging of the economic and social development of Silesia in relation to the Third Reich. We will allow ourselves to characterize the lower wage level (we give merely one of the symptoms here) with a few examples, especially the most striking ones. Gross earnings per hour of work of a Silesian worker were lower than the average in the Reich in the chemical industry by 27%, in iron production by 21.5%, in textile industry by 19%.

Another symptom of economic and population problems is a great loss caused by immigration.

Population movement in Wrocław

Migration population losses were in the years: 1934 – 1,060 persons, 1935 – 2,311, 1936 – 6,738, 1937 – 4,655, 1938 – 3,365.

The migration losses were greater than the population growth for many years. At a normal, natural further development, Wrocław would have today around 640,000 inhabitants, but in reality it has only around 622,000 of them, so by 18,000 less.

The extraordinary intensity of population movements in the post-war period, as well as already in the pre-war period, was mainly due to the fact that many young, yet untrained immigrants, mostly from the eastern part of Silesia, come to Wrocław only to later, after learning a profession and getting practical experience, move further west to industrial districts with better salaries, higher living standards and wider professional opportunities. This phenomenon, beneficial for industry in central Germany, was for Wrocław a severe disadvantage due to the loss of qualified specialists, which made it difficult to switch the specialisation of the plants necessary after the war. However, a thorough switch of plants' production was necessary in Wrocław. The industrial production of Wrocław has lost around 3 million consumers due to the renunciation of areas in the eastern part of the Reich. In addition, the purchasing power of the population who arrived in the city immediately after the end of the war was very weak. This resulted in an extremely heavy burden on the Wrocław social welfare system and the Wrocław housing market.

The statistics of the last 50 years show that most of the people who came to Wrocław were servants, people with no professional training, unskilled craftsmen and day labourers, and at the same time the city was constantly losing highly qualified workers and people with large incomes. In the last six years (since 1933), there has been a very strong outflow, above all, of skilled workers, followed by scholars, civil servants, military personnel, qualified industrial assistants and wealthy people without a profession. The natural consequence of this population movement, considered according to professional groups, is a constant decline in education and culture due to the continuous inflow of low-skilled and unskilled workers and the outflow of highly-skilled people.

The picture of the negative development and influence of the economic structure of Wrocław is further emphasized by the results of statistical research concerning the age of emigrants. Over the last six years, Wrocław has recorded an increase in its population mainly in the age group from 5 to 15, whose training is a burden on the city budget, and in the age group from 40 to 50 and older people, i.e. the ageing and disabled, who lack initiative and strength to work. These people are very often a burden on the municipal social care. Conversely, people aged 20 to 30 years and 30 to 40 years, productive and fully qualified workers with experience, 15 to 20 years of age, who have just obtained their professional qualifications and can go into production, emigrate in particular. **Thus, professional and biological selection of the Wrocław population takes place, as a result of which Wrocław**

loses a better part of its population. Immediate stopping of this phenomenon is a pressing need. [emphasis – T.K.]

Additional discussion on housing issues in the city

Wrocław is still one of the cities with the most unfavourable housing conditions, both in terms of living space and hygiene. According to the 1937 housing census, there were 11.1 single-chamber dwellings per 100 flats; when in all the larger cities in Germany only 3. These housing ratios have not changed fundamentally also at present, as evidenced by the still high percentage of small flats (1- to 3-chamber), which at the beginning of 1938 was 68.3%, while in other cities this percentage was on average around 50%.

The Wrocław housing issue is particularly pressing due to the large number of children in families in of the German East. About 20% of flats are overcrowded. Wrocław has a sad record in this regard among other cities. The housing shortage cannot be covered by the existing efforts in the field of housing and estate construction. Today it can be estimated at about 15,000 missing flats.

The economic situation of the Wrocław population, worse than the average, is closely related to the city's finances. It is important that, despite the external alignment of budgets in the years 1937–1938, no real internal balance of the budget was ever achieved. (Statutory reserves are completely inadequate. There are no reserves for urgent matters, such as the construction of schools, the reorganisation of transport in the city centre, the construction of cheap and mass “folk” flats, etc., and insufficient coverage of individual plans). It should also be taken into account that external budget alignment have been achieved thanks to the alignment of finances by Prussia. Therefore, it must be preserved in its consequences unconditionally to ensure at least the existing services. It should also be pointed out that Wrocław has increased its tax base to such an extent that it will undoubtedly impede economic recovery.

However, in order to enable the city to make the necessary undertakings, which will be discussed further in this report, new financial resources should be made available to the city. This includes, among other things, loosening the credit ban on municipalities and loosening the blockade of credits intended for savings banks and other cash institutions. Such a financial policy is of particular importance for the city of Wrocław, as the Wrocław savings bank has not used up much of the

mortgage quota and, as a result of it, would be able to immediately grant far-reaching loans for the construction of small housing once the credit blockade would have been lifted.

In view of the low real incomes and the need to raise the standard of living, it should also be examined whether it is not possible to include Wrocław in a better pay scale and thus raise the real wages of local workers. Wrocław is currently at the 16th level of the urban pay scale¹, while Königsberg, a city with disproportionately better conditions, is at the 14th level of that scale.

The general facts set out above make it clear that there are grounds for the Führer Decree in Wrocław to be implemented as far as possible and as quickly as possible. [...] Favourable conditions for political and economic development within Grossdeutschland [emphasis – T.K.]

Never has there been a more favourable situation for successfully tackling the difficulties in the economic development of Silesia than today, as favourable conditions have been created for the economic regeneration of Silesia and Wrocław. There is a change in the political and communication situation, such as the construction of the Oder–Danube canal, the privileged transit motorway Wrocław–Brno–Vienna and the facilitated car traffic through Czechoslovakia, which means the incorporation of Silesia into the Reich’s motorway network and the facilitation of communication for privileged transit, goods and passenger traffic through Czechoslovakia, i.e. there will be a complete change in the strategic situation, enabling the creation in Silesia of economic and military potential and future prospects in the great eastern area.

It is furthermore pointed out the economic benefits created by the creation of the Wrocław–Brno–Vienna motorway and expects another political and communication construction, namely the Oder–Danube canal and the expansion to southern and eastern Europe [...]. [emphasis – T.K.]

Untersigned:

Oberbürgermeister – Dr. Hans Fridrich,

Regierungspräsident des Regierungsbezirks Breslau – Dr. Georg Kroll

¹ Urban pay scale – in the Reich, some cities were considered privileged centres in terms of wages. State officials in these centres received higher wages than the average in the Reich. The same applied to craftsmen for their services. However, Wrocław did not belong to this category of cities.

STRESZCZENIE

W prezentowanym tu dokumencie z lutego 1939 r. władze miasta Wrocławia konstatowały wieloletnie braki i zaniedbania systemowe poprzednich rządów w gospodarce miejskiej, jednocześnie oczekiwały ekonomicznych zmian oraz utworzenia zapowiadanych przez Hitlera “Wielkich Niemiec”. Zarówno mieszkańcy, jak i wrocławskie władze z aprobatą odnosiły się do projektu budowy kanału Odra–Dunaj i sieci autostrad, widząc w nich korzystne włączenie Śląska, usytuowanego na południowo-wschodnim krańcu Rzeszy, do nowoczesnego systemu ruchu towarowego i osobowego na wielkim obszarze Wschodniej Europy. Oczywistym było, że jego opanowanie i dalszy rozwój wiązał się z rozpoczęciem wojny, którą jednak aprobatywnie i neutralnie określano, jako “ekspansję na południe i wschód Europy”. Nie ukrywano też, że projektowane rozwiązania oznaczały możliwość korzystnych terytorialnych zmian w odniesieniu do polskiego sąsiedztwa.

ARTYKUŁY RECENZYJNE I RECENZJE REVIEWS

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Dagmara Adamska, *Wieś – miasteczko – miasto. Średniowieczne osadnictwo w dorzeczu górnej i środkowej Oławy [Village – Town – City. Medieval settlements in the upper and middle Oława River basin]*, Łomianki: LTW, 2019, 565 pp.

Dagmara Adamska's choice of the not very popular theme of the history of settlements as a subject for monographic studies should be regarded as highly appropriate, because – with regard to Silesia – there is a considerable shortage of such studies. The existing studies by 20th-century Polish and German historians are often burdened with the impact of previously prevailing ideologies on their interpretation of sources and formulation of conclusions. Nowadays, laborious historical and settlement studies are rarely undertaken, which is probably due to the vastness of the source base, as well as the lack of basic works, such as the regional historical and geographical dictionary. The necessity for the researcher to meet the technical requirements specific to historical-settlement research is also a very important aspect. Undoubtedly, D. Adamska has shown a good mastery of them.

As the goal of her work, she chose “a study of the settlement landscape” (p. 9). However, the study area of the upper and middle Oława River basin seems to be somewhat artificially singled out, as the area is physiographically diverse and did not constitute an independent political entity in the Middle Ages (and later). Nevertheless, D. Adamska's research made it possible to identify the specificity of this area and as such, it constitutes an important contribution to the knowledge of settlement processes on a general Silesian scale. The chronological and problematic structure of the work corresponds well with the formulated objective, which reflects the Author's own model of historical and settlement research, in my

opinion successful. The interdisciplinary approach and the ability to interpret various categories of sources – from written, through archaeological, onomastic, cartographic – to sources specific to art history, is essential to it.

D. Adamska's monograph consists of 9 chapters, which are divided into issue-based subchapters. In the introductory Chapter 1 the natural conditions of the study area are characterised. The next four Chapters, from 2nd to 5th, discuss the medieval settlement processes. The Author arranged them chronologically in three stages: early medieval (from the tribal times to the 12th century), intensive colonisation (in the 13th century) and settlement stabilisation (in the 14th–15th centuries). The Author describes particularly carefully the 13th century colonisation, because, as she emphasises, thanks to the policy of Silesian Henryks, and later Duke Bolko I the Strict, as well as the involvement of church institutions and knighthood, the settlement network, which had previously had only an isolated character, was completed in the analysed basin. She does not consider the Mongol invasion of 1241 as an important caesura for the development of settlement, and believes that it was rather “a catalyst for colonisation, associated with the need to rebuild the destroyed and depopulated country” (p. 91). The analysis of church divisions, in turn, allowed for noticing a correlation between the progress of colonisation and the formation of the parish network in this period. Whereas, in the last of the distinguished periods – settlement stabilisation – the Author considered the first half of the 15th century to be particularly important. It was then that the studied area, as well as the whole Silesia, was severely affected by the Hussite invasions, which caused a social and economic crisis, noticeable also on the overall Silesian scale. It was aggravated by climatic changes caused by the arrival of the so-called Little Ice Age and changes in the natural environment caused by humans (deforestation, erosion and soil depletion). The crisis manifested itself in the depopulation of villages and their abandonment, whilst the weakening of control by the princely authority led to an increase in the importance of the nobility, especially the noble family of Czirn, and to growing anarchy in internal affairs.

Chapter 6, the first of four “issue-based” chapters on settlements in the upper and middle Oława River basin, was devoted to the ownership structure of estates. The Author distinguished the church property and knightly property, emphasizing the special importance of the property of the Cistercian monastery in Henryków. In Chapter 7 she analysed the morphology of rural settlements, demonstrating the popularity of Rundling villages and, in the southern part of the study area, Waldhufendorf villages. Linear villages and tiny settlements were less frequent. In

Chapter 8, devoted to local site names, D. Adamska made use of very extensive toponomastic material, including a catalogue of so-called field names, with about 75,000 entries, compiled by Ernst Maetschke and Arthur Zobel. Although the Author noticed a significant research potential in this material, she limited her conclusions to stating that since the majority of settlements in the studied river basin have names of Slavic origin, they may date back to pre-colonisation times.

Chapter 9, devoted to Transformations of the Settlement Landscape, is to some extent a concluding chapter. In a synthetic manner, the Author discussed the dynamics of settlement processes, from the formation of an urban network (including Ziębice, Strzelin, Wiązów, and possibly Przeworno) to the formation of suburban settlements (“suburbs”), referring also to the transformations of the rural landscape. She briefly discussed the importance of selected economic facilities – watermills, fulling houses and windmills, but she did not pay any attention to inns mentioned in this context, nor to fairs or centres of glass and iron production. However, the presentation at the end of this chapter of the communication network in the area of the upper and middle Oława River, both within its area and its connections with routes all over Silesia and beyond the region, well completes the picture of settlements in the studied area.

Relatively little consideration has been given by D. Adamska to the issue of ethnic affiliation of the participants of colonisation activities. While for the earliest period she indicates that the studied area was settled by the Ślężanie tribe, in reference to the 13th century she only mentions that it was a period of “dynamic colonisation under German law and with the participation of German colonists” (p. 90). However, it is not clear from the present work what this participation consisted of and how it related to the participation of other ethnic groups in colonisation undertakings. Compared to the former historiography, the Author was very cautious in her analysis of the topo- and anthroponomastic material, limiting herself to the conclusion that the preserved “names say little about the former ‘ethnicity’, but testify to the contacts of both groups and to the participation of Poles and Germans in colonisation”. Since “the mechanisms of name formation and their relationship to the ethnic factor are neither simple nor obvious” (p. 324), she is not convinced “whether we are dealing with a reflection of the language of the inhabitants or of the chancelleries” (p. 331). There is also a certain lack of emphasis (precisely in Chapter 9) on legal issues, for which the area of the Oława River basin provides a great source material (e.g. the Book of Henryków), reflecting the clash between local legal traditions and innovations brought by the colonists.

There are just a few weak points of D. Adamska's monograph, but one can raise doubts about part of the title of the book, in which the phrase "Village – town – city" appears. It is not clear what justifies such a gradation, since what is discussed in the work are towns, suburbs and villages as settlement units. However, the second part of the title already unambiguously characterises the content of the book. There are some mistakes in the work, which are incidental, but out of my duty as a reviewer I will nevertheless point out some of them. These include: incorrect identification of the protagonist of the poem about a crusade – it is not Emperor Louis I the Pious (as in the index), but the Landgrave of Thuringia, Louis III the Pious; and an inexpert shortening of a source quotation (in the presentation of Prince Bolko II of Ziębice from the chronicle of Janek of Czarnków, p. 202); spelling errors in names (e.g. Schulc instead of Szulc, vier Hofe instead of Viehhöfel); it is unclear whether the Summary, which begins on p. 402, refers to the whole book (as the table of contents suggests), or Chapter 9 (as the typography suggests).

Although the literature on the subject used in the book is impressive (see the list on pp. 461–514) and the Author draws extensively on the achievements of German historiography, there are certain, sometimes significant, omissions, both of pre- and post-war works by German authors, e.g. Victor Seidel (*Der Beginn der deutschen Besiedlung Schlesiens*, 1913), Friedrich Schilling (*Ursprung und Frühzeit des Deutschtums in Schlesien...*, 1938), or Josef Joachim Menzel (*Die schlesischen Lokationsurkunden des 13. Jahrhunderts*, 1977; *Iura ducalia...*, 1964).

The work of D. Adamska are well complemented by illustrations, including maps, sometimes specially prepared for the book. However, some of the illustrations are quite difficult to read, due to the poor quality of the reproductions, which are devoid of colour and often small in size. The list of references to settlements in written sources and the list of medieval churches and village chapels, placed at the end of the book, are also useful.

D. Adamska undertook a difficult task and, in my opinion, successfully achieved her objectives. Her monograph provides a comprehensive description of phenomena related to the formation of settlement landscape in the upper and middle Oława River basin from the early Middle Ages to the end of this epoch. Although the area investigated by D. Adamska's research covers a relatively small territory (ca. 3% of the area of historical Silesia), yet the findings concerning the processes that took place there can be well applied for research on the history of settlement in the overall Silesian dimension.

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Grzegorz Węgrzyn, *Tożsamość ekonomiczna Górnoślązaków [Economic identity of the Upper Silesians]*, Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach, 2017, 213 pp.

Economic identity of the Upper Silesians has been studied due to the fact that in the general population censuses a significant group of people declared their affiliation to the Silesian nationality. According to the official census in Poland, in 2002, more than 173,000 residents of the Opole and Silesian Provinces declared Silesian nationality. However, in 2011 this number increased to 362,000 and 415,000 declared a dual national identity: Silesian and Polish. The existence of such a numerous group of people demonstrating Silesian nationality led Grzegorz Węgrzyn to pose the questions: “Do Silesians exist as a supra-individual social entity?” and “Are Silesians a territorial collectivity, an ethnic group or perhaps a nation?” (pp. 8–9). In order to explore this problem, the Author suggested that “there is a connection between the economic environment in which the Upper Silesian community functions and their social identity, especially in terms of economic identity” (p. 11).

Confronting such a wide-ranging problem, quite innovative in its intention, required the use of interdisciplinary research methods. However, the Author admits that his publication may appear “not economic enough for economists, not sociological enough for sociologists and not historical enough for historians” (p. 11). Assessing the monograph from the point of view of a historian’s methodology, it should be noted that although its Author graduated in sociology, he based his

findings in 65% on historical works. The remaining part of publications consisted of sociological, demographic, cultural and linguistic monographs. Out of the historical books listed, 53 were published in the Poland's Second Republic period, 48 were published between 1946 and 1989, that is immediately after the last war and during the years of socialist regime. Another 99 of them were written after the political transformation in Poland. In terms of these studies the publication date was used to estimate the scale of editions listed by the Author, which were published under systemic censorship, when original studies were exposed to the necessity of modifying research intentions. It remains unclear whether Węgrzyn was aware of these factors and took them into account when analysing the findings and conclusions included in the studies from the years 1946–1989.

In eight chapters the Author developed the substantive assumptions presented in the “Introduction”, beginning with a definition of the boundaries of Upper Silesia (Chapter I). Then, he defined the terms “Upper Silesians” (Chapter II), “Identity” (Chapter III) and “Economic Identity” (Chapter IV). The most extensive part of the monograph – “Social and Economic Changes in Upper Silesia and Their Impact on the Shaping of the Economic Identity of Upper Silesians” (Chapter V) – was based on historical studies. The last three chapters were devoted to the relationship between professional ethics and work ethos in terms of the economic identity of Upper Silesians (Chapter VI), the religious aspect of this identity (Chapter VII), and reflections on the household model perceived as an element of economic identity in Upper Silesia (Chapter VIII).

Węgrzyn began his narrative in Chapter I, by determining the boundaries of Upper Silesia and claiming that it is difficult to fully define its geographical and historical area, its social, religious and cultural dimensions, as well as the aspects of self-identification and identity of its inhabitants. The Author's explanation do not provide reasons for using the term ‘Upper Silesians’ in the title of the book, while it seems logical that the term originates from the name ‘Upper Silesia’, that is, the south-eastern part of the Silesian land. The Author also failed to consider important historical aspects of a region. Similarly to those, who lack deeper knowledge of the past, he defined the area only as the contemporary Silesian Province, without considering the western part of Upper Silesia, today also known as Opole Silesia.

Having encountered difficulties in defining the term ‘Upper Silesians’, he suggested the use of the auto-stereotype criterion (p. 25), i.e. the ‘fellow countryman’ – ‘stranger’ category (pp. 25–28, 33). However, he did not specify who and

for what reason was included in the discussed population. Although he managed to avoid classifying them by nationality, yet referring to terms that antagonise the inhabitants of this region, he pointed to the ‘feeling of injustice’ mainly because of the results of the 1921 plebiscite. It was then that the German state lost 40% of the inhabitants of this territory, who had voted for incorporation to Poland (p. 28). Another type of trauma was the Upper Silesians’ confrontation with immigrants from other parts of the Second Republic (p. 28). The Author referred to this issue again in Chapter V, “Social and Economic Changes in Upper Silesia and Their Impact on the Shaping of the Economic Identity of Upper Silesians”.

When writing about the causes of ‘Silesian frustration’, Węgrzyn mentioned, among others, the wartime events related to the passage of Red Army troops through Silesia in 1945, including the rape of women and the deportation of men deep into the USSR, as well as their confinement in labour camps. He also did not overlook the activities of the Polish Public Security apparatus, as well as the post-war nationality verification of the inhabitants (p. 30). The Author concluded that all these actions disappointed Upper Silesians and he compared their post-war reality to their living conditions in the German state. This might lead to the conclusion that they had suffered injustice in the Polish state (p. 34). In this passage of his work, the Author did not provide any convincing evidence to justify his position. On the other hand, Węgrzyn does not mention that Upper Silesians, being Polish citizens, signed the Nazi national list (*Volksliste*), which protected them against repressions directed towards the Polish and Jewish population¹.

The Author began his considerations with questioning and defining the Upper Silesian identity, to which he devoted the following Chapter II. He supported the findings of Antonina Kłoskowska² and Zbigniew Bokszański, who discussed the existence of variable criteria, including ‘professional identity’ (p. 49). Węgrzyn suggested the possibility of a similar approach to the concept of ‘economic identity’. Its scope is further specified in Chapter IV, recognising the emergence of this identity as a consequence of the distinctiveness and economic specificity of the region. This particularity resulted from the consolidation of heavy industry, which affected the employment structure and professional ethics of the local population. Furthermore, he emphasised that the emergence of this type of identity was also

¹ Paweł Kacprzak, *Weryfikacja narodowościowa ludności rodzimej i rehabilitacja tzw. „volksdeutschów” w latach 1945-1949*, “Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne”, 63 (2011), 2, pp. 149–150.

² Antonina Kłoskowska, *Kultury narodowe u korzeni*, Warszawa 1996.

influenced by the “strong social stratification of its inhabitants in the past, overlapping with national, linguistic, religious and cultural divisions” (p. 59).

The Author justifies these opinions in Chapter V concerning socio-economic changes in Upper Silesia and their impact on the development of the economic identity of Upper Silesians. This chapter constitutes the essential part of the study, however, in terms of its content it is not plausible enough. In over 80 pages the Author outlined the times ranging from the *Kulturkampf* (beginning in 1871) and the era of the German Reich, the outbreak of the First World War to the inter-war territorial changes of Poland and Germany. He also discussed the years of the Second World War, the period of the Polish People’s Republic and the subsequent social and economic transformation after 1989. In an almost ‘telegraphic style’, he presented the specific attitudes of Upper Silesians recorded during the 2002 census. In the last part, in each of the aforementioned subsections, he focused on two problems: the economic difficulties in Upper Silesia caused by the policy of the Polish state taking into account international factors and their influence on the formation of the economic identity of Upper Silesians.

He began discussing this issue by outlining the economic circumstances in Upper Silesia linked to the Industrial Revolution, leading to “the transformation of the discussed area into one of the leading industrial regions, not only of Germany, but also of Europe” (p. 70). The changes were reflected in economic, social and cultural circumstances, allowing the Upper Silesians to develop a sense of separateness, which was allegedly “strengthened by the policy of the *Kulturkampf* and Germanisation” (p. 70) and shaped their identity at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. According to the Author, this meant “perceiving [their – W.M.] place in the socio-professional structure and belonging to a given ethnic-national group” (p. 70). He noted their high “propensity to migrate in search of better living conditions” and their “distrust towards newcomers, who were perceived as competitors on the local labour market”. According to Węgrzyn, paternalistic relationships were established among employers and workers in Upper Silesian mines and factories (pp. 70–71). They developed in parallel with the *Landflucht* and *Ostflucht* phenomena also evident there. It is worth noting that the *Landflucht* was a migration of the rural population from the eastern lands of the Reich, who were losing their livelihoods as a result of unfavourable enfranchisement, or the loss of financial liquidity of landed estates transformed to fit capitalist economy. The *Ostflucht* was an economic emigration from Silesia to the much more developed industrial

centres of the Ruhr, Saxony and Berlin. It has been estimated that, for these reasons, 260,000 people could leave Upper Silesia by 1914. According to the Author, those emigrants also included people leaving for the United States and Brazil (pp. 71–72). They were replaced by immigrants from across the eastern border of the Kingdom of Prussia. By accepting lower-paid job offers, those newcomers made much of the local population hostile, as it limited their ability to make wage demands. However, by maintaining low wages, Upper Silesian products became competitive on the German and European markets, and increased profits encouraged German capitalists to make new investments and employ the immigrants. The Author analysed the consequences of the immigration of workers from across the eastern border to German enterprises, drawing attention mainly to the decrease in labour productivity caused by those workers and also to the increase in the number of accidents at work (p. 81), but without indicating their source. Industrial accidents arose from the lack of preparation of the agricultural population for the skills required in the industrial plants and also from language difficulties³.

Węgrzyn is sceptical about the incorporation of the eastern part of Upper Silesia into the independent Polish state in 1922. He pointed out the negative consequences of the demarcation of the Polish-German border, such as transition of 11 German monopolies and mining and metallurgical cartels, 120 mines and shafts, 55 coal fields and 43 zinc and lead ore mining fields, as well as the infrastructure of numerous metallurgical plants to the Silesian Province. He defended the property of German citizens, who in 1922 owned about three-fourth of the heavy industry enterprises and 85% of private land as they hampered the economic condition of the reborn Poland. In the view of scarce state financial resources, some efforts were made to attract French capital. The Author emphasised the national aspect of this decision, placing the blame on independent Poland, as its newly-established economy in Upper Silesia was not capable of making full use of the coal as well as metallurgical and industrial products available there. Węgrzyn also failed to see Germany's hostile policy in 1925 when the customs war against Poland was declared and resulted in an 'economic catastrophe' for Poland. It stopped the export of coal, the work of mines and mining-related plants, causing a major increase in

³ Danuta Kocurek, *Rzemiosło na Ziemi Pszczyńskiej w XIX wieku do 1918 roku (na tle pruskiej polityki gospodarczej)*, [in:] *Rzemiosło. Problemy doby współczesnej i czasów minionych. Książka wydana z okazji 70. rocznicy nadania sztandaru opolskiemu cechowi rzemieślniczemu*, eds. Wanda Musiałik, Roman Śmietański, Opole 2017, pp. 170, 172–173.

unemployment, before its negative effects were mitigated by a strike of English miners in 1926, enabling the export of coal to Scandinavian markets (p. 88). The problem of selling coal arose again in the years of the Great Economic Crisis (1929–1935) and Upper Silesians also affected by this stagnation – they either lost their jobs or kept only part-time employment. The loss of employment opportunities at that time resulted in the illegal bootleg coal mining also known as *biedaszyby* (poverty mine shafts) (p.114).

An indirect effect of the economic collapse and the Great Depression was an increased hostility of Upper Silesians towards people immigrating there from other parts of Poland, which was reflected in the reinforcement of the ‘fellow countryman’ – ‘stranger’ stereotype. The Author notes that “[w]hile in the past it was mainly low-skilled labourers who relocated to this area, after 1922 clerks, teachers, policemen, railwaymen predominated” (p. 115). He accuses them of “not coming in search of any type of work, but to govern, shape, change, integrate with the rest of Poland” (p. 116). Węgrzyn estimated the immigration level at 400,000 people based on Church statistics (p. 117), questioning the official number of 31,500 employees suggested by Maria Wanda Wanatowicz⁴. However, the Author did not comment on this estimation and methodology of his findings. It is also questionable whether opinions about attitudes towards Polish immigrants were grounded in reality or rather in the subjective feelings of some poorly educated Upper Silesian, who could not benefit from opting for belonging to the Polish state.

When analysing the influence of immigrants from inside Poland on the formation of the identity of Upper Silesians, the Author omitted three groups of immigrants: firstly, those who were relocated from the western part of Silesia, which remained German and who sought refuge in the Silesian Province after the Silesian Uprisings, secondly economic re-emigrants from Westphalia, the Rhineland and Berlin, and thirdly *optants* from the Third Reich. So far research studies have discussed the first group, estimated at about 60,000 people, who left the Opole Silesia after 1922 due to the anti-Polish terror⁵. A selective estimation of the size of the re-emigration from German industrial centres was carried out by Beata Olszewska for the Deanery of Rybnik. When estimating the size of this group, she

⁴ Maria Wanda Wanatowicz, *Ludność napływowa na Górnym Śląsku w latach 1922–1939*, Katowice 1982, p. 169.

⁵ Edward Odorkiewicz, *Uchodźcy z Opolszczyzny po powstaniach i plebiscycie*, “Zaranie Śląskie”, 25 (1962), 1, pp. 37–57.

also provided its demographic characteristics. She collected accounts of cultural differences which were revealed when confronted with the Upper Silesian reality⁶. So far historians have not been interested neither in the *optant* community nor in the Jewish population which came to the Silesian Province from the Third Reich after the *Kristallnacht* in 1937⁷.

It seems evident that the Author systemically omitted the assessment of the policy introduced by the Nazi government on the economic identity of the Upper Silesians. This is reflected in the fact that the subchapter devoted to their problems during World War II is three-fourth page long [sic!]. Highlighting their living conditions during the last war, Węgrzyn mentions the increase in the extraction of coal, full employment and employment of “a greater number of war prisoners along with the simultaneous sending of local workers to the front lines” (p. 120). For example, he completely omits the effects of the Nazi *Volksliste*, introduced in 1941 to the inhabitants of the Silesian Province, the acceptance of which protected them from forced labour, confiscation of private property, eviction and displacement. Omission of the above mentioned aspects considerably lowers the cognitive value of the work under review. This can only be justified by rather limited interest of Polish historians in the problems of Hitler’s internal policy in Upper Silesia incorporated into the Third Reich. So far this issue has been explored by Ryszard Kaczmarek, who proved that during the years of Nazi dominance, the material status of some Upper Silesians improved⁸.

The end of the war brought an increase of resentment among the Upper Silesians due to civilian losses caused by front-line operations and also by men being sent to work in the USSR. The Author rightly emphasised the establishment of the Military Miners Corps, whose members were sent to forced labour in mines in Upper Silesia. However, Węgrzyn failed to evaluate the policy towards Upper Silesians in the times of the Polish People’s Republic, that is in the period from the 1970s and the next two decades, when Edward Gierek, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party, gave the Upper Silesian miners a privileged economic position in comparison to other professional groups.

⁶ Beata Olszewska, *Reemigranci plebiscytowi w powiecie rybnickim – przyczynek do badań*, “Zeszyty Rybnickie”, 6 (2008), pp. 227–236.

⁷ See “Urzędowa Gazeta Gminy Izraelskiej w Katowicach”, 1937.

⁸ Ryszard Kaczmarek, *Górny Śląsk podczas II wojny światowej. Między utopią niemieckiej wspólnoty narodowej a rzeczywistością okupacji na terenach wcielonych do Trzeciej Rzeszy*, Katowice 2006, p. 312.

Upper Silesian miners benefited from a separate system of wages, social and health care, access to recreation centres and summer camps for children, as well as to special shops and rationed goods⁹. Since the Author overlooked these issues, it may seem that at that time the Upper Silesians were still discriminated. In fact, at that time they were considerably privileged and with Poland's transition to a market economy in 1990 and the reduction of miners' privileges, the Upper Silesians' sense of economic identity was threaten.

The book under review does not provide clear answers to the important questions posed in the first pages of the book: "Do Silesians exist as a social supra-individual entity?" and "Are Silesians a territorial community, an ethnic group or perhaps a nation?" (pp. 8–9). According to the Author's narrative they had already achieved the status of a nation and, at the end, he posed a question about the future of this identification. According to Węgrzyn, the apparent change in the status of those, who work in mining and industry may highlight the nostalgia of Upper Silesians for periods of economic prosperity. However, he did not address the issue of whether the announced economic departure from the dominance of heavy industry would strengthen or weaken the sense of this 'economic identity'. He could have discuss this issue by referring to processes already evident at the end of the 20th century in English, French or West German mining districts. By making no such attempt, along with other omitted issues discussed earlier, the Author leaves the Reader of this monograph unsatisfied and in doubts regarding the selection of the presented material and the subsequent conclusions.

⁹ Przemysław Snoch, *Edward Gierek wobec Górnego Śląska i jego mieszkańców (1957–1970)*. [in:] *Oni decydowali na Górnym Śląsku w XX wieku*, eds. Janusz Mokrosz, Mirosław Węc-ki, Katowice–Rybnik 2014, p. 158.

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***Z historii rzemiosła na Śląsku Opolskim [From the History of Craftsmanship in Opole Silesia]*, ed. Wanda Musialik, Opole: Izba Rzemieślnicza, Wydawnictwo MS, 2017, 399 pp.**

The history of craftsmanship in Opole Silesia is not widely known, because there are only a few studies on the history of this form of professional activity, which were created in the 1960s and 1970s¹. There are equally few studies of crafts concerning other historical Polish lands². Therefore, it was a reasonable decision to make an effort to elaborate a study of the development of craftsmanship in the Opole region from the time of its emergence in the 13th century until the present day. This task was carried out by a research team created under the scientific direction of Wanda Musialik, which prepared a collective monograph titled *Z historii rzemiosła na Śląsku Opolskim*.

The project involved a group of six authors, four of whom have dealt with its subject matter segment, undertaking to present the history of craftsmanship until 2016. While two authors have prepared for print individual memoirs of 20 crafts-women and craftsmen, reflecting the conditions under which the crafts functioned

¹ See Władysław Dziewulski, *Rzemiosło na Opolszczyźnie w XIV–XVIII w.*, [in:] *Księga Rzemiosła Opolszczyzny*, ed. Jerzy Bałaban, Opole 1967; Jan Kwak, *Nauka rzemiosła w miastach księstwa opolsko-raciborskiego od XVI do połowy XVIII wieku*, Opole 1973 (Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej w Opolu); Michał Lis, *Odbudowa podstaw gospodarki Śląska Opolskiego na przykładzie przemysłu*, Opole 1978.

² Tadeusz Mańkowski, *Polskie tkaniny i hafty XVI–XVIII w.*, Wrocław 1954; Marian Szczepaniak, *Przemysł i rzemiosło wiejskie w Wielkopolsce w drugiej połowie XVIII wieku*, Poznań 1971; *Z dziejów rzemiosła warszawskiego*, eds. Barbara Grochulska, Witold Pruss, Warszawa 1983.

in Opole Silesia after World War II. In the elaboration of the history of craftsmanship, two boundary dates were adopted: 1945 and 1989. The first date is motivated by the change in the area's belonging to Poland, while the second date was considered to be borderline, due to the definitive collapse of the remnants of the communist system and the start of political and economic reforms in Poland. The narrative covering the history has been divided into 4 separate parts. The situation of Opole's crafts in German times was presented by Dorota Kurpiers, who in Part I covered "The Craft Work Regulations from the Oldest Times to the Beginning of the 20th Century". Then the conditions of the functioning of craft production in the People's Republic of Poland were presented by Wanda Musialik in Part II, titled: "Craftsmanship in Opole in 1945–1989". Each of them focused on the discussion of three fundamental problems: the organisation of craftsmanship and its legal regulations, the foundations of its social functioning and development, and issues related to the preparation of a new generation of manufacturers in the craft professions. The same construction of the internal narrative was adopted in Part III by Anna Jasińska-Biliczak, who presented "Craftsmanship in 1989–2016". The narrative of Part IV, in which Grażyna Dębicka-Ozorkiewicz presented the problems of organisation and functioning of crafts in connection with "The Economic Self-Government of Crafts at the Chamber of Crafts in Opole", was closed in the same period of time.

Referring to the content presented in particular parts of the monograph, it is worth noting that Kurpiers focused on showing the origins of handicraft in Opole Silesia during the Early Middle Ages, in the era of the Piast dynasty. She drew attention to its structures and internal corporate mechanisms, which depended on internal regulations created within individual cities and guilds who were standardizing their functioning. She also pointed to the hierarchy character of the system, relating both to the position of a particular guild in the city and to the issue of individual guild affiliation (membership). This resulted in dependencies and obligations between the master and the guild as well as his relationship with the apprentice and journeyman. The author also took into account the transformations that were taking place in the organisation of guilds and standards of craft production, as a result of changes in the state affiliation of the Opole region, in connection with the new patents issued by the enlightened rulers of Austria and then Prussia and the Reich. Similar issues were also referred to in their studies by Stefan Popiołek and Władysław Dziewulski, however, Kurpiers presents these issues in

a slightly broader perspective, using both older studies by German authors such as Franciszek Idzikowski³, and more recent studies by Klaus W. Richter, Bernhard W. Scholz and Dieter Veldtrup⁴.

In Part II, referring to the functioning of craftsmanship in Opole in 1945–1989, Musialik, on the basis of a broad archival query, precisely characterized the post-war political and social reality and the adaptation problems of crafts in the following years. She stated that initially the transformation and development of the organisational structures of Opole's craftsmen was dictated by their administrative affiliation to the Silesian-Dąbrowa Voivodeship, and then to the Opole Voivodeship, which was established in 1950. The then situation of craftsmanship was affected by the scale of destruction of the Opole region, caused by warfare and post-war looting by the newly arrived population. Musialik also takes into account the political obstacles to the normalisation of the position of craftsmen, such as the national verification of the local population and the discriminatory treatment of native craftsmen, equating them systematically to the situation of the German population. In the following years, at the time of the Stalinisation of the system, the professional stabilisation of craftsmanship was limited, as everywhere in Poland, by the top-down control of economic life by Party and State authorities. According to ideological assumptions, focused on the class role of the proletariat, the status of craftsmen as an emanation of the small bourgeoisie was devalued. The political principles of the fight against this social and professional group were implemented, as the author has shown, through the tax system, and the subordination of vocational education to the needs of state enterprises brought about the regress of the guild education system, as the acquired professional knowledge was reduced to the level of a worker. Musialik documented her study thoroughly, mainly with the outcome of the analysis of the documents available in the State Archives in Opole and in the internal archives of the local Chamber of Crafts, which has had at its disposal the post-war personnel files, and examination files of examination commissions: for journeymen and masters since 1951.

The third part of the monograph concerns craftsmanship in 1989–2016, in which Jasińska-Biliczak, referring to the previously adopted arrangement of the

³ Franciszek Idzikowski, *Geschichte der Stadt Oppeln*, Oppeln 1863.

⁴ Bernhard W. Scholz, *Das geistliche Fürstentum Neisse: eine ländliche Elite unter der Herrschaft des Bischofs (1300–1650)*, Köln–Weimar 2011; Dieter Veldtrup, *Prosopographische Studien zur Geschichte Oppelns*, Berlin 1995; Klaus Richter, *Die Wirkungsgeschichte des deutschen Kartellrechts vor 1914: eine rechtshistorisch-analytische Untersuchung*, Tübingen 2007.

study, discusses legal issues of the functioning of craftsmanship, its organisational development and vocational education of craftsmen. In the first place, the author pointed out the internal evolution of the attitude towards craftsmanship after the political changes in 1989, however, it was only the membership of Poland in the European Union and the adaptation requirements to its legislation that brought about significant changes in craftsmanship. As a result of the adaptation to European legislation, the term “craftsman” has disappeared from economic statistics due to the application to craftsmen’s enterprises of a unified category of enterprises divided into small, medium-sized and large. It is therefore now difficult to determine what percentage of those who earn their living are engaged in craft trades. The problem is not solved by the data from craftsmen’s guilds, because after the abolition of the obligation to belong to these associations, they only include a part of entrepreneurs connected with the craftsmanship tradition. The profile of professions and crafts – acquired and performed by individual entrepreneurs has also changed in connection with “the development of services and opportunities offered by information and communication technologies” (p. 157). It is worth noting that Jasińska-Biliczak’s text has been covered by her own findings from scientific research she carried out⁵. She takes into account the development of the economy, the mechanisms and instruments operating in the local area, and provides them with the conclusions of an analysis of laws and ministerial regulations, reports from craft organisations, and also interpellations of Members of Parliament.

The fourth and last substantive part of the monograph, written by Dębicka-Ozorkiewicz, concerns the functioning of the economic self-government of crafts after 1989, discussed on the basis of an analysis of the organisational structure and operating directions of the Chamber of Crafts in Opole. Presenting the circumstances of its establishment in the Polish post-war reality and the current evolution of its tasks, the author drew attention to the internal organisational changes imposed in 1990–1991. Their symptom was the phenomenon of a kind of organisational crisis due to the fact that “the new economic order, decentralising the management of the economy, has lost sight of the specificity of craftsmanship,

⁵ Anna Jasińska-Biliczak, *Instrumenty wspierające sektor małych i średnich przedsiębiorstw na poziomie lokalnym*, [in:] *Gospodarka lokalna w teorii i praktyce*, eds. Ryszard Bról, Andrzej Sztando, Andrzej Raszkowski, Wrocław 2014, pp. 54–64; *eadem*, *Problem samozatrudnienia – rola i miejsce mikroprzedsiębiorstw w gospodarce lokalnej*, “Barometr Regionalny. Analizy i prognozy”, 2015; *eadem*, *Endogeniczne uwarunkowania rozwoju innowacyjnego sektora małych i średnich przedsiębiorstw w regionie – ujęcie teoretyczne i praktyczne*, Warszawa 2017.

its production, service and educational capacities” (p. 200). For this reason, she has devoted much space to the legal position of the Chamber of Crafts, the formation of its personal composition and the new range of activities after 1989, including its role in vocational training. The author has already explored a similar issue, which has been highlighted in this part of monograph⁶.

The last Part V of the reviewed work has a special and timeless value, as it consists of “Memoirs of Craftsmen”, most of them prepared by Maria Kalczyńska and Roman Śmietański. They consist of 20 stories of people creating the post-war history of Opole’s craftsmanship, presenting the “oral history” of witnesses and participants of the events presented in the Parts II and III of the study. They are closed by the bibliography and the annex containing a list of the personal composition of the statutory bodies of the Chamber of Crafts in Opole, from the start of their activities in July 1951 to 2017. The reviewed work is an interdisciplinary one, bringing together specialists of various scientific specialities. History is represented by Kurpiers and Musialik, economics by Jasińska-Biliczak and Dębicka-Ozorkiewicz, social sciences by Śmietański, bibliology by Kalczyńska. The authors were recruited from among the employees of the Faculty of Economics and Management of the Opole University of Technology and the Chamber of Crafts in Opole, whose President Tadeusz Staruch was the initiator of the study. The interdisciplinarity of the authors’ team made it possible to present the beginnings and functioning of Opole’s craftsmanship over the past seven centuries in a coherent and critical manner. The reviewed collective work may be a good example of scholarly work focused on the history of local professional groups.

⁶ Grażyna Dębicka, *Rzemieślnicza edukacja zawodowa partnerem rynku pracy Na przykładzie województwa opolskiego*, [in:] *Edukacja w społeczeństwie ryzyka*, vol. 2, Poznań 2007, pp. 35–42.

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Yaman Kouli, *Dolny Śląsk 1936–1956. Szybki rozwój i nieudana odbudowa. Wpływ wiedzy na produkcję przemysłową* [Lower Silesia 1936-1956. Rapid development and failed reconstruction. The impact of knowledge on industrial production], transl. Tomasz Dominiak, Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2018, 315 pp.

The economic history of Lower Silesia in the 20th century has been the subject of many studies by Polish and German historians, although the year 1945 has become a fixed date in historiography, separating the long period of German rule in Silesia from the incorporation of the eastern German territories into the Polish state following the border changes after World War II. For this reason alone, the attempt by Chemnitz University of Technology historian Yaman Kouli to discuss the economic history of the region from the mid-1930s to the mid-1950s should be greeted with interest. Similar curiosity is aroused by the announcement of an analysis of “the impact of knowledge on industrial production”. However, the categorical thesis in the title about the “rapid development” of Lower Silesia during the Third Reich and the “failed reconstruction” of its industrial potential after the end of the war raises doubts.

The work is divided into five chapters, the “Introduction” (*Wprowadzenie*) and the “Appendix” (*Dodatek*) with the explanation of the bilingual naming of towns and cities together with the list of industrial plants) basically according to the chronological and thematic key. Although the title outlines three issues, the axis of the narrative has become “the relationship between scientific knowledge and industrial production” (Chapter II), which found its conclusion in Chapter VI

in the description of the “results of the study”. The Author assumed in advance that the economic development of the lands incorporated into Poland in 1945 remained below their proper potential. He polemicized with the previous findings, which emphasized above all the war damage and the subsequent dismantling of industrial facilities, the lack of capital and labor, the lack of interest on the part of the Polish authorities in investing in the area, and the sense of provisionality prevailing among the settlers. Kouli considered it necessary to add to the catalog of problems analyzed the loss of “knowledge relevant to the production process” as a consequence of the displacement of the German population (p. 16). He thus addressed a factor that cannot be measured, in the context of the collapse of production levels in 1945 and the inconsistent displacement policy (first seeking to get rid of the German population quickly, then trying to stem its outflow).

In Chapter II, “The relationship between scientific knowledge and industrial production”, (*Związek pomiędzy wiedzą naukową i produkcją przemysłową*) the Author recalled three categories of knowledge – educational, empirical, and so-called knowledge networks – that affect the course of the production process. He considered “methodical capture of macroeconomic manifestations of knowledge” to be significant challenge. He concluded that the interdependence between material capital and knowledge networks could be examined using the example of parts of the former eastern provinces of Germany. For the displacement of the German population undoubtedly meant the dismantling of existing knowledge networks (p. 33).

Chapter III traces the development of industry in Lower Silesia in the years 1936–1945, pointing to the important role of this province in the German economic system. The Author’s goal was to determine the level of production potential in Lower Silesia and to try to answer the question of whether the region was an example of economic underdevelopment (such a thesis dominates in historiography). He also stressed right away that Lower Silesia is the most interesting of the former German eastern provinces because it is not explicitly agricultural or industrial. There was both a long tradition of textile industry and a strong agricultural sector. Here the Author explained the choice of the starting caesura of the work as a result of the preservation of sources, specifically the existence of the censuses of the Reich Statistical Office from 1936 (p. 49). He also firmly rejected opinions about the relatively large destruction of infrastructure during the war (with the exception of Wrocław). On the contrary, he emphasized that the industrial potential increased during the war years because armaments plants were moved to Lower Silesia from other parts of

Germany exposed to Allied bombing. In the Author's detailed description, Lower Silesia with its mines in Wałbrzych, machine industry, textile industry, cement plants, ceramic industry, and sugar factories appears to be an economically well-developed region, although it is far below the national average in terms of net output per capita. This observation led the Author to the preliminary conclusion that "economically, the eastern provinces of the Reich belonged to the periphery" (p. 65). However, a little further on he contradicted this thesis, writing that the diversified structure of industry and the education of its employees testified to the contrary (p. 73). Still further on, however, he has no doubt that "before 1939, Lower Silesia in terms of economic development lagged behind the German provinces located west of the Oder and Neisse rivers" (p. 84). He then softens this categorical assessment, writing that there was indeed a lag in some industries, but that these were not "hopelessly outdated" ones (p. 87). This is supposed to be evidenced by the increase in production in the years 1936–1939, although not as fast as on a national scale. An important thread of the analysis is the problem of war damage in Lower Silesia. Already in this chapter, the Author points out that the scale of destruction and dismantling had previously been "overemphasized" (p. 118).

In Chapter IV, the Author focused on the period after 1945 to examine the extent to which continuity in the region's industrial production was interrupted. Here he returns to the issue of destruction and citing previous literature, draws the conclusion that the destruction has been "overestimated". However, it should be noted that the material losses in the cities are very impressive, the destruction of 40% of the bridges and almost all the tunnels. The scale of postwar Soviet dismantling is a matter of dispute. The Author argues against the thesis that their scope was "enormous", but actually does not take a clear position on this issue. Nevertheless, he believes that they had the greatest impact on the decline in gross factory property compared to the effects of military operations and dismantling carried out by the Wehrmacht (p. 139). The consequences of material losses proved impossible to recover, for tabular comparisons of employment structure and production volumes over twenty-four years show significant declines (the exceptions being the production of sugar and electricity). Table 18, comparing the development of output of selected industrial products in 1936 and 1960, is particularly suggestive. It shows that declines were as high as 62% (paper production).

Chapter V addresses the consequences of the displacement of the Germans, but the Author dealt with the problem of postwar reconstruction in general, stating

that in fact “it is difficult to determine the reasons for the abandonment of reconstruction and shifts in production” (p. 201). From the Polish official documentation, where he found a number of requests from various workplaces under the Ministry of Industry (85% of the requests were from Lower Silesia) for a total of more than 50,000 German skilled workers, Kouli concluded that an important reason for the production problems was the lack of specialized labor. Analyzing the policy of the Polish authorities, the Author showed the existence of a dilemma of the administration, which, on the one hand, strived for the fastest possible Polonization of the new areas, and on the other, wanted to effectively launch industrial plants (p. 205). As it turns out, plans to retain professionals because of the benefits in kick-starting the economy played no role in the practice of resettlement. In this context, Kouli writes about the “asymmetry of interests of ministries and factories’ managements” (p. 238). The Polish authorities believed that it was sufficient that German specialists would train Polish workers as their successors in the same jobs. As Kouli states, this strategy failed. The drive to assimilate a group of tens of thousands of Germans is supposed to prove that German workers could not be replaced. The Author concludes that: “There was a high dependence between complementary workers and means of production, and it was not possible to transfer to Polish workers the knowledge necessary for good management” (p. 260).

In Chapter VI, being a summary, the Author took a very cautious approach to the task of formulating a final conclusion, emphasizing the title “the impact of knowledge on industrial production”. He stated that he had succeeded in proving a link between the failure of reconstruction in Lower Silesia and the loss of knowledge subjects, adding that “knowledge substitution” had failed. However, he left unanswered the question of whether abandoning the displacement of the German population would have prevented the economic problems (p. 278).

All in all, Yaman Kouli’s study is an interesting comparison of the situation in the region in the last years of the Third Reich with the first years of Polish administration in these lands. The Author makes use of quite a number of sources, both German and Polish, and moves among them cautiously, which is sometimes visible in the not very precise formulation of his opinion. Focusing on one problem, but with the (necessary) presentation of a very broad political, social, and economic background, resulted therefore in a kind of pretextual monograph, which actually is an attempt at an original look at the socio-economic history of Lower Silesia at the time of the historical breakthrough.

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Aneta Nisiobęcka, *Z Lens do Wałbrzycha. Powrót Polaków z Francji oraz ich adaptacja w Polsce Ludowej w latach 1945–1950* [From Lens to Wałbrzych. Return of Poles from France and their adaptation in the People's Republic of Poland in the years 1945–1950], Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2018, 400 pp.

The issue of post-war forced and voluntary population movements in the area of the Polish territory was raised many years ago in original studies by Krystyna Kersten, Tomasz Szarota and Franciszek Kusiak¹. The subject of the analysis undertaken by Aneta Nisiobęcka is the fate of Poles who arrived from France after World War II, and their confrontation with the realities of People's Republic of Poland. This topic has not been studied before, although it has been mentioned in the relevant literature. The year 2016 marked the 70th anniversary of the signing of the first Polish-French re-emigration agreement and the arrival of the first transport of Poles from Lens to Wałbrzych, the towns highlighted in the book's title.

The opportunity for an in-depth study of the subject did not come until after 1990, when access to French archival sources was opened up. The Author made use of it in a very conscientious manner, reaching in particular for materials of the local state administration and security apparatus. The research covered a considerable amount of files from archives located in 5 departments: Nord and Pas-de-Calais, Basses-Pyrénées (Atlantiques), Pyrénées Orientales and Arièges, i.e. those

¹ Krystyna Kersten, *Repatriacja ludności polskiej po II wojnie światowej (Studium historyczne)*, Wrocław 1974; Tomasz Szarota, *Osadnictwo miejskie na Dolnym Śląsku w latach 1945–1948*, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków 1969; Franciszek Kusiak, *Reemigracja polska po drugiej wojnie światowej. Udział w zasiedlaniu ziem zachodnich i północnych*, Wrocław 1995.

industrial regions of France where Polish emigrants were most numerous and where they declared their willingness to return to Poland. It is worth noting with approval that the Author has also examined many file groups in the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris and in Warsaw, mainly in the Central Archive of Modern Records. Whereas when investigating the meanders of Polish domestic policy towards re-emigrants in the years 1945–1950, she also explored the resources of the Archives of the Institute of National Remembrance in Warsaw and its branches in Kielce, Katowice, Kraków and Wrocław, as well as the Central Military Archives in Warsaw–Rembertów and the State Archives in Katowice.

The result of this extensive research is an exhaustive monograph (originally a doctoral dissertation), in which the issues of repatriation and re-emigration of Poles from France are combined with the process of their settlement in Lower Silesia, a mining region acquired after the war when the new Polish-German border was demarcated. The title of the book refers to Wałbrzych, the centre of the coal basin, because it was there that the largest number of emigrant families settled and the region is still sometimes called “Little France”. Nisiobęcka formulated her research objectives in several preliminary questions concerning the plans and expectations of the Communist authorities in Poland in relation to repatriation and re-emigration from France, the country which, despite the existence of the “Iron Curtain”, allowed from 1946 on the departure of miners, industrial and farm workers. The Author was interested in the position of the French Polish community regarding the prospect of repatriation and re-emigration and their level of awareness of the economic and political objectives of the Communist repatriation/re-emigration policy and of the internal realities of Stalinist Poland.

The narrative motivated by the above-mentioned research questions was presented in Part I of the book, titled “Polish emigration in France between 1918 and 1945” (pp. 27–94), in three separate chapters. In Chapter 1 she presented “The social and political causes of Polish emigration after World War I and their adaptation in France” immediately after the restoration of independence in 1918. The number of Poles emigrating from Poland, the location and course of their immigration was regulated by the Polish-French emigration convention of 3rd September 1919. Also so-called “Westphalians” were included in the group of Polish emigrants, i.e. miners and workers from the Prussian Partition employed in the mining and metallurgical industry in Westphalia and the Rhineland, who came to France after 1918. The change in French policy towards foreigners who turned out to be “undesirable” in the 1930s,

in the conditions of the World Depression, was presented by Nisiobęcka in Chapter 2, titled “Indésirables en France”. According to her findings, Polish immigrants made up a community of 324,840 people. The tragedy of Polish fate as a result of the hostile policy of the Vichy government and the internment of Poles in detention centres for foreigners is shown in Chapter 3, titled “The war and its impact on the situation of Poles in France during World War II”. She also considers their joint conspiratorial activities with the French in occupied France.

The most extensive Part II of the book, “The Return of Poles after the World War II” (pp. 97–247), is divided into four chapters. The Author began her narrative with “An analysis of the legal basis for repatriation and re-emigration” in Chapter 1, moving on to present “The reasons for the end of the re-emigration action in 1947” in Chapter 2. The next Chapter 3 presents “The organisation and course of the re-emigration action in France and the occupied zones in Germany”, while Chapter 4 assesses “The consequences of repatriation and re-emigration”. The book shows that, although the Polish authorities, dominated by Communists were keen to repatriate wartime emigrants (“dipis”), in economic terms it was more important for them a return of the “old” economic emigration, including miners, farm and industrial workers, mainly from north-eastern France. In total, this was a group of some 425,000 Poles at the time, including wartime emigration estimated at 100,000. Of these, only 47,000 became French citizens in 1936–1946. The Author’s findings show that the Communist authorities were counting on the arrival of about 250,000 people, i.e. all the war emigration and about 150,000 of the “old” emigration. The efforts for their return began when the Polish-German border on the Oder and Lusatian Neisse rivers was established in Potsdam. For the Communist authorities, the Polish settling and development of the so-called Recovered Territories was a key political task.

The issue of re-emigration and repatriation was the subject of negotiations by the Polish-French Joint Committee, during which it became clear that the expectations of both sides were divergent. The Polish side wanted to gain the miners and farm workers, and the French only wanted to keep the former, since Poles accounted for as much as 40% of the employees in their mines. The authorities in Warsaw were hoping for migrants from the Pas-de-Calais department, where Polish miners and their families accounted for some 90,000 inhabitants, with a further 55,000 living in Lens. Meanwhile, despite the maintenance of official talks, the French were negative about the miners’ re-emigration. Thus, as the Cold

War atmosphere grew, their position in the Commission became more rigid and more campaigns were launched by them to encourage miners to remain in France. The same effect was produced by the so-called “whispered propaganda” of supporters of the London government against the Communist authorities in Warsaw. Eventually, however, in 1946, on the basis of two interstate agreements signed with the Provisional Government of the French Republic (GPRF), including an agreement on repatriation, around 70,000–78,000 re-emigrants arrived in Poland in 1947. In Poland at that time, the total number of repatriates and re-emigrants reached 3,798,715 people. In the course of researching autobiographical accounts of re-emigrants, the Author found that return was declared more often by agricultural workers than by miners or textile and chemical industry workers. Yet information about the collectivisation of Polish agriculture had an inhibiting effect on the farm workers, so more they were war emigrants who declared their willingness to return.

The change in sentiment is reflected in the numbers of re-emigrants. As a result of the first Polish-French agreement of 20th February 1946 (concerning miners only), 5,029 of them and 12,854 of their family members returned to the country. It is worth mentioning that these were mainly people with Communist views, including participants in the Spanish Civil War, not assimilated into French society. They were convinced that in Poland they would receive social benefits and a higher professional status than in France. Some were also encouraged by the fact that, under the terms of the agreement, they could return with all their belongings at the expense of the Polish state. As a result of another agreement of September 1946, out of planned 2,000 farm workers’ families, only 450 arrived (a total of 1,712 people). Their return was under much worse conditions, as they had to contribute half of the travel costs and were deprived of the right to transport their belongings and livestock. The last of the re-emigrant groups, in 1947, was the most numerous, with 13,336 people – miners, farm and industrial workers. It was, however, less numerous than expected, due to the fact that the talks on re-emigration were held in the atmosphere of internal political conflicts in France and social and economic disputes among Polish circles, as well as contradictory reports from the pro-Warsaw and pro-London press.

The third and last part of Nisiobęcka’s book, “Processes of adaptation of the re-emigrants to the post-war conditions in Poland” (pp. 251–329), concerns the integration of the ‘French’ into the Stalinist reality of the time. It also includes three chapters showing that the newcomers negatively perceived the confrontation

with the Communist reality (Chapter I), experiencing a dilemma: to stay or to travel back? Some, more affluent, were more likely to choose to return, but the majority accepted conditions of difficult adaptation, struggling with gruelling working conditions, miserable housing and low pay. Their daily life turned out to be much more difficult than in France, but the efforts to return were done more by the younger generation (men and women), who felt alienated by their lack of language skills, and who were “both fellows and strangers” to their co-countrymen (Chapter 2).

Moreover, they did not feel safe in the Polish western lands, in the then atmosphere of total destruction and temporariness. Some of the re-emigrants, in order to eliminate this climate of alienation, joined “the Communist security organs”. Isolated from the Polish society, they became involved in the process of “consolidating” the “people’s power” and the Stalinist system, participating in the operational activities of the Ministry of Public Security and the Military Internal Service, i.e. organs which, earlier, immediately after their arrival to Poland, were persistently looking for spies and political enemies among them, subjecting them to surveillance. The most ideological Communists, including participants in the Spanish Civil War, sought employment in specifically closed and, at the same time, privileged environments, i.e. in the Militia and the Security Ministry, in the prison service and in the structures of intelligence service.

Therefore, their return to Poland turned out to be one of the significant migration movements after 1945 and allowed them to participate in the post-war political life. On the extent and effects of their activities the Author writes in Chapter 3, “The character of the role of re-emigrants in the Communist State Security organs”. She gives numerous examples that some of the re-emigrants with Communist convictions took up high positions in the Militia structures and in Internal Security offices or ministries, and were also employed in the prison service. Politically, they joined the process of “consolidation of the people’s power” and “tightening” the Stalinist system, which the society treated with caution and even hostility. The role of this group of privileged “Frenchmen” changed after Stalin’s death in 1953. With the political “Thaw” and the weakening of the Stalinist system, their status began to deteriorate rapidly. The process of further changes concerning them was summed up by the Author with the words “the inhuman system began to devour its own children who returned to build the socialist homeland”.

“WROCLAW MEETING WITH ECONOMIC HISTORY”, OR AN ATTEMPT TO REVIVE RESEARCH ON THE ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

“WROCLAWSKIE SPOTKANIA Z HISTORIĄ GOSPODARCZĄ”, CZYLI O PRÓBIE OŻYWIENIA BADAŃ NAD GOSPODARKĄ I SPOŁECZEŃSTWEM

Significant changes in the development of research conducted in Poland on the economy and society had already been observed since the 1970s. Since many historians in Wrocław had withdrawn from active academic life, including those who continued the work done before the war by Prof. Franciszek Bujak (1875–1953) at the Jan Kazimierz University in Lviv and his team. At the same time it was noticeable that many research topics were no longer being continued, for example the work conducted on the development of industry on Polish lands in the 19th and 20th centuries. These problems were observed not only among historians in Wrocław, but also throughout the country, in academic institutions carrying out historical research.

For many postwar years at the Institute of History of the University of Wrocław the organization of research in the field of economic and social history was led by Prof. Stefan Ingot (1902–1994), the founder (in 1946) of the Department of Economic and Social History, and then for many years the head of the Department of Economic History, Demography and Statistics. His death, and a little later also the death of his student Prof. Leszek Wiatrowski (1930–1997), meant the end of research on the Silesian village of the feudal period. Similarly, after the death of Prof. Marian Haisig (1908–1996), who specialized in the feudal period, no one undertook

work on the history of Silesian crafts in that epoch. The death of Dr Marian Wolański in 1991 had a similar effect, interrupting the research on the history of prices in Wrocław in the feudal times. Some of the results of Dr Marian Wolański's research were published thanks to the efforts of Prof. Wiatrowski, but at present there are no indications that this work will be resumed. There is concern that the research on Silesian industry conducted by Professors Waław Długoborski (1926–2021), Zbigniew Kwaśny (born 1930), and Stanisław Michalkiewicz (1930–2008) will also meet a similar fate. No students or successors were left by Prof. Aleksander Nyrek (b. 1930), who retired. He conducted research on the intersection of history and natural sciences, including research on fishery and forestry industry important in Silesia from the 16th to 19th century. Prof. Kazimierz Orzechowski (1923–2009), an outstanding expert on land ownership and the economic system of Silesia, and Prof. Karol Jonca (1930–2008), an expert on Upper Silesian industry, also passed away.

After Inglot's retirement he was replaced for many years by Prof. Z. Kwaśny, his student. Another of his student, Prof. Waław Długoborski, headed the Department of Economic History, then at the Wrocław University of Economics. His retirement took place before habilitation examinations were to take place in the newly established Department, so the authorities of the Academy turned to Prof. Kwaśny with a proposal to take over the management of the Department. For several years Prof. Kwaśny simultaneously headed the Department of Economic History, Demography and Statistics of the University of Wrocław and the Department of Economic History of the Academy of Economics. Undoubtedly, Prof. Kwaśny's management of those units was facilitated by the fact that both of them were staffed by graduates of the University of Wrocław's Institute of History and that Prof. Kwaśny and Prof. Długoborski were Prof. Inglot's students. The period in which Prof. Kwaśny combined both leading functions can be regarded as a harbinger of future significantly developed research by economic historians of both institutions. However, health perturbations began in this team and a collapse in the field of economic and social research, with a political background, became apparent, which was also observed in the whole country.

Our awareness of the difficulties faced by the Wrocław community of economic and social historians led the next generation of researchers to the attempt to start cooperation. In the 1990s I was appointed head of the Department of Economic History, Demography and Statistics at the Historical Institute of the

University of Wrocław, while Prof. Jędrzej Chumiński was coordinating the work of the Department of Economic History at the Academy of Economics. During a joint meeting of both teams we considered undertaking joint research. At that time we outlined plans for cooperation and made the first decisions. This led to an application for a ministerial grant, as a new research profile for the two institutions was needed. The subject of the research project contained in the question: *Modernization or apparent modernization? The socio-economic evaluation of the Polish People's Republic 1944–1989 (with particular emphasis on Lower Silesia)*. The issue was socially and scientifically important, so we received funding for our research, which was completed in 2010. Their tangible result is a publication¹.

Earlier, in connection with the 60th anniversary of Polish economic and social research in Wrocław, a conference was also planned, and was held in November 2006. The invitation to the conference was accepted and taken seriously by leading scientific centres in Poland. It was then decided then that such conferences would be organized annually, and that their topics would include key economic and social issues observed throughout Polish history. We decided to call this and other scientific meetings under the common name of “Wrocław Meetings with Economic History”. The participants of the conference welcomed our initiative with great enthusiasm. All of them saw in it a great opportunity to consolidate our community and, in the future, to undertake joint research projects on key economic and social problems not only of the Polish lands. These meetings were thus to become an important platform for cooperation and exchange of scientific views, with numerous representatives from leading scientific centres in Poland attending.

Since that first Meeting with Economic History in 2006, there have been 14 conferences documented by volumes of studies published after each Meeting. In 2009, the Meetings’ organizers were hosts of one of the sections of the 18th General Congress of Polish Historians, which took place in Olsztyn. In 2010, an initiative was taken to establish the Polish Society of Economic History, with Prof. Wojciech Morawski from the Warsaw School of Economics (Szkoła Główna Handlowa – SGH) as its first president. From 2019, after I retired, the organizational duties were taken over by Tomasz Głowiński, Professor of the University of Wrocław. Representatives of the Wrocław Branch of the Institute of National Remembrance also joined the scientific committee of the conference.

¹ *Modernizacja czy pozorna modernizacja? Społeczno-ekonomiczny bilans PRL 1944–1989 (ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem Dolnego Śląska)*, ed. Jędrzej Chumiński, Wrocław 2010, p. 488.

While the first two conferences clearly placed the interests of the organizers and panellists in the 19th-20th centuries, the subsequent ones did not have such chronological limitations. While the first two conferences clearly placed the interests of the organizers and speakers in the 19th-20th centuries, the following ones did not have such chronological limitations. In this way, we tried to encourage historians interested in other periods to participate in our meetings. And we gladly welcomed representatives of other sciences, and even strove to make our conferences interdisciplinary. We hosted geographers, hydrologists, cartographers and historians of cartography. More and more often historians reached for experiences and findings of other sciences in presenting their interdisciplinary works. We have noticed the presence of historians in our group, whom nobody would classify as historians of economic and social history. Nowadays, those who usually focus on political history, more and more often reach for the issues that are the main area of our interest. Each meeting brings a lasting trace of the discussions held, as each year has resulted in the publication of new comprehensive volumes of studies indicating the economic and social dimensions of the issues covered by the conference.

What did our initiative bring about? Today we no longer have any doubts that from the very beginning these meetings were treated as a very needed platform for the community to exchange views on key research problems concerning economic and social history. This impression has not changed. Although the current new requirements for the evaluation of the scientific activity of the staff have lowered the rank of participation in conferences compared to the previous requirements. However, in our community there is a conviction that these professional contacts are very much required.

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ŚLĄSKI KWARTALNIK HISTORYCZNY SOBÓTKA

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Śląski Kwartalnik Historyczny „Sobótka” wydawany jest we Wrocławiu od 1946 r., początkowo jako półrocznik i rocznik pod tytułem „Sobótka”, a od roku 1957 jako kwartalnik pod obecnym tytułem. Należy do najstarszych w Polsce regionalnych czasopism naukowych o profilu historycznym, pozostając ważnym elementem polskiej humanistyki. Uchodzi za jeden z najważniejszych periodyków śląskoznawczych, ale jego łamy pozostają otwarte również na materiały o innym zakresie tematycznym. Służy prezentacji wyników badań nad dziejami Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej – ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem Śląska, sąsiednich regionów i krajów, zarazem refleksji nt. dziejów regionalnych. Przez wiele lat pismo znajdowało się w gestii Wrocławskiego Towarzystwa Miłośników Historii (Polskiego Towarzystwa Historycznego), obecnie ukazuje się pod auspicjami Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego. Dodatkowe informacje o czasopiśmie znajdują się na stronie: <http://sobotka.uni.wroc.pl>, na której można znaleźć jego bieżące i archiwalne numery.

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